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What if the schools in our communities are not, in fact, failing? 
What if the massive dropout rates, poor test scores, and poor 
skill sets that even graduating students sometimes leave school 
with are the actual systemic goal?
In a remarkable series of essays spanning the last forty-five 
years, the influential Argentinian-Mexican philosopher Enrique 
Dussel develops a pedagogics of liberation. We need first and 
foremost, he argues, a thorough and deep critique of those exist-
ing pedagogical practices and curriculum — Dussel calls them 
“educational praxes of domination” — that attempt to assimi-
late the poor of the global south or of first nations, by school-
ing them in the dominant westernized culture, its high art, its 
mainstream ideology, and its ethos of individualism and com-
petition. The major result of such praxes is to impart a sense of 
failure among the poor, who of course constitute the majority of 
children and youth sitting in classrooms across the globe. And 
after inducing failure in these students, these “educational prax-
es of domination” then inculcate feelings of guilt and shame for 




Dussel’s focus is on the pedagogy of Latin America, where, 
for example, even today less than half of low-income children 
complete nine years of school.1 But his analysis of the effects of 
poverty and oppression and the persistent influence of colonial-
ism will apply to the global South in general as well as to many 
communities, neighborhoods, and schools in the global North. 
Dussel’s account applies everywhere that the children of labor-
ers, of the racially oppressed, and of colonized cultures are forci-
bly subjected to the pedagogies of the dominant class, until they 
become so alienated that they leave school with, as he says, “a 
bitter taste of failure.”2
In this introduction I will offer an analytical overview of 
Dussel’s account that situates his contribution to the philosophy 
of education within his philosophy of liberation and within de-
colonial theory today. His writings on pedagogy have included 
both a critical and a reconstructive aspect, criticizing some of 
the canonical theory that is still practiced in colonial settings 
and settler contexts, and offering the contours of a reconstructed 
pedagogy that draws mainly from Latin American social theory 
but also engages with radical European philosophy, particularly 
the work of Emmanuel Levinas. But what Dussel primarily of-
fers, I’ll suggest, is a philosophical scaffolding or grounding for 
a decolonial pedagogy.
The decolonial turn is a relatively recent development in so-
cial theory so I begin with a brief account of the three major 
ways in which it is distinct from the older and more familiar 
postcolonial rubric that emerged in the 1970s. Dussel’s work has 
been a major influence in the decolonial turn, and so this will 
also help introduce what is distinctive about his approach.3
1 See for example, the resources provided by the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank’s “Graduate XXI” project: http://www.graduatexxi.org/en/re-
cursos/. There is variation across countries yet a persistent lack of progress 
among poor children in rural areas.
2 All the quotations from Dussel’s pedagogical essays come from this Backer/
Diego translation.
3 See Nelson Maldonado-Torres, “Thinking Through the Decolonial Turn: 
Post-continental Interventions in Theory, Philosophy and Critique: An In-
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Decolonial theory has emerged today in some measure as 
a reaction against what theorists saw as weaknesses in postco-
lonial thought. Postcolonial thought was and continues to be 
revolutionary in many of our disciplines in making the case for 
subaltern studies, in reaching beyond the nationalist narratives 
of colonial and even comprador elites, in putting the history of 
colonialism into the center of analysis in everything from liter-
ary theory to the European Enlightenment, and in mobilizing 
new thinking about the nature of domination and resistance 
that departs from or at least goes beyond Marxist categories.
Yet postcolonial thought had limitations, one of which was 
to continue to rely too much on European radical social theory, 
post-structuralist or postmodernist theory in particular. The 
critique often made, that postcolonial theorists were mostly 
working in institutions of the global North, is less important 
than the issue of where their theoretical resources are coming 
from. As Dussel has argued, the liberatory theories that enliv-
ened the transformative hopes of much of the world throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries developed from basical-
ly five countries, all from the global North. These theories were 
borne of that local experience. Social conflict was not given a 
racial or ethnic cast, nor was the international division of labor 
a central analytic. Capitalism was not explained as a develop-
ment out of, or alongside, colonialism, but as a replacement for 
European feudalism. As a result, liberatory social theories, in-
cluding Marxism, developed no theory of race, no conceptual-
ization of xenophobia, no critique of Eurocentrism, no concept 
of indigeneity, no analysis of the deep ties between culture and 
colonialism, and no analysis of the ways in which geographical 
hierarchies affect the making of theory itself.4
A few of the late-twentieth-century post-structuralist theo-
rists began to attend (in a limited way) to race and colonialism 
but retain serious limitations in their understanding of colonial 
troduction,” Transmodernity 2, no. 1 (2011): 1–15.
4 See Linda Martín Alcoff, “Educating with a (De)Colonial Consciousness,” 
Lápiz 1 (2014): 78–92.
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categories of identity and histories of resistance. Their theories 
and concepts are grounded in European experiences, textual 
traditions, and local histories. Foucault’s own analysis of the de-
velopment of disciplinary techniques, for example, is seriously 
compromised by his focus on France as a nation emerging from 
inter-ethnic European conflicts rather than as a colonial empire. 
The European radical tradition is not only limited but its analy-
ses have been flawed in ways decolonial scholars are now think-
ing through.
The debate that occurred over Edward Said’s Orientalism 
when it was first published in 1978 is instructive. Critics (from 
the global North) charged Said with being too loose with Fou-
cault, not being faithful, as it were, to Foucault’s account. Said 
was bringing in issues about the subject position of orientalists, 
their national and racial identities. His analysis was quite nu-
anced but this still went against the grain of the early postmod-
ern catechisms about the “death of the author.” In other words, 
Said was not allowed to make his own use of Foucault, to take 
what he found helpful and leave behind the rest. He was en-
joined to be a loyal subject. Certainly there are legitimate con-
cerns about scholarship and theoretical eclecticism, yet Said was 
not writing a scholarly interpretation of Foucault’s ideas but a 
critical analysis of orientalism.
Theoretical work on coloniality should make use of every 
available tool, but be aware of the hierarchies of citation that 
track the colonial world even in our current academic circu-
lations. Quoting the latest European theorist continues to get 
more traction, and signifies more theoretical sophistication, 
than quoting theorists from the colonial world that may be 
relatively unknown in the academies of the north. Implicit bias 
works in the field of radical social theory.
A second major distinction between the decolonial and the 
postcolonial concerns is the time frame of analysis. Postcolonial 
scholarship began with the seventeenth century understandably 
as a project of subaltern studies in south Asia. Their focal point 
for colonialism was the British incursions which involved the 
creation of new colonial governments over territories that were 
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not nationally unified, the importation of a class of administra-
tors who would become overseers and bring their own Euro-
pean families with them rather than intermarrying with local 
people, and the particularity of British ideas about everything 
from common law to education and protestant values. The ex-
perience of colonization in the Americas that began two cen-
turies earlier took quite a different form, involving sanctioned 
intermingling (from Cortés on), educational institutions as ex-
tensions of Catholic missions, relatively independent colonial 
governments with systems of land distribution and tributes or-
ganized as gamonales and encomiendas, and most importantly, 
a racialization of the labor force. From Columbus’s journals we 
can chart the beginnings of a conversation about the labor po-
tential of various groups that began to connect emerging ideas 
about human difference with behavioral dispositions and intel-
lectual potential, not to mention social and even human status, 
all developed within a project of colonizing a labor force. Co-
lumbus did not encounter societies with racial concepts; the 
Europeans began to create the modern world racial system still 
in place today.5 Hence, the constructions of racial difference 
preexisted the emergence of capitalism in the Americas, mak-
ing it harder, if we start here, to dodge the fact that capitalism 
has been a racial capitalism since day one. Clearly, colonialism 
in the Americas had temporal priority in the grand scheme of 
European empires, putting into place techniques of bureaucra-
tization, population management, governmentality, biopower, 
religious education, standardized time, and social reproduction 
that became the foundation for colonizing practices in Asia and 
Africa.6 European colonialism was not monolithic. The Spanish 
and British styles sharply diverged over the question of inter-
marriage, for example. Yet the point remains that eighteenth-
5 See Ramón Grosfoguel, “The Epistemic Decolonial Turn,” Cultural Studies 
21, nos. 2–3 (2007): 211–23.
6 See Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Ob-
ject (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).
16
pedagogics of liberation
century colonialisms built on and learned from the sixteenth 
century.
Most importantly, by beginning an analysis of the effects of 
coloniality with the conquest of the Americas rather than the 
incursions into South Asia, we have an altered understanding of 
the role of emerging ideas about race and the status of Europe as 
the vanguard of the human race. By the eighteenth century the 
Europeans understood themselves to have a distinct racial iden-
tity from those they colonized, and this understanding is ap-
parent in both the liberal and the radical traditions from Locke, 
Kant, Hegel, Mill, and Marx. Contemporary radical European 
thought has yet to put either race or colonialism on its agenda.
The third difference between decolonial theory and postco-
lonial theory follows from these first two differences. Given the 
lacunae in radical European theory on many important topics, 
decolonial theorists today have a renewed interest in the theo-
retical developments that came along with the national libera-
tion movements of the twentieth century. Postcolonial theory in 
some ways had to differentiate itself from the tradition of anti-
colonial writing by Césaire, Fanon, Cabral, Senghor, Nkrumah, 
C.L.R. James, and others who had produced the main canon 
of theory up until the 1970s. Much of this tradition was itself 
engaged with radical European social theory and made good 
use of liberalism, existentialism, Marxism, and psychoanalysis. 
These particular nineteenth and mid-twentieth century Euro-
pean traditions of thought were ones that the later postcolonial 
theorists had a great deal of skepticism about, mainly for their 
subject- centered nature, inflated ideas about individual agen-
cy, and historical progressivism. So for some decades this rich 
canon of mid-century anti-colonial thought fell out of favor and 
was rarely taught or debated.
Decolonial theorists today are taking a new look at this can-
on. The point is not to revive and revere it intact. Its omission of 
gender and sexuality, weak intersectional analysis, and assump-
tion of subject-centered nationalist projects merits ongoing 
criticism. And yet the texts themselves belie simplistic readings. 
So there is an attempt today to repair the broken links between 
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different periods of anticolonial thought, to take a larger histori-
cal frame of reference on the coloniality of power, to be wary of 
European theory idolatry, and to recognize the heterogeneity of 
European colonialisms.7
Dussel’s work has been a crucial influence in the decolonial 
turn by his global framing and his focus on the conquest of the 
Americas as the critical starting point. His own philosophical 
training was heavily European, but I would argue that his work 
on the philosophy of liberation, emerging from the theology of 
liberation, itself represents an approach indigenous to the west-
ern hemisphere. Before turning to his writings on pedagogy I 
will begin with some remarks on his philosophy of liberation.
Dussel points out that the colonies were a central, causal, and 
constitutive feature of modernity, including the European En-
lightenment, and that the colonized parts of the world actually 
had some intellectual and political advantages over the myopic 
tendencies of the Europeans.8 Turning the tables on Hegel’s as-
sessment of the colonies as historically static and philosophi-
cally sterile, Dussel presents Hegel’s errors — his rush to judg-
ment about peoples and cultures he knew little about and his 
overly confident characterization of the German epistemologi-
cal standpoint — as prime evidence that Hegel’s own geographi-
cal location in fact presented epistemological obstacles, a classic 
case of what some call the epistemology of ignorance.9 But on 
Dussel’s view, Hegel is in no way absolved on the grounds of 
these contextual considerations: Hegel’s is a willful ignorance 
and his invention of developmental modernism served to jus-
tify a lack of investigation. Hegel himself believed history and 
7 Besides Dussel, readers might consult the work of Rámon Grosfoguel, Wal-
ter Mignolo, Sylvia Wynter, Paget Henry, and Lewis Gordon, among others.
8 Enrique Dussel, Ethics of Liberation: In the Age of Globalization and Ex-
clusion, trans. Alejandro A. Vallega, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Eduardo 
Mendieta, Yolanda Angulo, and Camilo Pérez Bustillo (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2013). This argument is elaborated in the book’s introduc-
tion.
9 See, e.g., Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana, eds., Race and the Epistemolo-
gies of Ignorance (New York: SUNY Press, 2007).
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culture to have philosophical relevance, but for him this fact did 
not support relativism but an absolutist justification of his own 
epistemological standpoint. It was only because Hegel wrote 
from Europe that he could write of Man. A major task Dussel 
takes up is to show how this idea has been maintained in West-
ern-influenced philosophies from Weber through Habermas.
In contrast, Dussel acknowledges the non-universal nature 
of his own context of enunciation. Like every other Latin Amer-
ican philosopher since El Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, Dussel has 
been forced to contemplate how his context is situated with re-
spect to the regime of European truth. Dussel accepts Hegel’s 
view about the relevance of location and the necessity of reading 
the history of philosophy in light of the history of the world. 
Hence, historical location is inevitably a part of philosophical 
thought, and philosophical thought is advanced via a dialec-
tic. But crucially, Dussel drops Hegel’s developmentalism and 
redefines the local in a more global frame. Europeans largely 
denied that European modernity was dependent on the trans-
national flows of ideas and goods that colonialism intensified, 
and instead characterized their Enlightenment as “self-caused,” 
to mimic Aquinas’s characterization of God. In contrast, Dus-
sel maintains that modernity has always been a decentralized, 
global phenomenon. As a result, there is no local that can pro-
claim itself to be the vanguard. There is only domination and 
a plethora of global victims. Dussel replaces the Hegelian per-
spectivism grounded in an imagined developmentalist trajec-
tory of time with a materialist perspectivism grounded in the 
geography of place, both literal and structural. The world looks 
differently depending on who is doing the looking.
From his own spatial location (in exile in Mexico since the 
right-wing military coup in Argentina forced him to leave the 
country in 1975), Dussel deconstructs not only Hegel’s coloni-
al developmentalism but also his central thesis: that the story 
of human history is the story of the advancement of freedom. 
Dussel rejects Hegel’s claim that freedom is the central crite-
rion that establishes whether progress has been achieved. For 
Hegel freedom is the central concept for both history and phi-
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losophy, since it alone drives the dialectic and explains histori-
cal ruptures and motivates the cunning of reason and the on-
going growth of human understanding. The freedom to move, 
to grow, to expand, to create the conditions for autonomy, and 
also, we might silently think, the freedom to vanquish anyone 
who stands in the way. Because, for Hegel, freedom is the story 
of human history, the development of freedom countermands 
every other consideration, ethical or otherwise. In contrast, for 
Dussel the central concept is life, material life. The ultimate ethi-
cal criterion is not freedom but the “reproduction or develop-
ment of the life of each human subject in the community.”10 Sys-
tems — whether philosophical, political, or economic — which 
thwart and inhibit the reproduction or development of material 
life are invalid.
Yet, in a sense, to value life is to value the creative capacity: 
human beings being what they are, the nature of life can never 
coexist with stasis or the cessation of movement and develop-
ment. Citing the Chilean biologist and philosopher Humberto 
Maturana, Dussel puts this as follows: “We are a moment of 
autopoietic life.”11 Hence, the protection of life will protect the 
capacity to continue the open-ended movements of history. He-
gelian freedom, at least in some of its iterations, has served as an 
alibi for the destruction of life, even whole cultural communi-
ties. For Dussel, Hegel doesn’t understand freedom. By making 
freedom more important than material life he in fact diminishes 
freedom. In Dussel’s rendering, the protection of material life 
will maximize the creative capacity of the species.
Dussel suggests that the struggle of victims (defined as all 
those excluded from the very ability to maintain and secure 
their lives12) is to discover non-truth, non-validity, and non-effi-
cacy. Echoing Adorno here, Dussel holds that to make sense of 
the fact that the impoverishment of the majority of the world’s 
people and the imminent danger of eco-suicide are not on the 





agenda of dominant systems of thought, we need to cultivate a 
skepticism toward the intelligible, the valid, and the true. Only 
through discovering the fundamental lack in currently domi-
nant systems, processes, and values can the community of vic-
tims reach toward creative, reconstructive formulations.
And so, for Dussel, the agenda of a philosophy of liberation 
must include a commitment to a critique of vanguardism in all 
forms and an enactment of a democratic epistemology in which 
the source of knowledge is understood to be communal rather 
than technocratic and elitist.13 He argues that the central role in 
liberation is always played by the excluded and the victims who 
have proven over and over their capacity for insight and creativ-
ity. The social movements, counter-discourses, and reconceived 
institutions that communities of the activist oppressed continu-
ously create are what drives liberation:
The subject of the praxis of liberation is the living, needy, 
natural, and thus, cultural subject, and in the last instance 
the victim, the community of victims, and those who are co-
responsibly articulated with it.14
Finding non-truth, non-validity, and non-efficacy cannot 
happen without acknowledging the epistemic resources of eve-
ryday existence in the lives of victims, the true agents of ethical 
criticism and reconstruction.
This brings us to the task of decolonizing the sphere of educa-
tion. These core elements of the philosophy of liberation — the 
central focus on material life, the creative capacity of victims, 
and the need for a democratic epistemology in order to reach 
the exteriority of the current system — can be discerned in Dus-
sel’s writings on education.
For Dussel, what it would mean to decolonize pedagogy, I 
want to suggest, involves making two major methodological 





and a shift from ideal to non-ideal approaches. Though related, 
these shifts are distinct. A naturalized philosophy of education 
would base descriptive analysis on the actual practice of teach-
ing as it is embedded in the cross-generational work of com-
munity reproduction, while the non-ideal approach then takes 
real world conditions to craft pedagogical norms or prescrip-
tions. Both of these methodological approaches are enacted in 
his writings on education.
The naturalized approach Dussel advances begins not with 
the prescriptive question about what kind of workforce our edu-
cational institutions today should be preparing for the future, 
what assortment of skills our economy needs right now, but 
with the question of how a given community of adults interacts 
with a given community of children and youth in material and 
concrete ways given their different positionality with respect to 
the temporal dimension of collective life. In other words, the 
naturalized approach takes the perspective of the most funda-
mental and material aspect of education: the cross-generational 
encounter. Dussel calls this the question of the pedagogic, as dis-
tinct from pedagogy, to distinguish “the science of teaching or 
learning,” or pedagogy, from “that part of philosophy that thinks 
through face-to-face relationships.” In this context the face-to-
face relationships occur across differences of status but within 
relationships of care, such as father–son, teacher–disciple, doc-
tor–patient, and politician–citizen. Each of these sorts of rela-
tionships defy the expectation of equality, are enacted through 
difference, and are guided by the dictates of care as well as the 
material necessity of communal reproduction and regeneration.
Thus the question of the pedagogical begins with the child in 
a household and concludes with an adult who shares responsi-
bility for their community. The young have a different relation-
ship to the future, and a larger set of needs and vulnerabilities. 
The encounter between individual teachers and students occurs 
with these differences of temporality and condition always al-
ready in place, affecting the nature of the interaction, its stakes, 
and its outcome. Dussel reminds us that cross-generational en-
counters between human beings involve, in the first instance, 
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bodies and breasts, the provision of sustenance, comfort, and 
safety, and that the face-to-face-encounter between generations 
always occurs against a backdrop of impassable differences. This 
does not entail that children are never empowered vis-à-vis 
adults, but that the temporal differences cannot be set aside as 
tangential or something that can be transcended.
Dussel’s naturalistic language should be read as a feature of 
his Levinasian-inspired phenomenology. But unlike Emmanuel 
Levinas, Dussel’s naturalism is not paired with decontextualized 
generalities about the existential grounds for ethics, but with a 
political analysis of the concrete and material histories of the 
present. To take a naturalistic view requires an analysis of ma-
terial realities in all their variation. Thus, for Dussel, the ques-
tion of cross-generational encounters cannot be approached in 
terms of global generalities alone, but in relation to actual cul-
tural communities who are attempting to provide sustenance, 
comfort, and safety as well as ensure their communal regenera-
tion under very specific conditions.
Dussel’s approach here parallels a similar move that was 
made some decades ago in the sub-disciplines of philosophy of 
science and epistemology, shifting from an attempt to rationally 
reconstruct the process of justifying theories after the fact to a 
project of describing how scientists actually pursue their inquir-
ies in the moment, in the laboratory, in the process of collec-
tive work.15 Idealized portrayals of scientific determinations that 
occluded sociological and non-rational influences were then 
replaced in this naturalized approach by more accurate charac-
terizations that involved, for example, instances of negotiation. 
Naturalizing the philosophy of science made it possible to pro-
vide better assessments, evaluations, and eventually prescrip-
tions based on actually existing practice. Hence, a naturalized 
approach considers science not in the idealized terms of “Man’s 
Journey of Discovery,” but as consisting of actual research teams 
15 See, e.g., Ronald N. Giere, “Naturalized Philosophy of Science,” Routledge 




created through the vagaries of racist and sexist institutions 
controlled by capital interests with quite specific practical aims. 
Science can then be seen for what it is, grounded in human need 
and both enabled and challenged by every social dynamic in its 
context, including political and economic ones.
Thus I suggest first of all that we read Dussel as perform-
ing a similar function by naturalizing philosophy of education, 
and moving theory into the temporal, generational reality of hu-
man social reproductions under quite specific conditions. On 
the one hand, this brings to the fore the general condition of 
community survival and continuation as the constituting mo-
tive of pedagogical practice, while on the other it allows for a 
re-contextualization of specific schoolrooms in specific social 
moments, with actual faculties created through the vagaries 
of hierarchical social structures rather than imagined in their 
ideal state. In other words, the naturalistic frame is what pro-
duces both Dussel’s expansive outlook on education as well as 
his focus on actual practices within contexts of domination. The 
general charge of continuity must be adduced within actually 
existing conditions.
The second methodological shift Dussel is making is the 
move to non-ideal theory. To repeat what I said earlier, this 
move is related yet distinct from the naturalistic move. The 
point of a naturalized philosophy of education is to argue that 
descriptive analysis should be based in the practices embedded 
in the cross-generational work of community reproduction. The 
point of the non-ideal approach is primarily prescriptive, tak-
ing real world conditions in local contexts to craft pedagogical 
prescriptions.16 This is a recent push in social theory and phi-
losophy, coming particularly from a number of critical race 
philosophers and feminists. The tradition of European political 
philosophy has been shaped by texts such as Plato’s Republic, 
Hobbes’s Leviathan, Thomas More’s Utopia, and John Rawls’s 
Theory of Justice, all of which put forth ideals out of imagined 




generic thought experiments unconstrained by sociological re-
alities. One must have such decontextualized ideals, it has been 
argued, before one can identify specific shortcomings in a cur-
rent society or justify projects for redress. The ideal precedes 
the non-ideal. Against this, non-ideal theorists hold that the 
work of developing political and ethical norms requires before 
anything else an assessment of real world, non-ideal conditions. 
Norms of practice will emerge from an understanding of the ob-
stacles we encounter now, the challenges we face in this context. 
This means our norms are no longer universal, timeless, generic.
Dussel’s anti-pedagogy is grounded in an awareness of pov-
erty and colonialism, racism and sexism, and new forms of op-
pressions that are constantly articulated in social movements. In 
Dussel’s view, the activist oppressed are not in need of ideal the-
ory crafted through the thought experiments of elites to mount 
campaigns or develop new theory.
In Emile, or on Education, Jean-Jacques Rousseau himself of-
fered a pedagogy of liberation grounded in the European En-
lightenment ideals of a universal culture that would nurture the 
creative capacity of free minds and noble hearts. This idea of a 
universal culture legitimated the ideal-theory approach to the 
philosophy of education, with no need for contextually specific 
norms. Dussel turns to Rousseau repeatedly as a foil, a contrast, 
an exemplary mistake. His principal criticism is that the ideal 
of universal culture that Rousseau advocates for trades on the 
destruction of actually existing cultures. And so Rousseau in-
structs the teacher that it makes no difference whether the child 
has a father or mother. In any case, their particular genealogy 
has no bearing on the universal culture to which they should 
assimilate. The condition of the child’s actually existing cultural 
community is irrelevant. Rousseau’s utopian vision of a univer-
sal culture is thus no amalgamation or sublation of what exists 
and has existed; it is a substitution based on erasure. The child’s 
own culture of origin (or their people’s culture) can be justifiably 
ignored.
Given this overall orientation, the teacher is then positioned 
not as the generational equivalent of the parent, or as the par-
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ent’s partner or collaborator in pursuing the cross-generational 
work of survival. Rather, in Rousseau’s approach the teacher is 
the anti-parent, the pure, unsituated representative of universal 
or transcendental value pitted against the particular way of life 
of the child’s own community.
Educators have often been presented as correctives to com-
munity conventions in this way and hence as oppositional to the 
other influences being exerted on children and youth, especially 
those coming from parents and communities. Such teachers are 
then understandably eyed with suspicion by the community 
and with defensiveness or outright antagonism by the parent. 
For impoverished parents with little formal education, this may 
be a competition in which they lack the confidence to engage, 
with no hope to win. Rousseau insists that the student should 
observe a unilinear command structure, obeying only the teach-
er. His is a pedagogy that commands rather than inspires. To the 
extent it is followed without challenge, Dussel holds that it can-
not but ensure the further subordination of oppressed commu-
nities, not their survival, but their eradication. It is ideal theory 
enacting colonization and oppression.
As an alternative, Dussel argues for an “anti-Emile” that 
would reverse the power relations presented by Rousseau. In 
reality, the teacher is never a representative of universal culture 
coming to enlighten with a prior grasp on the truth. In real-
world contexts today such narratives only provide cover for 
pedagogies that are Eurocentric and colonizing. The teacher and 
the parent are in actuality correlative in their generational rela-
tionship to the child and youth. Both are involved in the process 
of the cross-generational encounter. In Rousseau’s view, the par-
ent represents stasis, while the teacher represents advance, as if 
only the teacher–student relation has a temporal orientation to-
ward the future. But both are engaged in a face-to-face relation 
to students/children as the harbingers of a future.
Dussel departs from Rousseau’s authoritarianism in the 
name of enlightenment to insist on the relationality of the teach-
er–student and parent–child encounter. Because it is always a 
relationality across temporal distance, it resists the stasis that 
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worries Rousseau and contains inherently creative possibilities. 
This temporal distance makes the child or youth an “Other”: 
“The child cannot be a possibility for the parents because his 
being is not founded in their project, rather it transcends them.” 
The child reaches “beyond the most extreme possibility of [the 
parents’] world,” constituting “another world, another human.”
Moreover, teachers are also in material relations with their 
students. The teacher cannot imagine himself, as Rousseau 
would have it, as an
aseptic preceptor, identified with the gods nor nature. The 
teacher is such, of a certain sex, a determined moment, a 
community and State, a nation, a social class, an era of hu-
manity, with its doctrines and theories. […] He therefore 
does not have the right to present himself before the disci-
ple as if he had all the rights, and especially the right to be 
obeyed without limit, like the preceptor in Emile.
Hence, the teacher–student relation is a temporal relation be-
tween two materially specific beings, and is therefore subject 
to the ethics of self/Other relations. The cross-generational en-
counter can neither be a one-way process of imparting Truth, 
nor one that abdicates the responsibility of the older generation 
or denies their influence. It must evolve a relationship through 
the praxis of mutual listening, what he calls the conditio sine qua 
non of agapē or moral love.
Such mutuality is negated and rendered impossible by Rous-
seau’s commandist pedagogy that mistrusts the child, as well as 
the parents and their community, rendering impossible a praxis 
of dialogue and mediation. Yet for Dussel, the role of the teacher 
is far from passive, but also involves active intervention. How, 
then, is the praxis of mutual listening coordinated with — ena-
bling of — intervention on his account?
Consider the real-world context of cross-generational en-
gagements with students from subordinated communities that 
face colonialism. In these scenarios, teachers are generally hired 
to teach the “truths” of the current system, with the system’s self-
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legitimation implicitly (or sometimes explicitly) integrated into 
a curriculum and practice designed to impart the belief that the 
current social order is “natural, eternal, and sacred,” the best of 
all possible worlds. Yet, the higher or superordinate task of the 
teacher is a perpetual striving to discern truth, and not to simply 
parrot existing regimes of accepted doxa. In the case of relat-
ing to a subordinated student sitting in a colonized classroom, 
this will necessarily involve constructing an exteriority to the 
system, Dussel argues. Such an exteriority provides an outlook 
upon which the current situation in which the student is posi-
tioned can be rendered subject first to observation and then to 
evaluative analysis.
Constructing an exteriority will then involve what Dussel 
has called “analectical reasoning,” or the reasoning that reaches 
beyond the simple dialectics of response and reaction to a space 
on the far side of what is intelligible within the terms of the cur-
rent thought and practice. Subordination itself can be rendered 
almost invisible within an orientation such as Rousseau’s that 
portrays commandist education as the gift of enlightenment 
rather than the destruction of difference and the threat to a 
community’s survival. To animate the students’ own critical fac-
ulties in such a situation requires reaching beyond the sphere 
of the currently imaginable, reaching toward an exteriority in 
which the child or youth is conceptualized as coming from a 
particular culture with something to offer, in which the child or 
youth is seen as having the capacity to think creatively and not 
simply obey. Hence, the teacher must actively intervene in order 
to reveal the exteriority that lies outside of colonizing curricu-
lum for the analectical reasoning in which, then, mutual listen-
ing between student and teacher can occur.
In this sense, the child becomes an anti-Emile. Dussel writes 
that it is “Malinche’s child who says [w]e are not orphans. Let 
us simply recognize our real and humble origins.” Where Rous-
seau proposes to transform the student into someone capable 
of transcending their humble origins, Dussel insists, with Jose 
Martí, Gustavo Guttierez, Octavio Paz, José Carlos Mariátegui, 
and others in this tradition that those origins neither can, nor 
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should be, denied or denigrated. When young radical activists 
in colonized communities find it impossible to identify with the 
imago patris or State or Patriarch in Power, this is continually 
misread as a manifestation of Freudian Oedipalism or the inevi-
tability of generational revolt. Such frames obscure the contex-
tual conditions of resistance. For Dussel, resistance in colonial 
contexts is a claiming of exteriority, a decolonial consciousness.
Dussel reminds us that, originally, indigenous teachers were 
also doctors, lawyers, psychiatrists, artists, and priests. That is, 
they performed a variety of roles in communities and with the 
young, including protecting, advocating for, adjudicating, ana-
lyzing, serving, and inculcating into religious life. There was no 
posture of neutrality or of being the transcendent representative 
of a universal that existed beyond communal life. Rather than 
passive servants, they were tlamatines, or wisdom leaders.
How does a teacher enable a student to imagine the impos-
sible? The first task must be to address the teacher’s own imagi-
nary representations of the epistemic condition of the student. 
If the teacher imagines the child as a tabula rasa, as the modern 
Europeans did, or, conversely, imagines the task of teaching as a 
process of animating the child’s existing memory, as the Ancient 
Greeks did, a pedagogy of liberation will be beyond reach. Nei-
ther erasure of the child’s past nor mere repetitive reinscription 
of that past correctly represents the cross-generational relation 
in which the student is recognized as an agential subject. If, on 
the other hand, the teacher–student relation is correctly under-
stood as an encounter between subjects, then students must be 
conceptualized as active epistemic agents, neither empty vessels 
nor merely the unthinking stewards of prior cultural knowl-
edge. Dussel describes the pedagogy that can emerge from a 
cross-generational relation in which students are recognized as 
epistemic subjects as a “creative revelation.” He says,
the teacher cannot simply deposit a certain amount of 
knowledge as acquisitions […], rather he must transmit what 
is acquired, but from the existential situation of the student 
and from the way in which his creative revelation arrives to 
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confound itself with the proper problematizing invention of 
the student.
This type of “transmission” is what he calls the pedagogical ana-
lectic.
In reality, the universal culture that educational institu-
tions imagine themselves to be imparting to students still today 
emerges without imaginative work since it is a mirror of elite 
culture. Dussel says “[t]he praxis of pedagogical domination 
is based on the postulate that there is no other possible speech 
than that which expresses the meaning of the established world.” 
In this case the teacher–father–state is in a relation of domina-
tion, not dialogue, with the student–child–community, as Freire 
argued.17 In the colonial context this means that only the cul-
tural national elite is accorded the role of active subject. To the 
extent creative intelligence is nurtured, it is only that creativity 
conformable to the current system’s needs and goals.
Decolonial approaches to pedagogy have rightfully insisted 
that colonized cultures have rich resources of knowledge which 
should be acknowledged in the curriculum. This can lead to 
the concern that a decolonial approach is mainly intended to 
conserve existing conventions of thought and practice in sub-
jugated communities and are thus counterposed to critique and 
transformation. Dussel’s writings on pedagogy offer an answer 
to this concern. 
To decolonize pedagogy, for Dussel, is not about conserving 
intact any system or culture as it exists today, but about recog-
nizing the analectical need to think exteriority in order to ena-
ble a critical analysis of existing doxa. Only in this way can what 
he calls “ontological novelty” be interjected into the system, be-
yond what is today the true, the valid, and the efficacious. But 
constructing exteriority requires dialogue, a reaching across of 
the generational chasm, and thus an ethics of relationality that 
acknowledges the full historical condition and materiality of all 
participants. For this, teachers need a collaborative approach 
17 See Dussel’s discussion of Freire in Dussel, Ethics of Liberation, 311–20.
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that recognizes their own need to learn about the child or stu-
dent’s actual reality. The teacher is not pitted in perpetual op-
position to the subordinated communities of their students, but 
to the national cultures of empire that incapacitate material life 
and ethical relationships of all sorts. For this the teacher may 
indeed run the risk of persecution and exile.
— Linda Martín Alcoff 




Luis José González, editor of the short standalone volume La 
Pedagogica Latinoamericana by Enrique Dussel (the title of 
which we have rendered, at Dussel’s suggestion, Pedagogics of 
Liberation: A Latin American Philosophy of Education) intro-
duced readers to the book by noting that Dusselian discourse is 
peculiar. It takes a little getting used to. Once one gets used to it, 
though, the terms are powerful contributions to philosophy of 
education, Latin American studies, and the humanities in gen-
eral. We would like to use this short Translators’ Introduction 
as a kind of “dis-claimer,” to play on Emmanuel Levinas’s style 
of breaking words into their etymological parts with a hyphen 
when calling new attention to their meaning. Throughout the 
book, many words and terms may seem unfamiliar to readers. 
However, listening to the voice of these words is exactly the kind 
of exercise the book’s argument requires. We have attempted to 
stay true to this challenge in our translation.
Take the title of the work and its flagship concept, for exam-
ple. “Pedagogics,” as Dussel told us when he generously answered 
our questions about the translation, should be considered as a 
type of philosophical inquiry alongside ethics, economics, and 
politics. Each of these words takes as its root a Greek term, 
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makes it an English compound adjective-noun (“ethic”1), and 
then denotes a type of inquiry by turning the adjective-noun 
into a plural (“ethics”). The same goes for the Greek paidagogos 
in Dussel’s lexicon, or pedagogica in the Spanish. Rendering this 
in English, we get a compound adjective-noun (pedagogic) and 
then a plural version of that term (pedagogics) to denote the 
corresponding philosophical field of inquiry. Reading pedagog-
ics should be like reading the word ethics, or the other fields of 
inquiry just mentioned.
Though this usage of “pedagogics” is something of a neolo-
gism, it makes good sense given the scope of Dussel’s inquiry. As 
he says in the opening lines of the “Preliminary Words”: “peda-
gogics must not be confused with pedagogy.” Pedagogy refers to 
the science of teaching and learning, while pedagogics “is that 
part of philosophy which considers face-to-face relationships.” 
Drawing from French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, Dussel 
examines the dominating and liberating features of intimate, 
concrete, and observable interactions between different kinds 
of people who have face-to-face relationships, specifically where 
there may be an inequality of knowledge and a responsibility 
to guide, teach, learn, care, or study: teacher–student, politi-
cian–citizen, doctor–patient, philosopher–nonphilosopher, and 
others. Those occupying a potentially superior position in these 
face-to-face relationships (teachers, politicians, doctors, philos-
ophers) have a clear choice for Dussel when it comes to their 
pedagogics. They are either open to hearing the voice of the Oth-
er, disrupting their sense of what is and should be by a newness 
beyond what they know; or they will try to communicate and 
instruct their sense of what is and should be (which Dussel, in 
a Latin American context, associates with dominant cultures) to 
the tabulae rasae in their charge. Dussel calls that sense of what 
is and should be lo Mismo, another term which comes from Levi-
nas. The French in Levinas is le Même, and we have translated 
1 “Ethic” is an English rendering of ethikē, a Greek word used in phrases like 
ethikē philosophia, which names the realm of philosophical thinking de-
voted to morality, customs, and behavior.
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Dussel’s lo Mismo as “the Same.”2 As mentioned at the outset, 
another Levinasian trait are words with hyphens breaking apart 
their etymological composites. Dussel follows him in this as well. 
Dis-tinct, pro-ject, meta-physics, and others pepper the text. The 
hyphens focus a new attention on the words themselves.
Dussel’s lexicon is not just Levinasian, however. It is an 
eclectic tapestry which includes Latin American history, lit-
erature, and philosophy, as well as the more Eurocentric tradi-
tions of Ancient Greek philosophy, Thomist theology, modern 
Enlightenment philosophy, analytic philosophy of language, 
Marxism, psychoanalysis (Freudian, Kleinian, evolutionary 
psychology, neuroscience), phenomenology (Sartrian, Heideg-
gerian, Husserlian, Hegelian), critical theory (Frankfurt School, 
Habermasian), and linguistics. We have done our best with the 
translations of particular terms given our experience with these 
diverse traditions, which is comparatively limited compared to 
Dussel’s fluency in them. We have rendered terms like “introjec-
tion” in their original form, for example. This particular word 
comes from psychoanalysis, which Dussel understands (close to 
Freud’s usage) as a process of subjectivation where a person in-
corporates contents from society into their sense of self.
Many of the passages Dussel cites from the Latin American 
tradition, particularly in the first chapters, were new to us. We 
found as many previously existing English translations as we 
could and did our best translating those we could not find.3 The 
book’s footnotes are an intellectual achievement on their own, 
and we encourage readers to seek out the texts Dussel cites and 
consult them. They form a kind of philosophical bibliography 
2 The translators of Dussel’s Ethics of Liberation have rendered it as “the 
‘Same,’” leaving the “the” out of the quotation marks. We have chosen to 
leave it in since Dussel includes the lo. Interestingly, English translations of 
Levinas sometimes render le Même as “the same,” uncapitalized. Dussel was 
clear that it should be capitalized in his usage. See Enrique Dussel, Ethics 
of Liberation: In the Age of Globalization and Exclusion, trans. Alejandro 
A. Vallega, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Eduardo Mendieta, Yolanda Angulo, 
and Camilo Pérez Bustillo (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013).




for Dussel’s oeuvre as it applies to education. As part of our 
commitment to Latin American philosophy of education, we 
have rendered the titles of Spanish texts into English, but have 
left French and German texts in their original languages.
This short book we have titled Pedagogics of Liberation: A 
Latin American Philosophy of Education is part of the larger 
project called Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana. 
This larger book, or “work” as Dussel refers to it in the Pre-
liminary Words, is composed of several “books,” published in 
multiple volumes by several publishers in at least two languages 
over more than a decade. Kaleidescopic and genre-defying in 
its organization, one way to think about Para una Ética de la 
Liberación Latinoamericana is as a series of published volumes. 
Yet this quickly becomes inadequate for capturing the fullness 
of the work. The first two volumes of Para una Ética de la Lib-
eración Latinoamericana appeared in 1973 as Para una Ética 
de la Liberación Latinoamericana, Tomo I and Tomo II.4 Dus-
sel then published a short book on pedagogics as a standalone 
volume in 1980.5 It is this short book which we have translated.
However, the same “book” may be found, two years later, as 
the second half of a third “book” (or published volume) of Para 
una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana, published in Por-
tuguese, which includes an Erotica along with the Pedagogica.6 
It can therefore be difficult to talk about “books” in this con-
text, given that some books in the series occur as parts of other 
books, and some books are volumes containing multiple books.
Dussel has an ingenious way of solving this problem, how-
ever. Another way of thinking about Para una Ética de la Lib-
eración Latinoamericana is as a single book containing at least 
4 Enrique Dussel, Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana, Tomo I 
(Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno, 1973) and Enrique Dussel, Para una Ética 
de la Liberación Latinoamericana, Tomo II (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno, 
1973).
5 Enrique Dussel, La Pedagogica Latinoamericana (Bogotá: Editorial Nueva 
America, 1980).
6 Enrique Dussel, Para uma Ética da Libertação Latino-americana III: Erótica 
e Pedagógica (São Paulo: Edições Loyola-UNIMEP, 1982).
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eight chapters and fifty-three sections, together articulating an 
expansive philosophy of social life from a liberation perspective, 
focusing on (but certainly not limited to) the Latin American 
experience. In this schema, the chapters are the following:
1. Fundamental Ontology (sections 1–6)
2. Ontics (sections 7–12)
3. Exteriority of the Other (sections 13–19)
4. Fundamental Eticity (sections 20–25)
5. Morality of “Praxis” (sections 26–31)
6. Ethical Methods (sections 32–39)
7. Erotics (sections 40–47)
8. Pedagogics (sections 48–53)
Each of these chapters is an aspect of the ethic of Latin Ameri-
can liberation: the fundamental ontology of liberation, the on-
tics of liberation, etc. (We believe this is why Dussel encouraged 
us to name the short book you read now Pedagogics of Libera-
tion.) According to this schema, the pedagogics of liberation 
we have translated is the eighth chapter of Para una Ética de 
la Liberación Latinoamericana, containing sections 48–53. We 
have also included section 18 from Chapter III as a sort of “first 
chapter,” since it is in section 18 where Dussel first introduced 
the concept of pedagogics in Para una Ética de la Liberación 
Latinoamericana.
Dussel makes reference to the other sections of Para una 
Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana throughout this transla-
tion. Due to the complexity of the work itself, we have simpli-
fied references to Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoameri-
cana by making reference only to the chapters and sections, in 
some cases noting page numbers. To find what Dussel is citing, 
readers can find the section number in the above list and its 
corresponding published volume through the citations in the 
footnote 4.
This chapter–section schema for understanding Para una 
Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana, the larger work for 
which this little book was written, is why we have numbered the 
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sections of this edition you read now in the seemingly strange 
way we have: starting with section 18, then skipping to 48–53. 
First, we have done this to preserve a sense of the immensity 
of Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana. Reading 
this book is like visiting one street in a major global city and 
we wanted to make that apparent in its presentation. Second, 
we want to highlight the gaping hole in English-language Dus-
selian studies: our translation of La Pedagogica Latinoamericana 
appears to be the first English translation of any of the chapters 
or sections of Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana. 
The preceding seven chapters and forty-seven sections remain 
unavailable in English, and by numbering the chapters of this 
book according to Dussel’s intended schema, we gesture to oth-
er students of Dussel — ask them, in a way — to start translating 
the others. Dussel has given his readers the gift of a helpful on-
line archive of his published writings, making hundreds of his 
books available for free download as PDF files.7 We recommend 
checking them out.
While translating this book’s arguments and understanding 
them in the context of their larger intellectual production was 
difficult, rendering its references and citation apparatus were 
particular challenges. We have used the Chicago Manual of Style 
construction similar to that found in the journal Educational 
Theory for our citation approach. This differs from Dussel’s ci-
tation approach in the original work, which was wide-ranging 
across languages, translations, and editions.
Part of this translation’s contribution is to make visible and 
available the variety of sources Dussel used to produce his peda-
gogics of liberation. Since the book is part of our ongoing study 
of Latin American philosophy of education, we have translated 
all Spanish language titles into English. When such a citation 
occurs we maintain the Spanish title and follow it with an Eng-
lish translation of the title in brackets, followed by its original 
Spanish publishing information. Such bracketed English trans-
lations do not occur where there are already existing English 
7 Enrique Dussel, “Libros,” http://enriquedussel.com/Libros_ED.html.
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translations of the works. Where we were able to find an English 
translation of a text, we provide the bibliographic information 
for that text after the original citation, preceded by the word 
“English: …”. Any succeeding reference to the book refers to the 
English text. German, French, Latin, and Greek textual citations 
we leave in their original languages and editions.
Conforming to Educational Theory’s style, all bibliographic 
information can be found in the footnotes. We have done our 
best to conform to a singular citational construction, though 
in some cases we could not find all bibliographic information 
needed to satisfy those requirements (which we indicate to 
readers where necessary).
We feel incredibly excited and honored to have translated 
this book. We think it contains a distinctly Latin American and 
original philosophy of education that will be critically useful to 
scholars and practitioners interested in thinking about teaching, 
learning, and studying. Pedagogics of Liberation: A Latin Ameri-
can Philosophy of Education also makes an important contri-
bution to the translation of Dussel’s prolific writings, many of 
which — we are sad to say — are not yet available in English.
In closing, we would like to thank Vincent W.J. van Gerven 
Oei and Eileen Joy at Punctum for their rigor, patience, and en-
couragement in this project (and Arthur J. Russell for connect-
ing us to them). We also want to acknowledge those who helped 
in the editing, translating, citation-finding, and other labors 
which birthed this translation, specifically Jason T. Wozniak, 
Rafael Vizcaino, Christopher Casuccio, Antonio Medina-Rive-
ra, and Tomas Rocha.
— David I. Backer, 
Assistant Professor of Education,
West Chester University of Pennsylvania, USA
— Cecilia Diego





Preface to the English Edition
 
This pedagogics (a philosophical text, not a pedagogical or em-
pirical text) is part of a much more extensive work written over 
a period of five semesters between 1970 and 1975. It was in 1975 
that I was fired from the Universidad Nacional de Cuyo in Ar-
gentina, due to a military dictatorship that officially took power 
in 1976 in my patria chica (my patria grande being Latin Ameri-
ca, the Caribbean, and the latinos in the United States). 1975 was 
also the year I began my exile in Mexico. Having discovered that 
my book The Ethics of Liberation1 had been quite abstract, ad-
dressing fundamental principles in the first two volumes, which 
gave it the initial mark of a categorical-theoretical framework, I 
developed the next four parts to give the book a more concrete 
orientation: the erotics (which today we would associate with 
questions about gender and the liberation of women and other 
consequences of gender), the pedagogics (which is the third 
volume of the Ethics, and is comprised of this book in English 
translation, covering the liberation of children, young people, 
1 Enrique Dussel, Ethics of Liberation: In the Age of Globalization and Ex-
clusion, trans. Alejandro A. Vallega, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Eduardo 




and the people’s culture), the politics (liberation of brothers, 
sisters, and friends), and three further books on anti-fetishism 
(addressing the question of reverence and sacrilege viz. practical 
totalities).
Pedagogics of Liberation, which you hold in your hands, is 
therefore part of a wide-ranging philosophical inquiry that 
makes certain presuppositions. This Pedagogics must be situated 
within the totality of that larger critical project.
Linda Martín Alcoff ’s introduction to this volume offers 
many explanations. I would therefore like to use this Prologue 
to position this text, which is almost forty years old, on the ho-
rizon of the Global South.
This short book gives voice to many discoveries that were de-
veloped over the years preceding it, but its principal and original 
insight is to consider the question of pedagogics in a geopoliti-
cal, cultural, and global context. More specifically, its aim is to 
think through the universal pretensions of Eurocentric peda-
gogics (the universality claim of Eurocentrism), as well as those 
of North America, thereby reclaiming the colonial (or neocolo-
nial) periphery’s right to its proper Latin American history — a 
history whose particularity they did not know because of mo-
dernity’s domination. Here we see “the provincialization” of the 
United States and Europe. In other words, without asking the 
question itself yet, the book is about the pedagogical founda-
tions of epistemological decolonization, which occupies us today. 
And I would alert readers that in 1973, when I was drafting this 
very manuscript, the project to decolonize knowledge was ar-
ticulated, before Edward Said did so in literature with his Orien-
talism, and before those in subaltern studies, like Rajanit Guha, 
did so for history in India, or before J.F. Lyotard’s Eurocentric 
postmodernism was developed.2
2 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979); Ranajit Guha and 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, eds., Selected Subaltern Studies (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1988); Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condi-
tion: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Brian Mas-
sumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
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We would like to note also that this translation has conserved 
a certain masculine patriarchy in its language, which was pre-
sent in the Spanish text as well. The original text was neither at-
tentive to the use of words like man, father, son, him, etc., nor to 
those words referring to women, like woman, mother, daughter, 
her, etc. Over time, we have found that others words are more 
appropriate, like human being, person, parents, etc. I was aware 
then of patriarchal machismo and also of a nascent feminism (to 
which I dedicated the first part of the Ethics in those years), but 
I did not yet know, at that time, how to overcome the problem 
linguistically.
I have elaborated on the pedagogics of liberation in a num-
ber of other books, but I hope that this English translation initi-
ates a fruitful dialogue in philosophy of education horizontally, 
South — South (between and among those in Latin America, 
Africa, the Muslim world, India, Southeast Asia and China) as 
well as globally, South-North (of those aforementioned cultures 
with Europe, the United States, Russia, etc.). I hope it will help to 
achieve a transmodern culture where intercultural dialogue can 
educate a new generation, and create a pluri-versal worldliness 
(not Eurocentrically uni-versal), one that is epistemologically 
decolonized: in a word, a culture that respects the existing dis-
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Youth does not ask. It demands the recognition of its right to exte-
riorize its own thinking.
— Córdoba Manifesto of 1918
There was a breathing spell. The students, full of hope, gathered 
for a meeting — not a demonstration — in the Plaza of Tlatelolco 
on the second of October. At the end of the meeting, when those 
attending it were about to leave, the plaza was surrounded by the 
army and the killing began. A few hours later it was all over. How 
many died? The Guardian, after a careful investigation, consid-
ered the most probable: 325[…]. The second of October, 1968, put 
an end to the student movement[…]. It was an instinctive repeti-
tion that took the form of an expiatory ritual.





Pedagogics of Liberation continues the work already underway 
in Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana. Man is now 
the father. Woman, the mother. The new one (the Other) is now 
the child.
Pedagogics must not be confused with pedagogy. The latter 
is the science of teaching or learning. Pedagogics, on the other 
hand, is the part of philosophy (along with ethics, politics, and 
economics) which considers face-to-face relationships: the par-
ent–child, teacher–student, doctor–patient, philosopher–non-
philosopher, politician–citizen, etc. Pedagogics as we intend it 
here has a greater significance than pedagogy, covering all types 
of “discipline” (what is received from another) existing in oppo-
sition to “invention” (what is discovered on one’s own). Further-
more, the study of pedagogics is unique because it is the point 
of convergence and mutual passage between the erotic and the 
political — which we will address in the next sections of Para 
una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana. Basically, pedagog-
ics begins with the child of the erotic household and concludes 
with the adult of political society. Yet in another way, it begins 
with the child in the pedagogical-political institution (culture, 
school, etc.) and concludes with a man or woman formed for a 
fruitful erotic life. Therefore, pedagogics clearly begins and ends 
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in the same erotics (of the child to the parents in the domain of 
the home) and the same politics (of the child to the teacher or 
pedagogue in the domain of the school). Th is four-part dimen-
sionality complicates the explanation of this particular chapter 
of the larger work, but the nature of pedagogics demands such 
an explanation.
As stated above (Figure 1), the son or daughter born in the 
family (1) is educated so that one day they become a father or 
mother (2) and at the same time become an adult citizen (4). 
Children in political-pedagogical institutions (3) are disciplined 
to one day be responsible for the community (4) or adults at the 
erotic level (2). Th us, in the sections that follow, we will always 
begin with the pedagogical-erotic and pass to the pedagogical-
political (though it would be possible to take the inverse path: 
from the pedagogical-political to the erotic). We will make this 
move whether the subject under consideration is symbolism and 
pedagogics (section 48), the starting point of all our situated Lat-
in American refl ections, or in the interpretation of ontology and 
pedagogics (section 49) and in its overarching meta-physic (sec-
tion 50). In the same way, the problematic of economy and peda-
gogics (section 51) will begin with erotic economy and culminate 
in political economy, since a pedagogics of economy depends on 
the family as much as the State or culture. We will also, in the 




last two sections, address a pedagogics of liberation (sections 52 
and 53), and take into consideration the aforementioned bipo-
larity of educational phenomena.
In this complicated chapter of the larger Para una Ética de 
la Liberación Latinoamericana, then, in addition to addressing 
traditional questions of evolutionary psychology or child psy-
choanalysis from birth to adulthood, and the problems already 
raised by pedagogics in its multiple aspects, we must also dis-
cuss childhood, ideology, culture, and all this in the context of 
dependency and liberation. We will, in other words, expound 
an anti-pedagogy.1
1 The concept of pedagogics is introduced in section 18 of Para una Ética de 




“The Other” as the Face of Pedagogics1
 
A child is born. A real novelty, the chosen and unique “Other.” 
The child is thrown into his or her world. That is all there is. 
Nobody asks for the child’s thoughts on the possibility of exist-
ing (an absurd question, one which occupied Sartre for so long). 
This would require the child to be present before conception. 
Rather, we hail from paternal fecundity. We are not from a phys-
ical time; nor are we, at least (and originally), from temporality 
(since temporality is ontological and is itself a moment of the 
pro-created2 child). Rather we are from a unique, non-transfer-
able, personal time. This time is the time of life (which might be 
documented in a biography). This time is a time of personal des-
tiny: a messianic time (if “messianism” is understood as the time 
of waiting during which the child will accomplish his alterative 
pro-ject). There is no more profound waiting than the waiting 
of letting-be (Gelassenheit); letting-be a new history, embodied 
in the child, a history which is just beginning. This history is 
1 Translator: The following is section 18 of chapter III of Enrique Dussel, Para 
una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana. See “Translators’ Preface” for 
details.
2 Translator: Here is the first instance of Dussel’s Levinasian use of hyphena-
tion. One can see it also in the following phrases in this section: “alterative 
pro-ject,” “dis-tinct” and “dif-ference.”
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“new” because it is unique; “new” because it is unpredictable; 
“new” because it is unrepeatable. “The Other,” the child, the fruit 
of fecundity, is liberty-as-creation, pro-creation, recreation but 
never a return: never repetition, cycle, or memory. Dis-tinct in 
its origin, it has a vocation to be “the Same” as that which is, 
which is to say: it has a vocation to be the Other for every other.
Therefore, the child, free and autonomous, the dis-tinct 
“Other,” begins an essentially separate relation in the real con-
stitution in utero. This constitution is the origin of its ontologi-
cal organization: the dis-course with “the Other,” pedagogi-
cal alterity, from which pro-creation emerges to penetrate the 
history which precedes it. Pedagogical alterity will accomplish 
its messianic function within this preceding history (moshiach 
comes from the Hebrew for the anointing “oil”: “anointed” in 
our case signifies that every child arrives anointed with his non-
transferable, unique, unrepeatable, and authentic destiny). As 
dis-tinct the child is a tabula rasa (the pure possibility of sens-
ing the world, having not yet sensed anything). Thus born poor, 
and tasked with everything that will be his history and her life. 
It is in this primal moment of the pro-created, who is not yet 
fully a creator, that Alterity accomplishes what we could call the 
meta-physical function, or the ethic of pedagogy. The child (in 
Greek pais, and from now on that which is necessary for any 
grade of perfection regarding this negative position) must be led 
by the hand to its proper pro-ject.3 This “pedagogical time” in a 
person’s life indicates the continuity of human history. “Peda-
gogical time” also indicates the meta-physical and ethical alter-
ity of humans’ being-in-itself. In nine months (from conception 
until birth) man goes from a unicellular organism to a newborn 
3 In Greek, agō means “to conduce” (pedagogue: the one who conducts the 
child). To educate, however, stems from the Latin: to conduce from the ori-
gin, or “educe,” “bring to light.” For a treatment of the pedagogical matter as 
we will suggest it here see Paulo Freire, Pedagogía del Oprimido (Montevi-
deo: Tierra Nueva, 1970), 247–50; English: Paulo Freire, The Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed, trans. Donald Macedo (New York: Continuum, 2005). For more 
on the pro-ject in the Totality, see what has been said in Dussel, Para una 
Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana, Tomo I, 52–55.
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child uttering his first historical cry (four billion years of life 
on our planet are travelled ontogenetically in utero). From birth 
until his adult autonomy (never total) man will travel through 
the “analectic of teaching,” traversing the more than two million 
years he has inhabited the earth. This pedagogical process is nei-
ther return, nor repetition. It is neither memory, nor maieutic: 
it is in-novation; it is learning; it is taking “the similar” back 
to square one and beginning from a dis-tinct starting point. 
Thus “the similar” becomes new. Man is nothing with respect 
to the sameness (which is not identical univocality) he receives, 
and this position constitutes the analogical being of man. “The 
Other,” the newborn, the child will not imitate what others have 
done but rather re-create what others-in-others have created. 
His world, a world where he transcends existentially, ontically 
or mundanely (“the Same”), will begin to grow from “the Oth-
er” through cultural, historical, and practical everyday learn-
ing. This is the question of the analectic of teaching, the human’s 
mode of taking on tradition.
The equivocal unity of eros which links the minimal alter-
ity of the couple (“the Same”) assumes the original dis-tinction 
between man and woman: that which opens itself again, but this 
time to the alterity of the child (the new “Other,” who, in his 
origin, is less dis-tinct to his parents than his father is dis-tinct to 
his mother; more dis-tinct in relation to his parents than to his 
siblings). The analectic of parents–child is already a pedagogical 
relation: the parent is the historical-cultural anterior (ontologi-
cally and meta-physically); the child is new and has to learn eve-
rything (of course, when something has been understood and 
concomitantly invented, he will have “some” experience “about” 
it; an experience which brings about new inventions and under-
standings that make his world grow). Authentic parents, teach-
ers, journalists, artists, professional politicians, philosophers…
hold an analectic position with respect to the children, students, 
community, non-philosophers, etc. The pedagogical analectic 
is grounded in a certain paternal and filial love (which is not 
eros, but rather a love in friendship that is equally ambiguous), 
a superior’s love (which can reveal something to the student) of 
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an inferior (and thus the teacher loves the student gratuitously, 
since the student’s love can collapse into mere friendship of 
pragmatic utility).4
In the ontology of Totality (Greek and modern) the dialectic 
of teaching may be summarized thus (especially in Plato): the 
teacher, the philosopher, the politician, or parent which com-
prehends the disciple (or child) as “the Same” must produce 
the memory of what has been forgotten and made invisible: a 
remembrance that makes “the Same” acquire actuality through 
the student’s present knowing. Some think that “the Same” 
can be acquired through the dialectic. Others think it can be 
acquired through science. Either way, this path to “the Same” 
results in an understanding of being, the divine, the from-al-
ways (the Idea, ousia, the Plotinian One). The doctrine of the 
Rig-Veda and Buddhism also teach “the Same” but with varying 
ancillary lessons. Modern thought, in terms of subjectivity, casts 
the disciple as tabula rasa, but due to the solipsism unique to 
its point of departure, this pedagogy is nothing but a leading-
out of what is already given in “the noble savage” (Rousseau, 
Montessori). Modern pedagogy is the originary doctrine of the 
ego cogito (or the Hegelian Absolute) that invents, pro-duces, re-
presents, or dis-covers everything “from itself ” (what Heideg-
gerian Wiederholung reiterates in the mundane totality of “the 
Same” given existentially). The ontology of Totality as pedagogy 
ultimately results in certain conclusions: for example, that mo-
rality is invention (for Sartre), or that the truth is dis-covery (for 
Heidegger).5
In the ontology of Totality, the teacher paradoxically holds 
both a passive and catalytic position that is not new. Like the 
Socratic midwife, philosophy is only maieutic. In other words, 
the task is already given, one just needs to give birth to it. Equal-
4 Aristotle saw this very clearly, but with a meaning different from the one we 
are ascribing it here: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ed. J. Bywater (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1894), Book IX, 1167b.
5 See also my Enrique Dussel, Para una De-strucción de la Historia de la Ética 
[Towards a De-struction of the History of Ethics] (Mendoza, Argentina: Edi-
torial Ser y Tiempo, 1972), 163–328.
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ly, in modern philosophy of education, the teacher must let-
be manifestations of the child’s spontaneity. Pedagogy, in this 
sense, merely keeps at bay the influences of foreign elements. 
In both cases “the Same” (divinely eternal and cosmological 
for the Greeks; subjective, free, and individual in modernity) 
brings out the student’s actuality from their potentiality. Intrin-
sically speaking, Alterity, “the Other” as teacher, has nothing to 
do with that process of bringing out actuality from potentiality 
(all of this is theoretical, of course, because in praxis the Greek 
teacher and modern teacher transmitted the historical tradition 
of their respective communities with an iron-like disciplinary 
system, without respect for the Other: the disciple as other). The 
Freudian psychoanalyst fulfills the same function, as does the 
existential psychiatrist, with their client, and the sick person in 
privatized medicine. In truth, the Greeks accepted the histori-
cal-cultural beliefs of their communities as innate. The moderns 
believed the ego’s invention presumed the Other’s continuous 
learning. The analectic of teaching goes beyond the notion of 
philosophy-as-maieutic, or as the thinking of what is com-pre-
hended.6 This analectic overcomes the false antinomy between 
learning as mere memory and all that we invent from the ego.
In the meta-physic of the face-to-face, Alterity is essentially 
and originally constitutive of the world of Totality. Look for ex-
amples at the pairing of a teacher’s (philosopher’s) exteriority 
and a disciple’s (non-philosopher’s) exteriority, and the parent 
confronted with the child (“the Other” that is born dis-tinct). 
Pedagogics before ontology: “the Other” precedes invention 
from “the Same.” We should not forget however that “the Same” 
(the child himself as such) proceeds from the Other (parents, a 
community, and a cultural history with traditions).
6 Philosophy, today, will develop a radically innovative, creative, pro-phetic 
character; it not only thinks about history, it gets in front of history and 
marks its path. Philosophy will, for us, be praxis in the diverse sense indi-
cated in Dussel, Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana, section 
12; it is an analectical praxis (see ibid., section 30).
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Searching for an example in universal thought, we find a small 
book by Augustine of Hippo: The Teacher.7 Augustine, whom 
Heidegger interpreted with great clarity during the 1919–1920 
seminars, deals with the factical experience of Judeo-Christian 
life, but not with the existential experience thereof in its concep-
tual formulation. At this point we may say the following: Augus-
tine, starting from an alterative existential position, only had an 
ontology of the Totality, which led him to an impoverished for-
mulation of alterity (which only a meta-physics of Alterity can 
formulate, thanks to recent and novel conceptualizations). This 
impoverished formulation can be perfectly observed in the little 
tract already mentioned. Augustine begins adequately enough 
by indicating that the question of pedagogy turns on language 
and the word: “Augustine: When we speak, what does it seem 
to you we want to accomplish (loquimur)? Adeodatus: So far as 
it now strikes me, either to teach or to learn (aut docere, aut 
discere).”8 But immediately Augustine says that we speak only to 
teach, and that we can definitively teach through memory (per 
memorationem), or as God “wills” it: “from our deepest rational 
soul, that is what is called inner man.”9 In other words, human 
Alterity disappears. The Alterity of the face-to-face relationship, 
which included carnality, even stops expressing God’s own “ex-
teriority.”
In the thirteenth century, working from a corrected Aristote-
lian ontology, it is said that
In one way, natural reason by itself reaches knowledge of un-
known things, and this way is called discovery, in the other 
7 Agustín, “Acerca del maestro,” Obras de San Agustín (Madrid: BAC Obras 
filosóficas, 1963), 538–99. English: Augustine, Against the Academicians and 
The Teacher, trans. Peter King (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1995), 
94.
8 Ibid., 94.
9 Ibid., 95: “[I]n ipsis rationalis animae secretis.”
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way, when someone else aids the learner’s natural reason, and 
this is called learning by instruction.10
For this reason, “the teacher or master must have the knowl-
edge which he causes in another explicitly and perfectly.”11 The 
subject has been indicated, but, at this point, its full historical, 
cultural, ontological, and meta-physical sense is far from being 
comprehended.
What has not been clearly demonstrated is that the “inven-
tion” (ontological area of “the Same” that develops one’s poten-
tial) opens itself from the “discipline” (disciplined). Teaching 
Alterity creates in the student, like revelation following nothing 
(the teacher as freedom beyond the ontological horizon of “the 
Same”: the student), the “sense” of everything that the child in-
corporates in his world (“the Same” from “the Other”). But very 
soon after this student starts to “invent” (pro-ducing from “the 
Same”) his world as a growing being (the seed beginning to send 
out roots and sprouts…). The pedagogical analectic is estab-
lished from this moment: “the Other” (the teacher, the parent, 
the philosopher) must doubly realize “the Same” (the student, 
the child, the non-philosopher). They must first realize “the 
Same” radically and with love of justice, because it is a dis-tinct 
“Other” (free extreme of the spectrum). Simultaneously they 
must realize “the Same” historically and culturally, and with an 
analogous love of friendship, because it contains in its making a 
certain “the Same” of resemblance (as part of the same cultural 
world: the familiar we of the pedagogical, national, and human 
community).
As dis-tinct, the disciple has a new historical pro-ject for be-
ing human (“the Other” as real and historical). The teacher can-
not simply deposit a certain amount of acquired knowledge (the 
“banking” conception of education, where the only question for 
10 Tomás de Aquina, “Quaestiones disputatae [Cuestiones disputadas],” De 
Magistro (Torino: Marietti, 1964). English: Thomas Aquinas, Truth, Vol. II, 




teaching is memory: to recall),12 rather he must transmit what is 
acquired, but from the existential situation of the student. The 
teacher must also transmit acquired knowledge from the way 
in which his creative revelation arrives, to confound itself with 
the student’s proper quality of problematizing invention. Which 
is to say, and Heidegger saw this in part, that the teacher must 
establish a pedagogical analectic that overcomes the apparent 
dis-tinction between parent–child, teacher–student. This peda-
gogical analectic is impossible in the ontology of Totality. The 
teacher professes his word (thus the teacher’s authentic word 
is pro-phecy13), and his word is the fruit of his authentic inven-
tion, as well as the authentic creation from his community (“the 
Same”), to the Other, his disciple. But in order for his word to 
be pro-phetic, teacherly, the teacher learns the student’s pro-ject 
concomitantly (“the Same” of the Other: the newness the teach-
er tends to ignore). The disciple understands the pro-phetic, au-
thentic word of the teacher, “the Other,” insofar as the teacher 
puts “the Same” out there, puts out his world, his pro-ject, in a 
movement that signifies his authentic realization. At the same 
time, the student demands an openness from “the Other” that 
“the Other” (the teacher) has revealed as a creator would reveal 
it. The ana-lectic, beyond the dia-lectic, teaches that the dia-lec-
tical process moves itself from beyond (ana-) the world: from 
“the Other.” The teacher and the disciple always have something 
to learn (from birth to death), and very soon that same student 
begins to teach (a small child that teaches his younger brother 
how to play, for instance) and continues to do so until death. No 
disciple is purely a disciple; no teacher is purely a teacher. What 
12 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 7: “The ‘banking’ concept of education as 
an instrument of oppression.” It oppresses the given culture and annihilates 
the Other as other, it makes culture an internal dif-ference of “the Same”: 
the reigning imperial culture; at least the culture of the “system.”
13 Pro-phecy comes from the Greek, pro- “before,” phēmi “to speak.” The pro-
phet is he who “speaks before” the Other about the “sense” of the historical 
present (this is in the Hebrew tradition): “Hear this, you elders; listen, all 
who live in the land. Has anything like this ever happened in your days or in 
the days of your ancestors?” (Joel 1:2).
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the teacher learns he also learns from the novelty of the child’s 
pro-ject (youth of the Other that is never equal to the youth 
of the teacher, because it has originated dis-tinctly in another 
moment of universal history; because this child is Other meta-
physically). Everything the student learns he learns from the 
Alterity of the teacher, that comes into the student’s world from 
nowhere (the teacher’s liberty and the anteriority of humanity as 
global “Other”). All teachers must teach more than what is giv-
en simply with anteriority; they must teach how it was reached 
with a critical mode. The teacher does not transmit traditions as 
traditional, but rather revives the conditions that made it pos-
sible to be new, unique, creation. Every student teaches his au-
thentic mode and dis-tinct human being, with attention focused 
on the inventions that he himself (“the Same”) contributes to 
history (“the Other”). These inventions are real. They are neither 
utopian, dreamy fantasies, nor a house of cards. The reciprocal 
revelation of teacher and disciple that begins on the part of the 
elder (teacher, parent) with a just love for the youth (student, 
child), and that moves within pedagogical friendship of the pro-
phet for his community, can close itself equivalently: the teacher 
can love the student and the latter can love the teacher as “one 
of our own”: the sect. This us (that in the man–woman relation-
ship is the family, and between Plato and his students could be 
the Academy) is “the Same.” Closed friendship will always make 
the teacher an oppressive teacher and the student a minor, an 
alienated being. Ultimately this closed friendship would entail 
a “will to power” and a destruction of the analectic originary of 
the “personal I of the teacher” in relation the “personal You and 
Other” of the student. Here we have the psychiatrist exploiting 
his client and not liberating him from that tutelage which alien-
ates him. In contrast, this position, which is authentically alive, 
also brings death — the passage to another moment where the 
teacher-as-teacher and the student-as-student, or the parent-as-
parent and child-as-child, itself dies as a moment. This moment 
of death occurs when the child grows and the student learns 
all the teacher can teach him. It is in this moment the student 
reaches the plenitude of alterity while still at the minimal level 
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of the initial dis-tinction: brother face-to-face with brother. This 
is why the teacher as parent will always pronounce “it is good 
that he (the student, new teacher) grows and that I (as teacher) 
disappear.”14 This “path” (hodos in Greek) is a “method” whose 
historical-concrete content is the pro-ject of the unpredictable 
Other, who is always other. The unpredictable other is an im-
possibility for which one cannot prepare a “lesson” necessitating 
the con-vergence of the real student and comes to reveal to the 
teacher the material of his course, his dis-course.15
To be an authentic teacher is a dangerous, risky job. It entails 
praxis, an existential commitment, and sometimes puts one’s 
physical life in jeopardy. In the degraded dialectic, the peda-
gogical Self-Other, the self-educator (parents, society) comes 
to transform into an impersonal “self ” (this is a false tradition; 
think of the sophist who teaches in the academy as a means for 
sustenance, according to his theoretical and irreal teachings). 
The Other-student (child, student of a society massified through 
opulence or oppression) is also transformed into an impersonal 
“him,” who must be “filled” with “traditional,” “safe,” and “ob-
jective” contents of knowledge. The authentic teacher begins a 
new process, the inverse path to decadence or degradation. He 
begins a path that destroys the bonds restraining the other’s lib-
erty, called from a critical position to recuperate his personal 
attitude. As such, the teacher is “a new man” and lives that face-
to-face relationship in anticipation. He lives in its proximity.
What follows is a figure depicting the above proposals (Fig-
ure 2).
14 Matthew 11:10.
15 Speaking in terms of the university, pedagogical dialogue takes place in a 
“seminar,” where professor and students study, discuss, and learn together, 
thinking with one another about certain subjects and texts. University-level 
“master class” does not justify itself as mere information which is already 
known (university students have the usual texts for this), but rather must in 
an actualized manner reach the student anew, where the teacher’s methodi-
cal thinking creates an irreplaceable revelation.
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When the teacher comes from the free and autonomous end 
of the spectrum, as an “I” with the capacity to establish rela-
tions irrespective of the self-Other, living in the face-to-face 
relationship between free beings, he must remain alone. Th e 
“self ” of the collective, the reigning and majoritarian us rushes 
to kill (professionally, psychologically, physically) that which 
has pretended to break the dialectic of domination. If the “Self-
Teacher” resists fi ghting with those who have waged war, “the 
exercise of reason itself,”16 then he will become surrounded by 
free men, those “student-Others” that shortly thereaft er will be 
brothers in a new historical age. Th e passage from alienation 
(when someone stops being “the dis-tinct Other” and goes on to 
be the internal di-ff erence of the totalitarian Totality) to liberty, 
they always initially produce it through pedagogical liberation. 
All of this must be utilized in the pedagogical method. Th ere are 
methods that fi ght against the Totality, pretending to set up a 
new domination. Th ere are others that negate the closed Total-
ity, trying to open it to Alterity.
16 Emmanuel Levinas, Totalité et infini: essai sur l’extériorité (Th e Hague: Nij-
hoff , 1968), ix.
Figure 2. Liberatory position of the teacher in the dialectic of mutual 






Our hermeneutic reading of pedagogics will begin with an ini-
tial suspicion grounded in our knowledge of Latin American 
reality. The parent (the imago of the father, and the mother, as 
well as the teacher, doctor, professional, philosopher, culture, 
State, etc.) extends his phallocracy in the form of aggression and 
domination of the child. In other words: filicide. The death of 
the child, the boy, youth itself, those fresh generations, enacted 
by gerontocracies or bureaucracies, is physical (the front line of 
an army of human sacrifices), symbolic or ideological. Despite 
these differences of manifestation, filicide is always a type of al-
ienation, domination, and annihilation of Alterity. Erotic phal-
locracy, mediated by a pedagogics of filicide, culminates in po-
litical fratricide. These are three aspects of what is today called 
“the death of God.”
In pedagogics, passing from the erotic to the political is con-
tinuous. It happens without our noticing. In Latin America, 
which is still machísta, the father-as-State opposes the mother-
as-culture. Thus:
I came to Comala because I had been told that my father, 
a man named Pedro Páramo, lived there. It was my mother 
who told me […]: “Don’t ask him for anything. Just what’s 
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ours. What he should have given me but never did […]. Make 
him pay son, for all those years he put us out of his mind.1
The child bears within himself the agonizing bipolarity of fa-
ther–mother, of violence–culture. The Latin American, a son 
of Malinche (the Indian that betrayed her culture) and Cortés 
(father of the conquest and of the virtues of a subordinate State, 
since, of course Cortés is not a King). The Latin American “does 
not want to be either an Indian or a Spaniard. Nor does he want 
to be descended from them. He denies them. And he does not 
affirm himself as a mixture, but rather as an abstraction: he is a 
man. He becomes the son of Nothingness. His beginnings are 
in his own self.”2 This paradoxical position of the child, Latin 
America itself, emerges because what is new can neither accept 
the more powerful father’s original domination (first the impe-
rial State and then the neocolonial State, betraying its proper 
culture), nor can it accept its dominated and violated mother, its 
culture — who breast-fed its symbols. To discover one’s destiny 
1 Juan Rulfo, Pedro Páramo (Mexico: FCE, 1971), 7. English: Juan Rulfo, Pedro 
Páramo, trans. Margaret Sayers Peden, ed. Danny J. Anderson (Austin: Uni-
versity of Texas Press, 2002), 12. On the “nostalgia of the father [Vatersehn-
sucht],” see Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion (New York: Broadview 
Press, 2012). “Little by little I began to build a world around a hope centered 
on the man called Pedro Páramo, the man who had been my mother’s hus-
band. That was why I had come to Comala… ‘Pedro Paramo’s my father, 
too,’ he said…We’re Pedro Páramo’s sons alright, but, for all that, our moth-
ers brought us into the world on straw mats. And the real joke of it is that 
he’s the one who carried us to be baptized” (Rulfo, Pedro Páramo, 3). The 
theme of searching for the father is ancient in American thought: “What 
was my father like? [asked Quetzocoatl], What was his stature? I would like 
to see his face…! They responded to him: He has died. He was buried far 
from here” (Angel Garibay, La Literatura de los Aztecas [The Literature of 
the Aztecs] [Mexico: J. Moritz, 1970], 24). See also in this same publication 
“Amonestación del Padre al Hijo” [“A Father’s Warning to his Son”], 107.
2 Octavio Paz, El Laberinto de la Soledad (Mexico: FCE, 1973), 78–79. English: 
Octavio Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude and Other Writings, trans. Lysander 
Kemp, Yara Milos, and Rachel Phillips Belash (New York: Grove Press, 
1985). For this pedagogics, we will keep this magnificent chapter, “The Son 
of La Malinche” (65–88), in mind.
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and history one must begin at a distance from the pedagogical, 
erotic, and political.
[A]nd a force was invading me through my ears, my pores: 
the language. Here once more was the language I had talked 
in my infancy; the language in which I had learned reading 
and sol-fa… There came back to me, after long forgetting…
put away somewhere with a picture of my mother and a 
blonde lock of my hair cut off when I was six years old.3
When the father forgets his wife, it is the same as when the child 
forgets himself. Forgetting of the mother’s being happens in the 
process of pedagogical domination, enacted by the father and 
by the Empire. This phallocracy is uxoricide, and therefore also 
matricide. Filicide, which is a pedagogic of domination itself, 
originates from this matricide:
And four days passed and the Sun in the sky was still. All the 
land was afraid beneath the shadows that dragged on for-
ever. The gods gathered and sought counsel with one anoth-
er: “Why does it not move?” The Sun was the wounded god 
transformed into sun, from his throne. The hawk goes and 
asks: “The gods want to know why you do not move!” And 
the Sun responded: “You know why? I want human blood! I 
want them to give me their children, I want them to give me 
their offspring!”4
3 Alejo Carpentier, Los Pasos Perdidos (Santiago, Chile: Orbe, 1969), 35. Eng-
lish: Alejo Carpentier, The Lost Steps, trans. Harriet de Ónis (Middlesex: 
Penguin, 1968), 38. We have said that the three women of the text are the 
three cultures practiced in Latin America: Ruth (imperial culture), Mouche 
(prostituted culture or high neocolonial elite), Rosario (popular Latin 
American ancestrality).
4 “El Quinto Sol” [“The Fifth Sun”], in Garibay, La Literatura de los Aztecas, 
16. The Sun is a masculine mythical moment; the fearful land is the mater-
nal-feminine moment. The child is immolated. See other examples and a 
modified psychoanalytic interpretation in Arnaldo Rascovsky, El Filicidio 
[Filicide] (Buenos Aires: Orión, 1973) — a book of great pedagogical inter-
est. Also see on filicide, Bartolomé de las Casas, Apologética Historia [His-
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This passage describes a pre-Oedipal situation in pre-Hispanic 
thought because Huitzilopochtli, the Sun, was a small god (the 
son) immolated by other gods in order to give him sustenance 
(being sun, as he is). Huitzilopochtil then demands the immo-
lation of all sons everywhere. This is filicide because the son, 
as child, is positioned between father and mother. His Oedipal 
hatred of the father arises from this positioning between his 
parents. 
Men have had sons since the beginning, even those primitive 
“men of wood” of the Quiché mythology:
They existed and multiplied; they had daughters, they had 
sons, these wooden figures; but they did not have souls, nor 
minds, they did not remember their Creator, their Maker; 
they walked on all fours, aimlessly […]. These were the first 
men who existed in great numbers on the face of the earth. 
Immediately the wooden figures were annihilated, destroyed, 
broken up, and killed.5
Progeny is novelty, renovation of the aged, perpetuation and 
eternity. The world is renewed with the child, with the “new 
year,” with accompanying rites of initiation.6 But the ontological 
novelty of the new must introject the current system (which is 
why it is a child’s blood that is sacrificed to conserve the life of 
the cosmos). Therefore “later our mothers were told, and com-
manded: ‘Go, my sons, my daughters, your obligations will be 
tory of the Indies] (Madrid: Bailly, Bailliere e hijos, 1909); José de Acosta, 
“Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias” [“Natural and Moral History of the 
Indies”], in Obras (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, 1954), 2–247, 
at 161–62. 
5 Popol-Vuh, ed. Adrián Recinos (Mexico: FCE, Biblioteca Americana, 1974), 
99. English: Popol-Vuh, trans. Delia Goetz and Sylvanus Griswold Morley 
(Los Angeles: Plantin Press, 1954), 43. 
6 See the essentially pedagogical topic of the “renewal of the world” in Mircea 
Eliade, Aspects du mythe (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), 56; and also, by the same 
author, Mythes, rêves et mystères (Paris: Gallimard, 1957), 254; and Le mythe 
de l’éternel retour (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), 83.
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the chores that we recommend’.”7 These chores are the commu-
nity’s customs and industries, the ethos of a nation.8 The child is 
educated in the culture, the symbolic totality of a community, 
to control his instincts (as in the case of incest) and his nature. 
Fire thereby presents itself as the independence and lordship 
cultural being has over the world: “There was a tribe that stole 
fire among the smoke. And it was those in the house of Zotzil. 
The god of the Cakchiquel was called Chamalcán, and he had 
the form of a bat.”9
Permit us a large and beautiful passage from the Inca Gar-
cilaso de la Vega:
The Inca Manco Cápac populated his communities while 
teaching the inhabitants to cultivate the land for their vas-
sals and fashion houses and dig irrigation ditches and make 
the many things necessary for human life. He would instruct 
them in the civility, companionship, and fraternity which 
they should have with one another according to what reason 
and natural law teaches, persuading them with great efficacy 
that, to have perpetual peace between them and agreement, 
so as not to give rise to anger and passions, they should do 
unto others as they would have them do unto them, because 
it was not permitted to want a law for oneself and another for 
7 Adrian Recinos, ed. & trans., Memorial de Sololá. Anales de los Cakchique-
les: Título de los Señores de Tonicapán [Memories of Sololá. Annals of the 
Cakchiqueles: Title of the Lords of Tonicapán] (México: Funda de Cultura 
Económica, 1950), 52.
8 It is in this sense which Hegel said that “pedagogics is the art that makes 
man ethical [sittlich],” G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, 
Theorie-Werkausgabe 7, eds. E. Moldenhauer and K. Michel (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 1969), 302. In other words, it follows the customs of a community, 
which gets at the “ontological” sense of pedagogics.
9 Popol-Vuh, trans. Goetz and Morley, 203. Following Freud and many other 
authors, Imre Hermann demonstrated very well in his L’instinct filial (Paris: 
Denoël, 1972) that the child, possessing the “grasping-of-the-mother” (see 
section 44 of the larger Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana) 
identifies the mother herself with the “tree,” whose wood was used for fire-
wood. Fire (which gives warmth like a mother to her child) is a substitute 
for the mother: culture. 
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everyone else […]. He demanded the collection of livestock 
roaming the land without owners, whose wool he used to 
dress all in the community through the industry and teaching 
that the Queen Mama Ocllo Huaco had given to the indig-
enous women in spinning and weaving. He taught them to 
make footwear that even today they wear, called usuta. For 
every community or nation he formed he elected a curaca 
that is the same as cacique […]. He demanded that the fruit 
of every community be guarded together, to make sure that 
everyone would have what they need.10
Every family, tribe or kingdom educated their children in these 
traditions, and thus:
I have not admired any other thing as much, nor found any-
thing more praiseworthy, than the Mexicans’ carefulness and 
10 Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, Comentarios Reales de los Incas [Commentaries 
on the Incas] (Lima: Colección de Autores Peruanos, 1967), 5. The Inca Gar-
cilaso is a beautiful example of the oral tradition’s power in a community, 
for example, “this long account of the origin of their kings was given to me 
by that Inca, my mother’s uncle, whom I asked for it, which I have attempt-
ed to translate faithfully from my own mother tongue, that of the Inca, into 
the foreign which is Castilian” (52). Culture, like the first and constitutive 
language of the child, is maternal: they suckle it. José de Acosta, in his “His-
toria Natural y Moral de las Indias,” 196, tells us that “the Indians of Perú 
had also another marvel: from childhood, each would learn all the trades 
necessary for human life. For among them there would not be official posi-
tions, as there are among us, of tailors, shoemakers, and textile workers, but 
rather every individual and household must learn everything, and therefore 
provided for themselves. Everyone knew how to sew and make clothes; and 
this is why the Ynca, by providing them wool, considered them clothed. 
Everyone knew how to till the land and benefit it, without hiring outside 
workers. They all built their houses; and the women had the most knowl-
edge of it all […]. [A]nd in a manner of speaking, the Indians are similar 
to the institutes of the old monks referenced by the Lives of the Fathers. 
Truthfully, they are a people of little greed, nor are they lazy, and in this 
way they are content to live modestly, and it is certain that if one’s lineage 
were continued thusly by choice and not custom or nature, we would say it 
was a life of great perfection.” On Incan education see, among hundreds of 




orderliness in raising their children, understanding well that 
all the full hope of a republic consists in childrearing and in-
struction of children and the young.11
Every family educated their children; not just kings, nobles, ca-
ciques or leaders, but the entire community. “My child, my gem, 
my rich quetzal plumage.”12 Thus didactic poems were frequent 
in American communities: “Lord, look at your longbow and 
sheath of arrows, it is my child’s, oh Lord. When he is grown, 
he will give you a paper offering, oh Lord.”13 “You, my son, you 
must marry one who has a mother and father. Her mother, her 
father will not want to give their daughter to an excessively poor 
subject. You must push yourself to wake up early, to be active in 
the execution of your work.”14 The efficiency of pre-Hispanic ed-
ucation was proverbial, regarding compliance with sexual laws, 
speaking the truth and treating foreigners with respect.
Then the European conquest arrived, descending upon this 
world of Amerindian culture. The male conquistador became 
the oppressive father, the teacher–dominator, whom “com-
monly left no one alive in war save the boys and women,” as 
11 De Acosta, “Historia Natural y Moral de las Indias,” 205. This is a chapter 
worthy of mentioning: “They sleep poorly and eat poorly, they were made 
to work since childhood so as not to become lazy people” (206). On Aztec 
education: De las Casas, Apologética Historia, 219. In chapter 122, De las Ca-
sas puts it this way: “You can see that the Mexicans were superior to many 
ancient communities in terms of their childrearing and education of the 
young” (297).
12 Garibay, La Literatura de los Aztecas, 107. There are beautiful recommenda-
tions for sons in these poems regarding lies and falsity, about life in the 
home, drinking alcohol, etc.
13 “Treinta y ocho textos lacandones” [“Thirty-eight Lacandon Texts”], in La 
Literatura de los Mayas [Mayan Literature], ed. Sodi M. Demetrio (Madrid: 
Joaquín Mortiz, 1976), 69.
14 “Un Señor da Consejos a su Hijo que Quiere Casarse” [“A Man Gives Advice 
to his Son Who Wants to Get Married”], in La Literatura de Los Guaraníes 
[Guaraní Literature], ed. León Cadogan (Madrid: Joaquín Mortiz, 1970), 
n.p. In Apologética Historia, De las Casas refers to a good number of these 




Bartolomé de las Casas wrote.15 The Indian “women” became the 
raped mother, whose child is the Indian orphan or Latin Ameri-
can Mestizo. Before Mestizo children existed, the Amerindian 
orphans wandered America. They were the object of a pedagogy 
of dominance, as the conquistadors “came and extended their 
power over the motherless and fatherless children.”16 In any 
case, though not an orphan, the Amerindian child inaugurat-
ed a new pedagogical style: “Thus was born my son Diego. We 
found ourselves in Bocó (Chimaltenango) when he was born on 
day six of Tzi. Oh my son! We then started to pay taxes. We took 
so many pains to end the war. We were in great danger of dying 
twice.”17 Thus commenced the introjection of Amerindian chil-
dren into the new colonial educational system and West Indian 
Christendom as a whole. Something was buried at that moment 
which would take centuries to recover:
I found ridiculous the attempt to use masks of Bandiagara, 
African ibeyes, fetishes studded with nails, without know-
ing their meaning, as battering rams against the redoubts of 
the Discourse on Method. They were looking for barbarism 
in things that had never been barbarous when fulfilling their 
ritual function in the setting for which they were designed. 
By labeling such things “barbarous” the labelers [sic], though 
we can amend it, were putting themselves in the thinking, 
the Cartesian, position, the very opposite of the aim they 
were pursuing.18
If the Latin American erotic process originated in the con-
quistador’s domination over the Indian woman, and if the po-
15 This is the epigraph at the beginning of the first published volume of my 
Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana, and is its frontispiece.
16 Barrera Vásquez, ed., Libro de los Libros de Chilam Balan [The Book of Books 
of Chilam Balam] (Mexico: FCE, Biblioteca Americana, 1948), 98.
17 Recinos, Memoria de Sololá, 162.
18 Carpentier, Lost Steps, 228. (This great writer’s last book — The Resource of 
Method, published in 1974 —  is a critique of modern Cartesian-European 
rationalism, much of which these short lines express.)
71
Symbols and Pedagogics
litical process originated through the Spanish murdering and 
dominating the erstwhile Indian, then pedagogical domination, 
properly speaking, began with the indoctrination that preceded 
and followed that conquest (and not by the evangelization inde-
pendent of conquest which Bartolomé de las Casas, the Jesuits, 
or Franciscans proposed, with their abridgements and enlight-
ened personalities from the sixteenth century).19 In general, his-
tories of pedagogy (as teaching and learning) do not emphasize 
how important the acculturation of Amerindian consciousness 
by the missionaries really was. The same may be said of histo-
ries of Latin American culture.20 The Amerindian world trans-
19 See the difference between the dialectical domination which conquest sup-
poses, and the analectic liberation quality of authentic evangelization in 
Enrique Dussel, América Latina, Dependencia y Liberación [Latin Ameri-
ca, Dependence and Liberation] (Buenos Aires: Editorial Fernando García 
Cambeiro, 1973), especially in “Historia de la Fe Cristiana y Cambio Social 
en América Latina” [“History of the Christian Faith and Social Change in 
Latin America”], 193. Regarding the process of evangelization, see Enrique 
Dussel, ed., Bartolomé de las Casas (1474–1974) e Historia de la Iglesia en 
América Latina II: Encuentro Latinoamericano de CEHILA en Chiapas [Bar-
tolomé de las Casas (1474–1974) and the History of the Church in Latin 
America II: Latin American Encounter of CEHILA in Chiapas] (Barcelona: 
Editorial Nova Terra, 1974), where you will find a short bibliography.
20 See my essay Enrique Dussel, “La Evangelización como Proceso de Acultu-
ración” [“Evangelization as a Process of Acculturation”], in América Latina 
y Conciencia Cristiana [Latin America and Christian Consciousness] (Quito: 
Departamento de Pastoral CELAM, Colleción IPLA, 1970), 74–76, at 74. For 
a sketch of the history of Latin American pedagogy, see Tomás Vasconi, 
“La Evolución de los Sistemas Educativos Latinoamericanos” [“Evolution 
of Latin American Systems of Education”], in Educación y Cambio Social 
[Education and Social Change] (Santiago: CESO, 1967), 39–54, at 39. On the 
educational problems during the time of Indian Christendom, see Felix Zu-
billaga and Antonio de Egaña, Historia de la Iglesia en la América Española 
[History of the Church in Spanish America] (Madrid: BAC, 1965), 597 and 
1068. For a prototypical history of pedagogy, see in Esteban Fontana, “Sem-
blanza Histórica del Colegio Nacional de Mendoza” [“Historical Sketch of 
the National School of Mendoza”], Cuyo 3 (1967): 43–88, and “Los Centros 
de Enseñanza de la Filosofía en la Argentina durante el Periodo Hispánico” 
[“The Teaching Centers of Philosophy in Argentina during the Spanish Pe-
riod”], Cuyo 7 (1971): 83–146.
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formed amid the ultimate foundations of Hispanic-European 
Christendom’s culture and its preachings. In this Christianity
the Indians, now orphans, the ties to their ancient cultures 
severed, both their gods and cities dead, find a place in the 
world […]. It is often forgotten that to belong to the Catholic 
faith meant that one found a place in the cosmos. The flight 
of their gods and the death of their leaders had left the na-
tives in a solitude so complete that it is difficult for a modern 
man to imagine it.21
This is how Latin American pedagogics began (Hispanic peda-
gogics as paternal and the Amerindian pedagogics as maternal): 
ideological domination in the name of the most sublime pro-
jects, delivered through the benedictions of papal bulls and of 
the Catholic Monarchs.
But the child in this case, properly speaking, is the Latin 
American Mestizo. This Mestizo, generation after generation, 
creates a new culture22; a culture separate, however, from every 
other culture; a culture that ignores its distinctness, that has not 
yet been dis-covered, where “[s]olitude and original become 
one and the same.”23 This new culture arrives “[o]f a nameless 
wrong: that of having been born”24; born of the Amerindian 
woman, born of
the Mother, with swollen belly, which was at one and the 
same time breasts, womb, and sex, the first figure modeled by 
21 Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude, 102.
22 Gabriel García Márquez, in his Cien Años de Soledad (Buenos Aires: Su-
damericana, 1972), 360, creates a hallucinatory milieu in the succession of 
generations in the small town of Macondo, “races condemned to one hun-
dred years of solitude do not have a second opportunity on earth.” English: 
Gabriel García Marquez, One Hundred Years of Solitude, trans. Gregory Ra-
bassa (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2006), 400.




man, when under his hands the possibility of the object came 
into being I had before me the Mother of the Infant Gods.25
The symbol of this violation is Doña Malinche, the mistress 
of Cortés. It is true that she gave herself voluntarily to the 
conquistador, but he forgot her as soon as she was no longer 
useful. Doña Marina becomes a figure representing the In-
dian women who were fascinated, violated or seduced by the 
Spaniards. And as a small boy, he will not forgive his mother 
if she abandons him to search for his father, the Mexican 
people have not forgiven La Malinche for her betrayal.26
The Mestizo, child of Latin American pedagogics, is like
a bleeding and humiliated Christ, a Christ who has been 
beaten by the soldiers and condemned by the judges, because 
they see in him a transfigured image of his own identity. And 
this brings to mind Cuauhtémoc, the young Aztec emperor 
who was dethroned, tortured and murdered by Cortés.27
Indian Christendom, with its catechisms, schools, and universi-
ties — from the high school in Santo Domingo in 1538, to the 
universities in Lima and Mexico in 1553 — created a Mestizo cul-
ture with a three-part internal contradiction. The culture simul-
taneously contained the imperial culture or “center,” the high 
culture of the chiefly oligarchy, and the people’s culture of the 
Mestizos, Negroes, Indians, Zambos, etc.28 The people’s culture, 
25 Carpentier, Lost Steps, 165.
26 Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude, 86.
27 Ibid., 83.
28 See Enrique Dussel, “Cultura Imperial, Cultura Ilustrada y Liberación de 
la Cultura Popular” [“Imperial Culture, High Culture, and Liberation of 
Popular Culture”], Stromata 30 (1974): 93–123, and an earlier piece I wrote 
before the explicit discovery of the doctrine of dependence: Enrique Dussel, 
“Cultura, Cultura Latinoamericana y Cultura Nacional” [“Culture, Latin 
American Culture, and National Culture”], Cuyo 4 (1968): 7–40. 
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the most authentic and distinct part of our new America, is con-
solidated around symbols such as
the cult of the Virgin of Guadalupe [and many other invoca-
tions like that of Copacabana, etc]. In the first place, she is 
an Indian Virgin, in the second place, the scene of her ap-
pearance to the Indian Juan Diego was a hill that formerly 
contained a sanctuary dedicated to Tonantzin, “Our Mother,” 
the Aztec goddess of fertility.29
These symbols predate the macho Hispanic conquistador. Thus 
“in contrast to Guadalupe, who is the Virgin Mother, the Chin-
gada is the violated Mother.”30 The Virgin is the new culture, 
a mother without a father, unraped, pure. Here we find Latin 
America, the new, the positive, the mother without sin, undom-
inated, hopeful; where the Indian (before his domination) and 
the Latin American are united in the time of their liberation.
Regarding that uniquely Latin American and mestizo cul-
ture, the people’s culture, the colonizer’s judgement will forever 
weigh heavily on it as the colonized:
Who decides that laziness is constitutive of the essence of the 
colonized […]. [But] the colonizer adds, so as not to give into 
the idea the colonized are perverse ignoramuses, with bad 
instincts, thieves and a little sadistic, legitimize their policing 
and just severity at the same time.31
29 Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude, 84.
30 Ibid., 85.
31 Albert Memmi, Retrato del Colonizado [Portrait of the Colonized] (Buenos 
Aires: Ediciones de la Flor, 1969), 93. The similarity between Algeria and 
Tunisia in the twentieth century and the Amerindian in the sixteenth cen-
tury is apparent here. One can read the judgmental comments about the 
Indians made by the conquistador and from the culture of bureaucratic, 
Hispanic, colonizers; in their seminars they said the Indians were “inclined 
to lust” which is why they could not be priests; “bestial and badly inclined” 
Fernandez de Oviedo called them; the American Councils (so just in other 
respects) considered them “rude” or like children, etcetera.
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This judgment of the people’s culture will penetrate profoundly 
into Latin America’s new pedagogical era.
In effect, a new generation, born after the battles for neoco-
lonial emancipation began in the nineteenth century, produced 
a rupture: “The Reform movement is the great rupture with the 
Mother,”32 with the ancestral past, from Juarez until Sarmiento. 
“Catholicism was imposed by a minority of strangers after a 
military conquest; liberalism was imposed by a native minority, 
though its intellectual formation was French, after a civil war.”33 
The neocolonial State, dependent on Anglos (meaning England 
and the United States), enacts a pedagogical betrayal of the past 
and dominates the community. In our Latin America:
at the same time, one can see two civilizations on the same 
soil: a nascent one, which ignorant of what it carries on its 
shoulders copies the naive and popular efforts of the Middle 
Ages; another which without taking care what lies at its feet 
tries to bring about the crowning achievements of European 
civilization. The nineteenth and seventeenth centuries live 
together, one within the cities, the other in the country.34 
32 Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude, 88. This rupture with the “mother” is such 
that in the case of Sarmiento, it would be good to perform a concrete analy-
sis of the mother–child relationship, to tease apart the sense of the negation 
of the popular Latin American culture as a negation of the mother and a 
correlating affirmation of the father (in this case, the successors of the con-
quistadors Cortés or Pizarro are England, France, and the United States).
33 Ibid., 127. In Mexico the emergence of liberalism is called The Reform 
Movement (c. 1857). For his part, Paz tells us that “the positivist disguise was 
not intended to deceive the people but to hide the moral nakedness of the 
regime from its own leaders and beneficiaries […]. After a hundred years 
of struggle the people found themselves more alone than ever, with their 
religious life impoverished and their popular culture debased. We had lost 
our historical orientation” (132). Regarding the French influence in Latin 
America there is nothing better than reviving it from within the work of 
Alejo Carpentier, El Siglo de las Luces (Buenos Aires: Galerna, 1987), 29: 
“Esteban dreamed of Paris, with its art exhibitions, its intellectual cafés, its 
literary life.” English: Alejo Carpentier, Explosion in a Cathedral, trans. John 
Sturrick (London: Minerva, 1991), 22.
34 Domingo Sarmiento, Facundo (Buenos Aires: Losada, 1967), 51. English: 
Domingo F. Sarmiento, Facundo: Civilization and Barbarism, The First 
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But beware! There are cities, yes, but there are other cities:
[T]wo parties, one old-fashioned and one revolutionary, one 
conservative and the other progressive, both represented by 
a city — each civilized in its own way — , fed with ideas from 
different sources: Córdoba, from Spain, from the Councils, 
the commentators, the Digest; Buenos Aires, from Bentham, 
Rousseau, Montesquieu and the entirety of French litera-
ture.35
It is this moment of bourgeois pedagogical thinking in Latin 
America whose technical-bureaucratic ideal is the United States 
and whose cultural mecca is France.36 The Project here is to in-
Complete English Translation, trans. Kathleen Ross (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2003), 70. Anibal Ponce, Humanismo y Revolución [Hu-
manism and Revolution] (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1973), particularly the 
section on “Sarmiento y España,” helps us discover Sarmiento’s observa-
tional genius, and at the same time gives us an understanding of the bour-
geois revolution’s failure in 1520s Spain (a century before the English and 
two centuries before the French). It is evident that “liberalism” is nothing 
more than the emergence of a certain neocolonial dependent bourgeois in 
Latin America.
35 Sarmiento, Facundo, 59. Sarmiento explicitly proposes a “philosophy of cul-
ture.” He calls European culture the following: consciousness, civilization, 
being, the urban; he calls the American the barbarous, material, nomadic, 
the countryside. One of them is industry, intelligence, beauty, reason; the 
other is uncultured, irrational, coarse, popular, Hispanic, medieval, Chris-
tian. “Quiroga” is taboo for Sarmiento, the Mestizo, the Latin American. 
Saúl Taborda importantly summarizes this in Saúl Taborda, Investigaciones 
Pedagógicas [Pedagogical Investigations] (Córdoba: Ateneo Filosófico, 1951), 
when he formulates the category of “the facúndico”: “He who consciously 
belongs to a society developed in time in line with an incorruptible system 
of ends, will act in accordance to the profound sentiment of the coming of 
time and will situate himself in the historical direction of the ‘facundican’ 
state contained in the phenomenon that is Sarmiento” (Taborda, Investiga-
ciones Pedagógicas, 230), which is rather “a conquest or colonization of one 
culture over another” because “Sarmiento’s educational endeavor [has the 
deliberate intention] of submission to a foreign culture” (ibid.).
36 See Anibal Ponce, Educación y Lucha de Clases [Education and Class Strug-
gle] (Buenos Aires: Matera, 1957), particularly the chapter “La Educación 
del Hombre Burgués” [“Education of Bourgeois Man”].
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ject into the community a high culture (i.e., that of the depend-
ent bourgeoisie, via obligation, free of charge, in the Sarmientian 
fashion via Argentinian law 1420) over and against the people’s 
culture (i.e., that of Fierro the gaucho). This project consists 
in the community’s introjecting a high culture that negates the 
people’s culture, Fierro the gaucho’s culture. This negation and 
introjection repeats the dialectic of conquest: a raped mother, 
a dominated father made servant to the new system, the creole 
mestizo, the son, the people’s Latin America,
They’ll be wandering motherless  
like babes from the orphanage  
already left without a father  
that’s how fate has abandoned them,  
with no one to protect them,  
nor even a dog to bark at them.  
Poor little creatures, maybe  
they’ve no place to shelter in,  
nor a roof to stand under,  
nor a corner to creep into,  
nor a shirt to put on them,  
nor a poncho to cover themselves.37
This orphan is acknowledged at “school” — an institution which 
Ivan Illich will call a sacred cow38 — where he is instructed in a 
foreign culture, alienated from his people’s tradition:
And when they find they’re chased away
as you chase off a dog,
Martin Fierro’s sons will go
with their tails between their legs,
in search of kindred souls
37 José Hernández, Martín Fierro (Buenos Aires: Losada, 1966), 53. English: 
José Hernández, Martín Fierro: The Argentine Gaucho Epic, trans. Henry 
Alfred Holmes (New York: Hispanic Institute in the United States, 1948), 31.
38 Ivan Illich, Libérer l’avenir (Paris: Seuil, 1971), 120.
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over to hide somewhere in the hills.39
In effect, hidden and living “mouth to mouth,” the Latin Ameri-
can people’s culture awaited its hour.
For all Latin America, the crisis of 1929 was a decisive mo-
ment for the awakening of a popular consciousness. The process 
of its occurrence anticipates this awakening in some countries 
(such as Irigoyenism in Argentina).
The Mexican Revolution was an explosive and authentic rev-
elation of our real nature […]. Its lack of a set program gave it 
popular authenticity and originality […]. The revolutionary 
movement was an instinctive explosion […]. Zapata’s tradi-
tionalism reveals that he had a profound awareness of our 
history. He was isolated both racially and regionally.40
The anti-liberal, national, and popular revolutions of the twen-
tieth century newly affirm the mother, that Latin American 
culture which had been gestating for five centuries: a forgot-
ten, negated people’s culture. The revolutions negate the father 
through political and economic domination of Spain, England, 
and the United States. They negate the father through the neo-
colonial oligarchical State, but they affirm a new fatherhood: the 
liberated State of the future where authentic culture educates the 
child in its own home. Rosario would overcome Mouche (not 
just because she is French) for a time41; but the counter-revolu-
39 Hernández, Martín Fierro, 32.
40 Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude, 135.
41 “The bond between Mouche and me was a habit of the senses, and not 
love… Three young artists had arrived… The musician was so white, the 
poet so Indian, the painter so black… The conversation had a single theme: 
Paris… [I asked] the young men about the history of their country, the first 
manifestations of its colonial literature, its folk traditions; and it was evident 
that my changing the subject was most distasteful to them… I saw them 
growing gaunt and pale — the Indian turning green, the Negro’s smile gone, 
the white man perverted — more and more forgetful of the sun they had left 
behind… Years later, having fritted away their youth, they would return [to 
their countries], with vacant eyes… That night as I looked at them I could 
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tion of Rosario will quickly overcome Mouche in equal and op-
posite fashion. Ruth then prevails for a time, but not eternally,42 
because the child has begun an irreversible rebellion that will 
bring about either its annihilation or its liberation. “Noël vague-
ly understood[…] [that] bowed down by suffering and duties, 
beautiful in the midst of his misery, capable of loving in the face 
of afflictions and trials, man finds his greatness, his fullest meas-
ure, only in the Kingdom of This World.”43
This rebellion of the child against the gerontocracies (the el-
ders) and the bureaucracies — not that of the neocolonial bour-
geoisie, but rather the society of opulence, the destruction and 
consumption of multinational companies — produces a new 
filicide and a new tragic pedagogical moment in Latin America. 
Now the youth, which burst forth in the University Reform of 
1918, presents itself 50 years after the disturbances which culmi-
nated in the massacre at Tlatelolco (October 2, 1968 in Mexico) 
or in Ezeiza (June 20, 1973 in Buenos Aires).
The Tlatelolco massacre reveals to us that a past we thought 
was buried is alive and erupts among us. Each time it pres-
ents itself in public, it presents itself masked and armed; we 
do not know who they are, except that they are destructive 
and seek vengence.44
Our new youth, our new culture, arrives here:
see the harm my uprooting from this environment, which had been mine 
until adolescence, had done to me… When the night enveloped me like a 
living presence, I found certain ‘modern’ themes unbearable” (Carpentier, 
Lost Steps, 64).
42 “Ruth, at the other end of the world, who had sent the Messengers that had 
dropped from the sky… and I had taken off into the clouds, to the stupefac-
tion of the Neolithic men… During these last days I had felt the presence of 
Rosario close at hand. There were times at night when it seemed that I heard 
her quiet breathing” (ibid., 146).
43 Alejo Carpentier, El Reino de Este Mundo (Montevideo: Arca, 1969), 121. 
English: Alejo Carpentier, The Kingdom of this World, trans. Harriet de 
Onís (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006), 178.
44 Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude, 40.
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As people on the fringes, inhabitants of the suburbs of history, 
we Latin Americans are uninvited guests who have sneaked 
in through the West’s back door, intruders who have arrived 
at the feast of modernity as the lights are about to be put out. 
We arrive late everywhere, we were born when it was already 
late in history, we have no post or, if we have one, we spit on 
its remains, our peoples lay down and slept for a century, and 
while asleep they were robbed and now they go about in rags, 
we have not been able to save even what the Spaniards left us 
when they departed, we have stabbed each other.45
The gamín of Bogotá is the symbol of the new culture:
The gamín is a street kid. He has no parents, or anyone to 
speak for him. He dresses in rags, he is dirty, he is hungry and 
sometimes begs for help. He robs and commits all kinds of 
crimes. He lives in gangs whom wealthy people fear.46
Gamín, the little orphan, the dominated child affected by a ped-
agogic of oppression: he is our subject.
45 Ibid., 228.
46 A. Villamil, C. Bejerano, and A. Cote, El Gamín [The Gamín] (Bogotá: Uni-
versidad Javeriana, 1973), 12. [Translator: to this citation was added “trabajo 
inedito,” indicating the manuscript may have been unpublished. We could 
not find the version to which Dussel makes reference here.]
81
49
Limits of a Dialectical Interpretation of Pedagogics
 
The pedagogical ontology active in Latin America has as its 
wellspring a long European and North American history. In this 
case, to arrive at an understanding of our Latin American peda-
gogics’ origin, we must include the culture of the “center” (like 
in the case of the erotic).1 We will attempt to discover the foun-
dation, the being of cultural domination’s “mechanism” which, 
with few exceptions, is still practiced today in our continent.2
1 For a pedagogy of the “center” nothing is better than the historical account 
by Theodor Ballauf and Klaus Schaller, Pädagogik: Eine Geschichte der Bil-
dung und Erziehung, 3 vols. (Freiburg/Munich: Karl Alber, 1969). See vol-
ume I: Von der Antike bis zum Humanismus and volume II: Vom 16. Jhd. 
bis zum 19. Jhd. In his 2,514 pages, Ballauf and Schaller not only give us an 
anthology, but a “European” interpretation.
2 For a minimal bibliography on Latin American pedagogy, beyond the 
works that we will cite at length in this chapter, see La Revista de Ciencias de 
la Educación (RCE) [Educational Sciences Journal] (based in Buenos Aires), 
which includes a good bibliography. See, e.g., Tomas Vasconi, “Contra la 
Escuela” [“Against the School”], La Revista de Ciencias de la Educación 9 
(1973): 3–22. Additionally, see the book series Educación Hoy: Perspectivas 
Latinoamericanas [Education Today: Latin American Perspectives] (out of 
Bogotá), which has a collection of related topics from January 1971 onwards, 
including Jose Vasconcelos and Cecilio de Lora, La Escuela Comunidad Ed-
ucativa [The Educative School Community] (Bogotá: Asociación de Publica-
ciones Educativas, 1972); Paulo Freire, Concientización [Conscientization] 
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Leaving aside the Greeks’ notion of paideia, whose funda-
mental thesis we have indicated in another part of this work,3 
(Bogotá: Asociación de Publicaciones Educativas, 1973); Pierre Furter and 
Ernani Fiori, Educacion Liberadora [Liberatory Education] (Bogotá: Aso-
ciación de Publicaciones Educativas, 1973). Regarding social change and 
education see Juan C. Agulla, Educación, Sociedad, y Cambio Social [Educa-
tion, Society, and Social Change] (Buenos Aires: Kapelusz, 1973); Tomás Vas-
coni, Educación y Cambio Social [Education and Social Change] (Santiago: 
CESO, 1967), 117–30; Clarence Edward Beeby, La Calidad de la Educación 
en los Países Nacientes [The Quality of Education in Emerging Countries] 
(Mexico: Reverte Mexicana, 1967). Regarding more theoretical notions, see 
Alfredo Morales, Hombre Nuevo: Nueva Educación: Educación en la Liber-
tad y para la Libertad [New Man: New Education: Education in Liberty for 
Liberty] (Columbia: Editorial de la Salle, 1972) and Aída Vazquez, “Prob-
lemas de Educación en el Tercer Mundo” [“Educational Problems in the 
Third World”], in the book edited with Fernand Oury, Hacia una Pedagogía 
del Siglo XX [Towards a Pedagogy for the Twentieth Century] (Buenos Aires: 
Siglo Veintiuno, 1968), 225–54. On history, see Luis Jorge Zanotti, Etapas 
Historicas de las Politica Educativa [Historical Eras of Educational Politics] 
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1972). For more 
of a monograph, Juan C. Tedesco, Educación y Sociedad en la Argentina 
(1800–1900) [Education and Society in Argentina (1800–1900)] (Buenos 
Aires: Solar, 1986), as an example of a particular period in one particular 
Latin American country.
3 See Enrique Dussel, Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana, 
Book 1 (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1973), 130–40, in particular notes 354–58. 
This is all known quite well from Werner Jaeger’s classic work Paideia. We 
must, however, propose further reflection. For Plato, and possibly Socrates, 
knowledge is “reminiscence” (anamnesis) (Plato’s dialogues Meno 81a-82; 
Phaedo 72e–73a, Phaedrus 249b–c, Republic 476a, 507b), which is ultimately 
grasped through ontological dialectic. It is a looking back upon “the Same” 
(to auto) which we would see done among the gods (Theaetetus 191–95; 
Philebus 34). “[T]he Same” (see what has been said in Dussel, Para una Ética 
de la Liberación Latinoamericana, Book I, 104–6) is divine: ideas, yes, but at 
the same time this is Greek culture itself. Pedagogically, Socrates, through 
his maieutic method, brings to his disciples the Greek response to questions 
and thereby creates divine ideas; which is to say, he divinizes Greek culture. 
Subtle pedagogical domination! What is more, the pedagogue, who is not 
the parent of the child, takes on the parent’s responsibility and occupies the 
position of the parent. As we will see, the disciple, as in the case of Rous-
seau’s Emile, is like an orphanic entity before the despotic schoolteacher’s ego 
which only assigns the orphan-child the role of remembering “the Same.” 
All dominating pedagogics discipline memory, remembering: one must re-
member that which really has being is the master. How could I have forgot-
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let us attend to the history of “modern” pedagogics. Basically, 
“modern” pedagogics came about in opposition to the medieval 
disciplines, Latin-Germanic Christendom in particular, in op-
position to a new heteronomous authority, as Kant will call it, 
and concealing a new pro-ject which quickly appeared. To pre-
sent the problematic, we must stop and examine the following 
ideas. First, as a fundamental thesis, in the manner which Freud 
wrote to his friend Fliess, it is necessary to comprehend that 
“our old world [was] governed by authority just as the new is 
governed by the dollar,”4 and that the ancient pedagogics of the 
disciplines transitioned to the new pedagogics of liberty (thanks 
to the critiques of Vives, Montaigne, and Fénelon). Second, an-
other aspect is the discovery that, in reality, the new conquering 
urban culture and imperial bourgeoisie culture negated and re-
placed feudal-rural authority (Rousseau’s Émile is a good exam-
ple). Manipulated subtly by the schoolteacher’s ego, the disciple 
transforms into an orphanic entity (entity with neither father 
nor mother: orphan). This ego is the constituent which impos-
es the memory of “the Same” that the orphan is, and thereby 
prepares the disciple to become a member of imperial, bureau-
cratic, and bourgeois society. We will conclude with a third and 
last aspect, showing a contradiction produced in the colonies, 
where the enlightened elite remain culturally alienated and in 
blatant opposition to the people’s culture. The people’s culture 
does not accept the aforementioned pedagogical ontology of the 
enlightened elite, and so it therefore becomes impossible to ac-
cept theories like those of Pestalozzi, Dewey, or Montessori in 
Latin America. Let us summarize and look at all these aspects 
piece by piece.
“Modern” pedagogics (which would originally be called the 
modern way) has medieval authority as its foundational horizon. 
ten, or for that matter remember, the newness that the disciple is, if he has 
never been but rather will be?
4 Sigmund Freud, Briefe (Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag, 1960), 244. English trans-
lation taken from: Sigmund Freud, Origins of Psycho-Analysis: Letters to 




“Modern” pedagogics rebels against this medieval organization 
of discipline in Latin-Germanic Christendom. Over the course 
of centuries “the Christian community organized in its bosom a 
bureaucratic-political structure (especially the Holy See, with its 
monarchic rights and ultra-center practices),”5 which would put 
in place a highly productive and efficient educational system. 
The existence of pedagogical institutions (from Catholic schools 
to universities) is least important here, as well as the fact that the 
Pope assumed the ultimate position of imago patris (the figure 
of the “father” before the “mother” Church). What is fundamen-
tal is that the censure (in its political and psychological sense) is 
introjected by the guilty subjectivity.
Here we have a new topic of research, thanks to which, ac-
cording to my hypothesis, it is possible to establish corre-
spondence between two existing planes: the Superego which 
tries to unmask analytical discourse, and the culture’s Super-
ego effectively exercised in a canonical text.6
The compulsory nature of censure makes it an inevitable impo-
sition when confronted with feelings of holy fear. The potential 
penitent faces a lack which enshrouds him. He feels as though 
he deserves a tremendous punishment. The collective power of 
the parents and the State accrue in the sacerdotal figure, bring-
ing it into being. This figure ascends to the primacy of “divine 
and natural laws” over “human laws,” the “roman pontificate” 
5 Pierre Legendre, L’amour du censeur: Essai sur l’ordre dogmatique (Paris: 
Seuil, 1974), 26. This suggestive work, which delimits the erotic in order 
to realize a social-political hermeneutic of medieval rights, lets us go from 
canonical text to psychoanalytic and political text. Do not confuse, in the 
following exposition, Christianity (a culture with which we will deal pres-
ently) and Christianism (a religion which will not occupy us here).
6 Ibid., 26. See in this text, particularly, the chapter called “L’ordre sexuel et 
sa terreur” [“The Sexual Order and its Terror”], 124–42 and “Politique des 
confesseurs” [“The Politics of the Confessors”], 143–64. This has nothing in 
common with the superficial and unilateral critiques of Latin American lib-
erals. Consult also Gabriel le Bras, Institutions ecclésiastiques de la chrétienté 
medievale (Paris: Bloud & Gray, 1959).
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over the “roman emperor” and “the clergy” over the “laymen.” 
The sacerdotal figure produces a canonical pedagogical struc-
ture wherein the educated remains dumbfounded before the 
auctoritas sacra. We must remember that this canonical peda-
gogical structure has taken the form of a particular culture, fre-
quently serving concrete groups, determinate communities, and 
certain historical interests. I am referring, in other words, to the 
equivocation on “Christianity” revealed by Kierkegaard.
Opposing the pontiff ’s ego, the feudal lords in rural areas 
act within the institutions of authority composing medieval 
censure. The obedient object of that censure desires something 
masochistic, and thus a new pedagogics arises to cast its prede-
cessor as an enemy. This new educated subject’s self-conscious-
ness constitutes the ascending and expanding bourgeoisie. The 
city-dweller (Burg in ancient German) paves the way for a new 
ego laboro, building this new ego on the same foundations from 
which the first medieval hamlets arose in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. In opposition to feudal man and church, 
the burghers (city-dwellers) establish a new mode of production 
with the fruit of their labor. Their new mode of production has 
neither past records nor inheritances. Rabelais (1483–1553) ex-
presses the newly-born bourgeoisie’s aspirations in his Gargan-
tua and Pantagruel. More clearly, Juan Luis Vives (1492/3–1540), 
in his famous work De Disciplinis,7 criticizes the previous me-
7 Juan Luis Vives, Obras Completas, ed. Lorenzo Riber (Madrid: Aguilar, 
1947), 337–687; English: Juan Luis Vives, On Education: A Translation of 
the De Tradendis Disciplinis, trans. Foster Watson (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1913) [Translators’ note: We follow Dussel’s page references to the 1947 
translation of Vives’s Latin text edited by Lorenzo Riber.] Our critical peda-
gogue tells us in one passage that “there are such things that I would pay to 
unlearn as much as others pay to learn them” (Juan Luis Vives, Against the 
Pseudodialecticians: A Humanist Attack on Medieval Logic, trans. Rita Guer-
lac [Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979], 51). And speaking 
nonsensically about feudal education he says that “if the people understood 
such dementia, it were the laboring masses who would kick them out of 
the city, whistling, booing, rattling their instruments like they would idiotic 
people with no common sense” (ibid.). See Vives’s existential distancing 
with respect to the feudal world and his closeness with bourgeois reality 
(when speaking positively of renaissance work).
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dieval pedagogy as a “corruption of the arts, not as a fatality 
celebrated in this or that sector of erudition or culture, but that 
which was exacerbated in all people for perdition and ruin of 
the entire body.”8 The humanist bourgeoisie task
for the progress of culture requires applying critique to the 
works of great authors, not just lazily relying on their author-
ity […]. Nature is not so exhausted nor so played out that it 
can no longer shed light on things as it did in the first cen-
turies.9
For Vives, the horizon of his pedagogics is not disconnected to 
the idea, prevalent during his time, that “we venture to new seas, 
to new lands, to new stars never before seen […] [and] it was 
with these prodigious discoveries that human lineage opened 
to the world.”10
We can see then that the new pedagogics primarily says no 
to the previous culture (feudal-rural) without yet affirming the 
new man (imperial bourgeoisie). This negative moment is pre-
cisely the skepticism of Montaigne (1533–1592), for example.1110 
8 Vives, Obras Completas, 399. In this piece, after a critique of the decadence 
of studies (either of the arts or the disciplines), comes a critique of each of 
the central branches of the fifteenth century curriculum: grammar, dialec-
tics, rhetoric, philosophy, medicine, mathematics, civil rights and the very 
method of teaching itself. It is an essential work of modern pedagogy.
9 Ibid., 341. Observe the fundamental quality of the pedagogical problem-
atic regarding “nature,” that will quickly replace medieval culture. In Vives, 
what’s more, one can already see the constitutive figure of the schoolteach-
er’s ego: “because with it I — the preceptor — will not be harmed, nor will I 
harm my students” (ibid.).
10 Ibid., 338.
11 See the diverse interpretation of this thinker by Anibal Ponce, “La Edu-
cación del Hombre Burgués” [“Education of Bourgeois Man”], in Educación 
y Lucha de Clases [Education and Class Struggle] (Buenos Aires: Matera, 
1957), 211. (“If chivalrous education no longer worked for the noble who 
needed to become a courtesan, then dialectic and theology worked neither 
for the noble bourgeois who chartered boats in the New World,” 212), and 
by Max Horkheimer, “Montaigne und die Funktion der Skepsis,” Zeitschrift 
für Sozialforschung, nos. 1–2 (1938): 1–54. See also Saúl Taborda, Investiga-
ciones Pedagógicas [Pedagogical Investigations] (Córdoba: Ateneo filosófico, 
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Skepticism, however, has a double dimensionality: it can be the 
Pyrrhonian skepticism defined by Horkheimer (like a sickness 
of the intelligence), or a Christian Apologetic skepticism, like 
that against the Roman Empire. In this second sense, the skeptic 
negates the truth of an existing world while actively affirming a 
fundamentally new world (because every negation fundamen-
tally includes an affirmation). Montaigne, as Anibal Ponce indi-
cates, is skeptical of the feudal world given his affirmation of the 
bourgeois and imperial man. This shows not only a dominant 
skepticism, but also that which permits survival in tranquil irra-
tionality, innocent and without risk. On the contrary, his skepti-
cism (a century before Descartes) is a critique of the authorita-
tive feudal pedagogics: the pedagogics of nobles and censures. 
To the children, he says:
[L]et the diversity of opinions be propounded to, and laid 
before, him, he will himself choose, if he be able; if not, he 
will remain in doubt. For if he embrace the opinions of Xe-
nophon and Plato, by the exercise of his reason they will no 
more be theirs, but become his own.12
Montaigne therefore shows a revolutionary skepticism pep-
pered with bourgeois influence (since the bourgeoisie were 
downtrodden in the Middle Ages). He doubts what everyone 
takes as evident: decadent medieval culture. Today, moving 
forward in time, we Latin American philosophers are skeptical 
of the philosophy of the “center.” We doubt its universal valid-
ity, but we will not proclaim, like the humanist and renaissance 
skeptics (who on their own formulated the bourgeois individu-
alism as can be seen in the work of Burckhardt and Sombart), 
1951), 113–47 (regarding the galant homme) and 161–64 (regarding the gen-
tleman).
12 Michel de Montaigne, “De l’institution des enfants,” in Essais, ed. M. Rat 
(Paris: Gariner, 1962), 156–88, at 161–62. For a bibliography, xlii–lxv. Eng-
lish translation from: Michel de Montaigne, “Of the Education of Children,” 
in The Works of Montaigne, ed. W. Hazlitt, trans. Charles Cotton (London: 
John Templeman, 1842), 59–76, at 62.
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that our horizon of comprehension is nature: ours is a historical 
pro-ject of liberation.
We cannot present all of the great modern pedagogues,13 
but we must not stop ourselves from engaging with the great-
est influence in Europe, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). Of 
course we must focus on his masterpiece, Emile, or On Educa-
tion, published in Paris in 1762.14 To begin, we articulate our ini-
tial suspicion in terms of a pedagogical hermeneutic, operating 
simultaneously on the erotic-political level: the aforementioned 
modern pedagogues, confronting feudal authoritarianism, pro-
pound the liberty of the educated, a liberty to critique, doubt, 
and choose. This postulate of liberty, concretely, is the right 
proclaimed by a man emerging: the bourgeoisie. To educate the 
child–youth–community in the new world one must negate the 
previous medieval tradition. This negation of the mother–peo-
ple’s culture is carried out by the bourgeois father–State, follow-
ing an English pedagogical lineage.15 The passage of the erotic 
to the political is continuous: the father–State dominates the 
woman–people’s culture (as feudalism commences). In the co-
13 If you read, for example, François de Fénelon and Octave Gréard, De éduca-
tion des filles (Paris: Pierre Emery, 1719), you can see, among other things, a 
machismo present in every line ( “instruction des femmes sur leurs devoirs,” 
chapters 11 and 12, 65–79); situated at the level of the bourgeoisie (“She has 
the science of making herself heard […]. It is necessary to choose the serv-
ants,” 70), and how education slowly liberates itself from clerical tutelage 
(“I think you — the mother — could educate better than any convent,” 86); 
etcetera. [Translators’ note: We do not have the edition or version of this 
text which Dussel cites here. We have done our best to find these passages 
in the 1719 version from Pierre Emery, though we have used Dussel’s page 
references.]
14 We will use the 1964 F. Richard edition (with a bibliography on xli–
l). [Translators’ note: Dussel cites Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Émile ou de 
l’éducation, trans. F. Richard (Paris: Garnier, 1964). For the English, transla-
tors have used Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, or On Education, trans. Alan 
Bloom (New York, Basic: 1979).]
15 One has to realize, for example, that John Locke (1632–1704), contemplating 
bourgeois revolution in Cromwell’s England, puts forward the anthropolo-
gy of the tabula rasa: the man born without presuppositions, without a past, 
without previous conditionings. What an admirable educational prospect! 
Locke’s philosophical work on education appeared in 1693.
89
Limits of a Dialectical Interpretation of Pedagogics
lonial world, the neocolonial State symbolizes the father, em-
bodied in the Empire’s salaried teacher. The mother envelops 
her child; thereby receiving compensation from the male who 
treats her as an object (people’s culture suckles its children on its 
symbols and purports to preserve them from the bourgeois state 
and its pedagogy). But the father–State intervenes between the 
mother–people’s culture and the child–youth–community. Here 
an oedipal situation emerges: the child hates the bureaucratic 
father–State. Overcoming oedipal pedagogics occurs through 
negation of the mother-people’s culture and by acceptance and 
identification with the father–State. The child–community, ne-
gating its mother–people’s culture, becomes an orphan (an or-
phanic entity as we have said) at the disposal of the father–State 
which masks itself behind the severe and friendly face of the 
preceptor, the schoolteacher’s ego. The preceptor identifies his 
state phallocracy with “nature” itself. In other words, the bour-
geois man who relates to the cosmos in an attitude of exploit-
ability (this is natural for capital: the flow of wealth via exploita-
tion) claims that the horizon of his world is universal, eternal 
nature. The Greeks elevated their culture to the divine — when 
Socrates pretends that the responses induced in him are divine 
ideas — meanwhile modernity asserts that its bourgeois culture 
is natural (a nature which serves them as benevolent opposi-
tion to the neurotic authority of feudal medieval culture). Na-
ture, being, the fundamental ontology of this modern pedagog-
ics, desires to educate a child–community starting from the 
tabula rasa (because if the child–community was conditioned 
in any way, there would be opposition to modern pedagogics’ 
educative work, an opposition distorting its dominating praxis). 
Without obstacles in its way, without family to predetermine it, 
without its people’s culture to inform it, with neither a negated 
mother nor an oppressive father, the child–community is an or-
phan, a “child of nobody,” the Emile (like Octavio Paz’s use of the 
symbolic). Overcoming that oedipal pedagogics through iden-
tification of the child–community with the father–State is the 
repression of the child–community. That repression is dominat-
ing pedagogics exerting itself upon the orphan. In this way the 
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preceptor that replaces the father16 accomplishes its function as 
an employee of the bureaucratic State, which then replaces the 
people’s culture (feudal in Europe, but Latin American among 
us). Universal nature identifies itself with the prevailing bureau-
cratic ideology, murdering the child (filicide that is plebicide: a 
death of the people). We see all this in Rousseau.
Our philosopher is a genius, and as such expresses revolu-
tionary ideas for a new pedagogics. Our task here cannot be, 
therefore, to limit ourselves by repeating ad nauseum the oft-
extolled virtues of the book we comment upon. Rather, as Latin 
Americans, we will suggest what is never said from the “center.” 
Basically, Rousseau refers to the fundamental ontology of his 
pedagogics, the horizon that justifies his entire discourse: peda-
gogic being or the pedagogical com-prehension of being. He enun-
ciates this foundation at the beginning of the book: “Everything 
is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything 
degenerates in the hands of man.”17 Nature is being, proper be-
ing, original being. But what is human nature for Rousseau? In 
the first place, we can clearly see from his comments that
this education comes to us from nature or from men or from 
things. The internal development of our faculties and our or-
gans is the education of nature […]. Now, of all these three 
different educations, the one coming from nature is in no 
way in our control.18
Furthermore, nature equally opposes what we might call primi-
tive culture, because “it is necessary not to confuse the state of 
nature with the savage state, and, similarly, the state of nature 
with the civil state.”19 Savagery is only a first mode of civilized 
life, and if savagery is better for Rousseau than modern man, it 
16 Alexander Mitscherlich is wrong therefore, in Auf dem Weg zur vaterlosen 
Gesellschaft (Munich: Piper, 1963), inasmuch as the father masks himself 
with ambiguous substitutes. 
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is not because it is “natural,” but because it is closer to a pristine 
nature. The opposite, the enemy, what Rousseau fights against 
pedagogically, is the “civil state,” culture: “Prejudices, authority, 
necessity, example, all the social institutions in which we find 
ourselves submerged.”20 For our author, then, culture or civili-
zation is a prison. Why? Because, in its historical and concrete 
experience, European culture, which is medieval, feudal, noble, 
and Christian, made itself felt like a corset, as oppression and 
repression.21
Human nature for Rousseau is composed of “original dispo-
sitions that everything must be related [to].”22 We are not refer-
ring only to habits, for habits can be both acquired or natural,23 
but to spontaneity: “Leave him alone at liberty. Watch him act 
without saying anything at him. Consider what he will do and 
how he will go about it […]. He is alert, light, quick, and his 
movements have all the vivacity of his age.”24 This is why our 
thinker has boundless confidence, because: “Nature has, for 
strengthening the body and making it grow, means that ought 
never be opposed.”25 Furthermore: “In the natural order, since 
men are all equal, their common calling is man’s estate […]. Liv-
20 Ibid., 37. “Good social institutions are those that know how to denature 
man, to take his absolute existence away from him in order to give him a 
relative one and transport him into a common unity” (40). “Civil man is 
born, lives, and dies in slavery. At his birth he is sewed in swaddling clothes; 
at his death is nailed in a coffin; so long as he keeps his human shape he 
is enchained by our institutions” (42–43). “It is here, from the first steps, 
outside of nature” (50.)
21 [Translator: We were not able to verify which edition Dussel refers to here, 
but we think it is Sigmund Freud, Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (Vienna: 
Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1963), 18.] Freud does not ac-
cept that culture’s value can be negated in general. In reality, Rousseau does 
not negate culture in general but rather, clouded by “feudal culture” or the 
prevailing ecclesiastics, he projected his critique on this culture, on all of 
culture. Understood thusly the Rousseauian critique gains a greater impor-
tance.






ing is the job I want to teach him […]. Our true study is that 
of the human condition.”26 On the contrary: “Dependence on 
men […] engenders all the vices, and by it, master and slave are 
mutually corrupted.”27 For Rousseau, natura (that which is con-
stituted biologically, originary impulses, the tension in becom-
ing that which one is by birth: natus) achieves, surreptitiously, a 
sense which is nonetheless full of content. It is visible here and 
there, so to speak.
Reading the Emile obliquely we see, for example, that the 
children’s lives in the countryside are preferable to the opposite, 
the spoiled and deformed child of the city.28 At the same time, 
we should be critical of the softness and stupidity of palace life.29 
But, in the end, Rousseau is inclined towards the bourgeois-in-
dustrial life because
that which brings him [the child] closest to the state of nature 
is manual labor. Of all conditions, the artisan’s is the most 
independent of fortune and men. The artisan depends only 
on his work. He is free […].30
But, furthermore, life’s liberty must follow a first law:
So soon as Emile knows what life is, my first care will be to 
teach him to preserve it […]. You trust in the present order 
of society without thinking that this order is subject to in-
26 Ibid., 41–42.
27 Ibid., 85.
28 “Among the city children none is more adroit than he” (ibid., 161). “I see big 
boys in your fields plow, hoe, drive a team, load a barrel of wine, and control 
a cart” (166). “The first and most respectable of all arts is agriculture” (188).
29 “If he has the misfortune of being raised in Paris […] he is lost” (ibid., 202). 
“Do not expose his eyes at the outset to the pomp of courts, the splendor of 
palaces” (227). “I would not want to have a palace for a dwelling” (347).
30 Ibid., 195. “But in society, where he necessarily lives at the expense of oth-
ers, he owes them the price of his keep in work. This is without exception. 
To work is therefore an indispensable duty of social man” (ibid.). Rousseau 
finds himself, however, between two worlds, since he cannot but recognize 
(the feudal taste) that “agriculture is man’s first trade” (ibid.).
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evitable revolutions, and it is impossible for you to foresee or 
prevent the one which may affect your children. The nobles 
become commoners, the rich become poor […]. We are ap-
proaching a state of crisis and the age of revolutions, […] 
nature does not make princes, rich men, or great lords.31
This man, prepared for competition, presuming an equal playing 
field, nonetheless demonstrates his preferences: 
My furnishings would be as simple as my tastes […]. Gam-
bling is not a rich man’s entertainment […]. I would be the 
same in my private life and in my social relations. I would 
want my fortune to provide ease everywhere and never to 
create a feeling of inequality.32
Bit by bit Rousseau goes about designing the ethos bourgeois 
as a totality, for which he educates Emile, which is why Emile’s 
education is finished with a trip through Europe, the delight of 
European bourgeois expansion.33
At its core, in its foundation, as a horizon of pedagogic com-
prehension, nature is taken to be the bourgeois world, which 
may be seen in the fact that
The poor man does not need to be educated. His station gives 
him a compulsory education. He could have no other. On the 
contrary, the education the rich man receives from his sta-
tion is that which suits him least, from both his own point of 
view and that of society […]. For the same reason I will not 
be distressed if Emile is of noble birth.”34
31 Ibid., 194.
32 Ibid., 347–48.
33 Ibid., 450. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that, for Rousseau, that 
which is useful has more value than that which is honest, and thus praises 
those travelers who know how to utilize their trips and not simply become 




Therefore, improving the education of the bourgeoisie stands 
in contrast to the traditional education of the feudal world: 
the world of the noble, monarch, and ecclesiastic. The reigning 
“culture” is negated, and “nature” is identified with the nascent 
bourgeoisie.
Thus, “Emile est orphelin”35 because every relation with his 
mother–culture must be cut for the sake of his being educated 
by the father–State (the French Revolution, that bourgeois revo-
lution which adopted Rousseau as its chosen philosopher). The 
question is clear, and social-psychoanalysis can help us with the 
hermeneutics of Rousseau’s confession:
It makes no difference whether he has his father and mother. 
Charged with their duties, I inherit all their rights. He ought 
to honor his parents, but he ought to obey only me. That is 
my first, or, rather, my sole condition.36
At this point, the erotic contract and the contrat social, or po-
litical contract, have been made into a pedagogical contract. 
The citizen has no rights within the State (Hobbes’s Leviathan) 
since these rights have been renounced within the general will. 
This State educates children on its own terms, and therefore the 
family and people’s culture will have no say in the matter, nor 
have an opportunity to intervene as teacher. The preceptor (the 
masked father–State mediated by the schoolteacher’s bourgeois 
bureaucracy) “always” has the child–community in his power. 
In this way, the preceptor is a master occupying the place of the 
parents because “[n]ature provides for it [“a state of weakness”] 
by the attachment of fathers and mothers; but this attachment 
can have its excess, its defect, its abuses.”37 Thus the preceptor 
supplements their deficiencies. Thus is born the modern “peda-
gogical institution,” the school of the first bourgeois state, which 





Limits of a Dialectical Interpretation of Pedagogics
ing its predecessor (feudal culture) and oppressing the people 
(the people’s culture in the “periphery”: our distinct and partly 
autochthonous culture).
Th erefore, ideologically interpretive categories mask reality 
in a perfectly discernible way in Rousseauian ontological peda-
gogics. It is worthwhile to present a graphic which advances the 
material presented later in this chapter (Figure 3). 
Rousseau consciously uses hermeneutic categories, telling us 
to “generalize our views and consider our pupil abstract man 
(abstrait).”38 By the same abstract procedure, nature is bour-
geois-European being, or the pedagogical horizon of bourgeois-
European com-prehension. Th e preceptor is the constituting I 
and educator-as-such. Emile’s curriculum (that which can be 
followed step-by-step in the book’s fi ve main sections) is the 
order by which bourgeois man is educated through creativity, 
harshness, audaciousness, serenity, honor, etc.; in other words, 
those attitudes necessary in a world of harsh competition, which 
38 Ibid., 42.




does not depend on hereditary nobility but rather the active 
agent’s capacity. Utility is the absolute criterion:
But will we make of Emile a knight errant, a redresser of 
wrongs, a paladin? Will he go and meddle in public affairs, 
play the wise man and defender of the laws with the nobles, 
with the magistrates, the courts? I know nothing about all 
that […]. He will do all that he knows to be useful and good. 
He will do nothing more.39
Pedagogics are a moment of modernity’s ontology. The consti-
tuting subject in this case is the father, the imperial State, the 
master or preceptor. This subjectivity understands being: he un-
derstands the project of European man, the bourgeois “center.” 
The father–State–master is the ego, the positionality of support, 
the “from where” out of which unfurls the circle of the peda-
gogical world, and the ideological and gerontocratic domina-
tion of the child, youth, and community. The learner must obey 
the preceptor who has all the duties and rights of teaching (just 
as the State, in the contrat social, has all the duties and rights 
of governance). The learner, an orphan, whose memory of ex-
periences is skillfully facilitated by the preceptor, is the object 
or teachable entity. The learner–orphan is educable, civilizable, 
europeanizable (if in a colony). We might say he is nearly do-
mesticable. His subjectivity is objectivized. His other-world is 
ontified, used, manipulated, with the pretense of respecting his 
liberty. It is only necessary for him to be free of certain condi-
tions (the father–mother, family, the people’s culture, etc.). After 
he is free of these conditions he must be “led” (for this is paid-
agogos) by the pre-existing pro-ject of the educator.
These “categories” will be used by all the eminent pedagogues 
of Europe, Russia, and America. If we consider the work of Jo-
hann Pestalozzi (1746–1827), John Dewey (1859–1952), and Ma-
ria Montessori (1870–1952), to name three examples, we find the 
same ontological mechanism, a pro-ject of dominating peda-
39 Ibid., 250.
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gogy which they never name outright. The first of these tells us 
that “just as I see a tree growing, I see a man growing. From be-
fore his birth, the child has in him dispositions that will develop 
for the sole reason that he is alive.”40 This spontaneism, which 
we must know how to cultivate, will always hide the real inter-
vention of the preceptor, who is an active agent introjecting the 
reigning pro-ject.41 This is why Rousseau has such an apprecia-
tion for Robinson Crusoe, Daniel DeFoe’s character: “The sur-
est means of raising oneself above prejudices and ordering one’s 
judgements about the true relations of things is to put oneself 
in the place of an isolated man […] (isolé).”42 In the same vein, 
in her well-known work The Advanced Montessori Method, Vol. 
I: Spontaneous Activity in Education, Maria Montessori writes 
that “it is the teacher who creates the mind of the child […]. It is 
the teacher who has in his hands the development of the intel-
ligence and culture of the children.”43 Maria Montessori’s con-
tribution consists of multiple discoveries in experimental psy-
chology regarding the ways children better understand what is 
taught to them. This psychology negates, in fact, the importance 
of the possibility of Italian culture’s teachings. But the teacher, 
as always, does not merely expand the child’s natural disposi-
tions, but rather ensures that the child introjects the proper 
dominating culture. We can see this in a reproduction of a dic-
tation in one of the works of the aforementioned pedagogue: 
40 Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, “Semejanza entre el Crecimiento Orgánico y el 
Desarrollo Humano” [“Similarities between Organic Growth and Human 
Development”], in Grandes Maestros de la Pedagogía Contemporánea [Great 
Masters of Contemporary Pedagogy], ed. Francisco de Howre (Buenos Aires: 
Marcos Sastre, 1966), 280–92, at 270. See also Federico Delekat, Pestalozzi: 
L’Uomo, il Filosofo, l’Educatore (Venice: La Nuova Italia, 1928).
41 The problem of introjection (in Freudian terms: “Aggression is introjected 
[introjiziert], internalized [verinnerlicht][…]”: Freud, Das Unbehagen in 
der Kultur, 250) is of the utmost importance in social psychoanalysis, since 
pedagogical institutions constitute the reigning ethos (which Freud would 
call the Über-Ich — ego ideal — or the internalized father in overcoming the 
oedipal complex).
42 Rousseau, Emile, 185.
43 Maria Montessori, The Advanced Montessori Method, Vol. I: Spontaneous 
Activity in Education (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1917), 25.
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“Dictation. Italy is our beloved homeland. The king of Italy is 
Vittorio Emmanuel, and his august consort is the graceful Elena 
di Montengero.”44 This is how the prevailing political pro-ject 
stains the tabula rasa of the orphanic entity (the child), medi-
ated by the bureaucrat of instruction: the teacher!
But Emile will always be more fully dominated when proper 
political society and culture are identified with nature, with “de-
mocracy” and “liberty.” This supposes an overcoming of limited 
individualism45 and an explicit assumption of the bourgeoi-
sie’s social-industrial reality.46 Thus pedagogy’s function is to 
study “the way in which a social group brings up its immature 
members into its own social form.”47 For Dewey, the appropri-
ate “social form” is that of his country, his culture: Anglo North 
America. Being is defined here as the pro-ject of the prevailing 
system, the child–youth–community will be educated in this 
system to “function” (here functionalism plays the role of peda-
gogics) within the reigning order, a fixed pedagogical totality. 
Bureaucratic institutions of education and mass communica-
tion will scientifically introject dominant ideology (following 
the best pedagogy). Imperial and high culture thus transforms 
itself into repressor, a subject Freud studied in Civilization and 
its Discontents.48 Pedagogical institutions are those that permit 
“the culture to dominate the individual’s aggressive inclina-
tion, debilitating it, disarming it and having it overlooked by 
44 María Montessori, Il Metodo della Pedagogia Scientifica, Applicato all’Edu-
cazione Infantile (Rome: Ermanno Loescher, 1913), 230.
45 “Whenever we have in mind the discussion of a new movement in educa-
tion, it is especially necessary to take the broader, or social, view” (John 
Dewey, The School and Society [Chicago: Phoenix Books, 1966], 7).
46 “The modification going on in the method and curriculum of education is 
as much a problem of the changed social situation, and as much an effort to 
meet the needs of the new society that is forming, as are changes in modes 
of industry and commerce” (ibid., 8).
47 John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Education (New York: Macmillan, 1925), 12.
48 In addition to the work of Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization (Boston: 
Beacon, 1955), it would be interesting to contrast the works of Gérard Men-
del: La revolte contre le père (Paris: Payot, 1974), Pour décoloniser l’enfant 
(Paris: Payot, 1989), and La crise de générations (Paris: Payot, 1974).
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an instance lodged in his interior, like a garrison in a conquered 
city.”49 It might even be tolerable to lament this if the cultural 
order was my own, was our own, a culture which everyone has 
procured together. It might be tolerable even if, as everyone 
knows, this “opulent society” is critiqued by those who suffer in 
the “center.”50 But the neocolonials of this “opulent society” must 
suffer the imperial cultural order, this alien and dominating 
pedagogics that is not our own. This cultural order oppresses 
doubly: by being a repressive culture as such, and through the 
oppression of national culture by another more powerful nation 
(economically, politically, and militarily speaking).
The schoolteacher’s ego is an established dominator. We see 
an example of this in the conquistadors of America in 1492, 
who failed during the “crusades” in their plan to obtain “disci-
ples” in the Middle East. This schoolteacher’s ego must first of all 
take away the cultural dignity of the oppressed. Thus Gonzalo 
Fernández de Oviedo (1478–1557) tells us
that these people from these Indies — though rational and 
of the same lineage as those from Noah’s sacred arch — were 
irrational and bestial with their idolatry and sacrifices and 
infernal ceremonies […],51 and just as they have a hard head 
they also have a bestial and ill-inclined understanding.52
49 Freud, Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, 47 and 250. Reflect on the metaphor 
proposed there: “a conquered city [eroberten]” which expresses the phe-
nomenon of “repression” (264).
50 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, Chapter 4: “The Closing of the Universe of 
Discourse” (especially the section titled “The Language of Total Bureau-
cratization”) and Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (New York: 
Routledge, 2006) [Translator: We could not find the edition of Marcuse’s 
One-Dimensional Man to which Dussel refers, so we include this 2006 edi-
tion for general interest);(Henry Jacoby, The Bureaucritzation of the World 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and in Russian pedagogy, 
Anton Semionovich Makarenko, The Road to Life: An Epic of Education, 3 
vols. (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2001) gets to the same point.
51 Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, Historia General y Natural de las Indias 
[General and Natural History of the Indies] (Mexico: FCE, 1950), 60.
52 Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, Sumario de la Natural Historia de las Indias 
[Summary of the Natural History of the Indies] (Mexico: FCE, 1950), 2.
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Or the way in which Ginés de Sepúlveda characterized the In-
dians by saying that
having cities and some rational way of being and some type 
of commerce — things natural necessity induces — only 
proves they are not bears or monkeys and are not completely 
lacking of reason.53
The barbarian is just burly, like a child in need of education, 
unto which the “gift” of European civilization must be given.
The saddest thing about this is that the dominating neoco-
lonial culture has among its people many who would applaud 
the imperial mechanism’s pedagogics. Domingo Faustino Sarm-
iento, in the nineteenth century no less, tells us that in Latin 
America
at the same time two civilizations are seen on the same soil: 
a nascent one, that without any knowledge of what it car-
ries on its shoulders is copying the naive and popular efforts 
of the Middle Ages; and another that without taking care of 
what lies at its feet tries to bring to fruition the last results of 
European civilization […]. It is a struggle between European 
civilization and Indigenous barbarity, between intelligence 
and matter, a grand struggle in America.54
Sarmiento is part of an elite, an enlightened oligarchy, and it is 
to this oligarchy which Sartre refers when he writes that: “[t]
53 Ginés de Sepúlveda, Democrates Alter, ed. Alberto Losada (Madrid: CSICT, 
1951), 15.
54 Sarmiento, Facundo, 51 and 39. See also my “Cultura Imperial, Cultura Ilus-
trada y Liberación de la Cultura Popular” [“Imperial Culture, High Culture, 
and Liberation of Popular Culture”], in the appendix of Dussel, Para una 
Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericanas of Latin American Liberation, Book 
I; also in Enrique Dussel, Dependencia Cultural y Creación de la Cultura en 
America Latina [Cultural Subordination and the Creation of Latin American 
Culture] (Buenos Aires: Bonum, 1974), 43.
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he European elite undertook to manufacture a native elite […]. 
These walking lies had nothing left to say to their brothers.”55
Today, the imperial bourgeoisie’s ontological pedagogics 
does not teach only in schools and universities, but also through 
subtle and ideological actions via mass media. Our children are 
students of Donald Duck, cowboy movies, and Superman and 
Batman comics. From these our new generations learn that the 
supreme value is measured in dollars, that being wicked means 
taking private property, that the way to re-establish an order 
“violated” by an “outlaw” is with the irrational violence of “the 
man.” All this embodies the animated figure of “Patoruzú” (pop-
ular Argentinian caricature from an out-dated magazine), and 
alienation arrives in his paroxysm: When have you seen an In-
dian owning land in Patagonia? When have you seen an Indian 
living in Buenos Aires as a man of means? Patoruzú is noth-
ing but a member of the landowning oligarchy disguised as a 
friendly Indian, who protects the “avivato” (the steward of ports’ 
practical intelligence perverted or corrupted for the benefit of 
the empire) of “Isidoro.” Everything in this story is insulting.56
The “orphan” par excellence of dominant pedagogics is not 
only the child, but the child of the periphery, the colonial or-
phan, the neocolonial orphan, the Latin American Mestizo who 
introjects the treat (imperial culture) by means of the trick (hu-
man nature).
It cannot surprise us then that the most critical student will 
be the university student, the youth studying in those under-
developed and oppressed countries of the periphery. The youth 
thus transforms in a supremely lucid moment of the world-
mechanism of dominating pedagogics. If a European author 
55 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Vintage, 1963), 7.
56 Regarding our following topic, see Armand Mattelart, La Comunicación 
Masiva en el Proceso de Liberación [Mass communication in the Process of 
Liberation] (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno, 1973); Ariel Dorfman and Ar-
mand Mattelart, How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Dis-
ney Comic (New York: OR Books, 2018); and Armand Mattelart and Michele 
Mattelart, Juventud Chilena: Rebeldía y Conformismo [Chilean Youth: Rebel-
lion and Conformity] (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1970).
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asks himself “why do adolescents focus on the tensions of in-
dustrial and technological revolution?”57 then we have to ask 
ourselves: Why do adolescents in neocolonial countries focus 
not only on industrial and technological revolution, but equally 
on national liberation and the Latin American continent, or 
in Africa or Asia? The response is not difficult to proffer: the 
adolescent, youth (twenty-five to thirty years old, and younger), 
fails to overcome the second Oedipal crisis. In this second oedi-
pus the father–State (or social authority) is not given as an “ego 
ideal” but rather as an adult in crisis, as a corrupted and cor-
rupting State (whether it be imperial or neocolonial, he reads in 
the newspapers that the CIA uses eight million dollars to over-
throw Latin American governments, that Ford intimidates the 
Arabs with the possibility of a war if they raise the price of oil, 
or that our governments do not have other means of achieving 
their ends beyond assassinating and torturing their opponents). 
The child of four or five years can admire his father (at least 
for his size and physical strength), and identifies with him as 
he “overcomes” the first oedipal complex. During adolescence 
and young adulthood, however, it is not possible for the young 
to identify in any way with him: they have no other option than 
to rebel against both their father and a society that does not 
give them much reassurance. On top of this, their professional 
futures are uncertain in the short term. This produces a prole-
tarization of the university student, and thus the youth of the 
Third World have a privileged liberatory consciousness.58 This 
consciousness is why students were assassinated at Tlatelolco 
Plaza, as you read at the beginning of this text in the epigraphs. 
The phenomenon of the new left is essentially pedagogical 
(and therefore erotic-political), and Latin America still has not 
grasped its originality, particularly the fact that it has little to do 
with apparently similar phenomena in the “center.” Failure to 
57 Mendel, La crise de générations, 137.
58 See Alejandro Nieto, La Ideología Revolucionaria de los Estudiantes Eu-
ropeos [The Revolutionary Ideology of European Students] (Barcelona: Ariel, 
1971), 267–77.
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notice these differences, this optical failure, may yield lamenta-
ble and joint errors in diagnosing politics.
In the end we must point out that contemporary philosophy 
of language fully expresses a tautological pedagogics: it calls 
those groups in a dominated system “the Same” a priori. We will 
deal with this question in what follows.59
59 Albert Borgmann, The Philosophy of Language: Historical Foundations and 
Contemporary Issues (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974). For an introduction to lin-
guistics, see Gabriel Bes, “Lingüística,” Ciencia Nueva 26 (1973): 8–14. For 
a linguistics of liberation it will be necessary to focus specifically on eve-
rything which is “put aside” to arrive at manageable “abstract objects” for 
science in order to take into account the prevailing “linguistic totality” and 
then be able to study “the oppressed” in this totality (or the excluded as 
“not-being” and thus “not-said”). Examining this we see that a language of 




Meta-physical Description of Pedagogics
 
Let us now begin overcoming the ontological pedagogics of 
domination. We will do so through a discovery of the child’s 
exteriority in a pedagogics of liberation.1 This pedagogics of lib-
eration is an anti-pedagogy existing within the system. Against 
Hegel, we might define our anti-pedagogy as “the art of making 
unethical man (unsittlich).”2
1 For this section, beyond the indicated bibliography, see Paulo Freire, The 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Donald Macedo (New York: Continuum, 
2005); Paulo Freire, La Educación como Práctica de la Libertad [Education 
as the Practice of Freedom] (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno, 1970); Guillermo 
Gutierrez, Ciencia, Cultura y Dependencia [Science, Culture, and Depend-
ency] (Buenos Aires: Guadalupe, 1973); Darcy Ribeiro, La Universidad 
Latinoamericana [The Latin American University] (Santiago: Editorial Uni-
versitaria, 1971); Hector Silva Michelena and Heinz Rudolf Sonntag, Univer-
sidad, Dependencia y Revolución [University, Dependency, and Revolution] 
(Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1971); within a “developmentalist” vision, Jose 
Maria Echavarria, Filosofía, Educación y Desarrollo [Philosophy, Education, 
and Development] (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1967);  from the United States, 
Noam Chomsky, The Responsibility of Intellectuals (New York: Students for 
a Democratic Society, 1966); Alberto Parisi, The Problematic of Culture in 
Latin America, 1974 [Translators’ note: We were unable to find a citation for 
this book by Alberto Parisi].
2 G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Theorie-Werkausgabe 
7, eds. E. Moldenhauer and K. Michel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969), 302, tells 
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Ontological pedagogics dominates because it considers the 
child–disciple an entity in which knowledge and attitudes must 
be deposited. These attitudes and knowledges compose “the 
Same,” which the master or preceptor is. This domination (ar-
row b in Figure 3) includes the child in the Totality (arrow a 
in the same figure): it alienates him. In this case the child–dis-
ciple is that which is educable: the one who is educated is the 
fruit, an effect of educational causality. This causality is an ontic 
causality, which pro-duces something within something. The 
pro-duct (the “guided” in opposition to the view or reason which 
evaluates the result) is a formed, informed adult. This informed 
adult is constituted in accord with the fundamental pedagogical 
pro-ject: “the Same” that the father, teacher, system already is. 
Overcoming this ontology means opening oneself to an envi-
ronment beyond the “being” instilled by the prevailing, reign-
ing, pre-existing pedagogics. It expresses a meta-physic.
When they decide to give being unto the child, the pro-gen-
itors, those who generate someone “afore,” as we have seen in 
section 44 of the previous volume, open themselves to the his-
torical future properly speaking. They open themselves to that 
which ad-vents the impossible, that which is not a possibility 
within myself nor our pro-ject. The “being” of the child is re-
ality beyond ontological “being.” The child is the Other: other 
than the pro-genitors; always already “other.” The child cannot 
be a possibility to the pro-genitors because the child’s being is 
not founded in their pro-ject, rather it transcends them. This 
is not mere transcendence, not even ontological transcendence; 
particularly for those children who overthrow this world, com-
prehending the horizon of the light of being, since the center of 
their parents’ world is always “the Same.” This transcendence is 
meta-physical transcendence properly speaking, because it goes 
us that “pedagogy is the art of making ethical man.” Of course he quickly 
warns us that “man dies by his habits, it is to say, when he has accustomed 
himself to everyday life, he degenerates spiritually and physically.” There-
fore, the unsittlich or unhabituated person we propose is not expressed 
merely in the sense of being active “within” the Totality, but rather is liber-
ated “beyond” the system: un-installed.
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beyond the parents in their being, in their power-being, beyond 
the most extreme possibility of their world. The child moves to-
wards an-other world, towards the real constitution of someone 
“other.” Regarding the child, the parents — because they are not 
mere parents of an animal or zoological individual (where the 
species is an insuperable totality) — are not the proper cause, nor 
the child a pro-duct or effect of their actions. This is a child, not 
an entity. The pro-genitors are pro-creators. With the notion of 
pro-creation we do not indicate a causal act, but rather a mo-
ment of fecundity. With the word “fecundity” we want to signal 
a human moment when one transcends meta-physically, con-
stituting another world, constituting another human, or better: 
constituting the Other. It is a meta-physical act (and not ontic; 
it cannot properly be an ontological act) by which we want to 
indicate the abysmal separation of the instantiation of someone 
dis-tinct and not something dif-ferent. If eros is love between man 
and woman in the beauty of nudity, if philia is brotherly love 
found in the enthusiasm of the assembly, then agapē is the love 
of the Other that is not-yet real. Desire, which we have called 
“love-of-justice” (in section 16 of chapter III [of Para una Ética]) 
for the nothing that is-not yet, is excessive love par excellence. 
The man–woman face-to-face transcends in that newness where 
lovers see the face of the Other, the Other par excellence: the 
child that is not yet pro-created. The face-to-face of brother–
brother, the face-to-face of citizen–citizen, each accepts the 
young, youth (not as a group of young people but rather what 
makes up the young as such: juvenility, as opposed to senility, 
for example). They recognize the disciple by giving space to 
him, treating him as that which comes from beyond prevailing 
being. Certainly the child-youth-disciple is never an equal, nor a 
different thing, nor an interlocutor “at par with the teacher.” The 
child is dis-tinct in his origin, someone new, an eschatological 
history. He is messianic.
Paternity or maternity, as roles, may be cast as a kind of cau-
sality. In this case, the child must be the pro-duct of the thing 
close to his life, his career, his future: “the Same.” Filiality would 
not be thus, but rather the relation that unites effect to cause, 
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responding to what is pro-duced in him. Filiality responds to 
the expectations of pedagogical action, though this action looks 
more like domestication, ideological conditioning, and func-
tional preparation within the system. Filiality is liberty, libera-
tion, respect, novelty, and authentic history when paternity and 
maternity are fertility in gratuitous meta-physics; when they 
to want to have another someone, the Other, with whom to 
affirm, confirm, and transcend erotic love. Cause–effect is an 
ontic action with an ontological foundation; paternity–filiality 
is a transontological meta-physical moment which constructs 
a pedagogics’ novelty. Ecstatic admiration before the face of the 
Other (of the erotic or political), understood as the presence of 
the absence of mystery, is the adult human’s experience. Open-
ness before the face of the not-yet of the desired child is respect 
before extreme alterity. The child that already-is is an historical 
continuity of their parents within the tradition and the risk of 
that tradition’s alteration (and in this sense man and woman are 
more in alterity in their first encounter). Yet the child is also 
“afore” (if that word serves), since the parents love their beloved 
child that is not-yet with an agapic love. This is a love for human 
plenitude as such, where man simply desires to give reality to 
the Other; not to give a form to an entity (pro-duct, in-forma-
tion), but rather give a constitution of alterity to someone else. 
To pro-duce, even the most beautiful work of art, is to put a 
thing into the world. To pro-create is to let another world, a new 
world, be. It is to open from the pulse of supreme alterity the 
possibility of a witness which, from beyond being, is always the 
judge of the world.
Pedagogics is essentially the meta-physical bipolarity of the 
face-to-face of what is anterior to the Other, but in its beforeness 
what is always posterior. The child, pro-created by his parents 
(a prius) is that which reaches farther because he is younger. 
A diachrony therefore exists (a temporality which is neither 
coeval nor contemporary) that is very different from the syn-
chrony of the erotic and political; one which makes both the 
erotic and political possible. The discontinuity of pedagogical 
temporality is essentially diachronic because it consists, justly, 
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in transmission via transubstantiation — as Levinas says3 — of 
human legacy onto new generations. But this transmission is 
not effectuated by generational differentiation of human iden-
tity. Rather it effectuates the legacy gathered in its likeness by a 
unique distinction, newness, the radicality of youth and student. 
The notion of tradition aspires to negate the notion of passive 
repetition, imitation, remembrance. Tradition is re-creation in 
a double sense: to create anew and to celebrate the appearance 
from nothing (the liberty of the child), the history constituted 
therein. This passing from exteriority to exteriority, from total-
ity to alterity, discontinuously, as if by leaps, makes the human 
species an analogical species: a historical species, not merely ex-
volitional and dialectical, but rather properly dis-volitional and 
analectical.
Paternity–maternity cannot therefore hide their anteriority, 
their tradition, their State–culture. The teacher is not an aseptic 
preceptor, identified with the gods or nature. The teacher is such, 
of a certain sex, a determined moment, a community and State, 
a nation, a social class, an era of humanity, with its doctrines 
and theories… He therefore does not have the right to present 
himself before the disciple as if he had all rights, and especially 
the right to be obeyed without limit, like the preceptor in Emile.
On the other hand, the child–disciple is not an orphan, 
though they have told him he is. Reigning pedagogics pretends 
to manipulate and domesticate him. But this is not true. The 
other
does not exist: such is rational faith, the incurable belief of 
[dominating] human reason. Identity = reality, as if, in the 
end, everything must necessarily and absolutely be one and 
the same. (So says Antonio Machado, the great metaphysi-
cal poet.) But the other refuses to disappear; it subsists, it 
persists; it is the hard bone on which reason breaks its teeth. 
Abel Martín, with a poetic faith as human as rational faith, 




believed in the other, in “the essential Heterogeneity of be-
ing,” in what might be called the incurable otherness from 
which oneness must always suffer.4
The poet’s formidable philosophical formulation helps us ex-
press our thinking: the child, the Other of pedagogics, is there 
anyway and against all pedagogics of domination. He is there 
against imperial and neocolonial forces, national oppressors or 
dominating classes, enlightened cultures and others. The Other, 
the child, does not acknowledge the certification which pro-
claims his death. The Other rebels, it will always rebel. There 
will always be reforms such as the Reforms of Córdoba in 1918, 
or Córdoban students, or the students in Tlatelolco in 1968. 
Wanting to eliminate the child–other is the same as pretending 
that he is an orphan. Without predecessors, they are assigned 
the system’s deferred share: “the Same.” In this way, the Latin 
American child is the victim of antonomasia: “he does not af-
firm himself as a mixture, but rather as an abstraction: he is a 
man. He becomes the son of Nothingness. His beginnings are 
in his own self.”55 But this impossibility is the fruit of imperial 
and national enlightened pedagogy. “Child of no one” is he who 
does not have his own culture, nor the people’s culture. “Child 
of no one” is he who has negated the mother for the father, and 
negated the father for someone who playing the role of domina-
tor (his Creole father has been similarly dominated). The Emile 
that can be educated by and for domination is a paradigmatic 
“child of no one.” But, again, this is not the case. The American 
child’s mother is an Indian, a Creole, a Latin American woman, 
or the people’s culture, all of whom feeds the strongest resistance 
to empire at their breast. Furthermore, the orphan does in fact 
have a father: the assassinated or oppressed child, the Spanish 
man who forgot his spawn, the humiliated Creole. This is why 
4 The first lines of Octavio Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude and Other Writings, 
trans. Lysander Kemp, Yara Milos, and Rachel Phillips Belash (New York: 
Grove Press, 1985), 1.
5 Ibid., 87.
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the child of no one is the child of the colonized, but the child 
of the half-colonized, because throughout his history he carries 
the memory of many half-liberations.
Neither the preceptor nor the child are autonomous or un-
conditioned. Both of them are moments in the Totality, but 
both are at the same time meta-physical Exteriority. This double 
analectic dialectic constitutes the anti-pedagogy mentioned at 
the outset: a pedagogics of liberation. This anti-pedagogy is a 
situation which is erotically anti-oedipal and politically post-
imperial, both filial and of the people (and anti-filicidal and 
anti-plebicidal). The pedagogics of the face-to-face,6 therefore, 
is respect for the Other, be it child or teacher. For the pro-
genitor and teacher, the Other is the child–disciple: the sacred 
before which no love is sufficient, no hope excessive, no faith 
adequate. For the child–community the Other is the pro-genitor 
and teacher: the before, an epiphenomenal presence which ex-
ists as an original creator. This original creator is responsible for 
their being a reality. It is metaphysically impossible for the child 
to pay that debt. Parents grant being like a gift! The new can-
not respond in kind with the same currency. His repayment can 
only be valid, in that moment, if he desires to return anew the 
superabundance in gratitude of new pro-creation. Yet this re-
turn must happen dis-tinctly, never as “the Same,” always with a 
new history that impedes the ontological circle of eternal return. 
That circle imposes its iron domination, always articulating “the 
being is, the non-being is not.” The new child is the factual dem-
onstration of overcoming. He is the death of the Parmenidian or 
Hegelian ontologies. The old parent and teacher is the presence 
of existing history, a presence which denies us an existence like 
Robinson Crusoe’s idolatrous “god” and its pantheistic preten-
6 See the possible positions I have indicated in chapter VII, section 44, note 
180 of Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana. Positions 3 through 
10 are all properly pedagogical. The preponderant relations of pedagogi-
cal domination are the fourth (father–son) and seventh (father–daughter), 
which derive from the first (man–mother). Enrique Dussel, Para uma 
Ética da Libertação Latino-americana III: Erótica e Pedagógica (São Paulo: 
Edições Loyola-UNIMEP, 1982), 99.
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sions to eternal dominance. Neither the preceptor nor the disci-
ple are without condition. To be without condition is a false way 
of overcoming the Oedipus complex and political-pedagogical 
domination, since the father masks himself behind the aseptic 
teacher and the ideal pedagogics of the neocolonial and liberal 
State. In fact, the imago patris represses the child, but without 
warning or notice. The “center,” the neocolonial State, mediat-
ed by imperial and supposedly enlightened cultures, identifies 
itself with universal culture, totalizing culture, human nature, 
without permitting critical consciousness. This totalization is the 
empire of ideology through collective communication.
On the other hand, the father, whose position is extended via 
the teacher and the State, does not have reason to interrupt the 
mother–child, the people’s culture–community, if the mother 
has not totalized the child or the people’s culture or commu-
nity. But, as we have seen, the mother–people’s culture tends to 
totalize itself within the child–community when, in the man–
woman or State–people’s culture dyads, it does not provide the 
required satisfaction. When the unsatisfied woman totalizes the 
child, the father then feels displaced. When the people’s culture 
totalizes the community, the neocolonial and oligarchical State 
discovers its potential and actual enemy (the people’s liberating 
nationalism). The father–State’s repressive violence subjects the 
new (child–community), but at the same time produces a guilty 
moral consciousness. The child will desire its mother just as the 
community desires to live with its people’s culture, which has 
been judged as barbaric, uncivilized, and illiterate. Repressing 
a love-for-justice with dominating pedagogics within the ser-
vile consciousness of the dominated (child–community) is an 
introjection of violence. A dominated exteriority is its result. If, 
in contrast, the father satisfies the mother in the man–woman 
dyad, she does not totalize the child. Yet this is a satisfaction 
which requires her to liberate herself (reaching in this face-to-
face the plenitude of historical orgasm). In this case, the father 
interrupts the breast–mouth bipolarity (mother–child) as the 
Exteriority, as the Other, as the poor that interpellates the prin-
ciple of totalization from beyond. He implores like a teacher, 
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like a pro-phet who reveals future paths and calls upon the “vo-
cation” of alterity. Exiting the womb, ending the weaning pro-
cess, leaving the house to play, leaving the house for school and 
even work, some of these exits from the Totality through Alter-
ity position the father as the child’s “con-ductor”: that is, his 
pedagogue (he-who-directs-the-child). In the same way, if the 
new, social, postindustrial and democratic state, the liberator, 
complies with the oppressed community’s pro-ject, satisfying it 
with real social justice, the people’s culture will not totalize the 
community as a State-sponsored set of oppositional, coercive, 
repressive, or leading institutions. On the contrary, the people’s 
culture becomes the institution which serves the community as 
it grows from what it has received into what it is: its own distinct 
Latin American culture, which until now has been in part op-
pressed and, for the most part, a questionable exteriority.
The child, the Other, should be an anti-Emile, “Malinche’s 
child,” yes. It is not origin which discredits newness, but rather 
the way in which we assume that origin. Children of the Amer-
indian mother, clung to her flesh, fed from her breast, we enter 
history into the continuous discontinuity of tradition. We are 
not orphans. Let us simply recognize our real and humble ori-
gins! Let us love our mother. Let us recognize our despotic and 
phallocratic father. Or better yet, our despotic and phallocratic 
grandmother and grandfather. Our parents have rather been 
the community of colonial Christianity, the Creole whose father 
was the neocolonial oligarchy. Margarita transformed into Mar-
got. We are dark children from the margins of history. Accepting 
our origin, we can be the teacher Latin American children need. 
This child, our child, child of those who have taken on trauma, 
oppression, children that have learned to forgive their mother 
and father, they will have a Latin American mother who will, for 
the first time, be able to nurse him on the smooth milk of her 
own culture’s symbols. The father, a Mestizo, son of the conquis-
tadores, son of the oligarchies and the rebellions and people’s 
revolutions, is already the father–State that will not interrupt the 
child as it drinks from the maternal breast. On the contrary, he 
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embraces both of them and brings them to their full realization 
in their authentic and alterative fulfillment.
Meta-physical pedagogics issues its question in agonizing 
hope, because:
Someone is hearing me without knowing it,
but those I sing of, those who know,
go on being born and will overflow the world.7
Pedagogics essentially plays the part of Alterity in serving the 
Other as other, whether in the bipolarity of speech-hearing or 
questioning-listening. All this happens at a political and erotic 
level, because
if the evolution of culture has such a transcendent analogy 
with that of the individual’s evolution […]. I would dare to 
maintain that the temptation to transfer psychoanalysis to 
the community would be something like a pathology of cul-
tural communities […].8
Or, perhaps, a cultural diagnosis of the individual pathology. 
Passage from the erotic-familial to the erotic-political is given 
by a doubly Oedipal situation: the first oedipus of childhood 
around four years of age, and the second oedipus from adoles-
cence to youth (where the father is at the same time “my” father 
and the State).
The child is there. He might not have existed, perhaps sim-
ply because he is not desired, or because he is always avoided,9 
7 Pablo Neruda, “El Pueblo,” in Obras Escogidas (Santiago: Andres Bello, 
1972). English translation of “The People” by Alastair Reid may be found in 
Harold Bloom, Poets and Poems (New York: Infobase Publishing), 315–23, at 
322.
8 Sigmund Freud, Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (Vienna: Internationaler Psy-
choanalytischer Verlag, 1963), 269.
9 See Carlos Trimbos, Hombre y Mujer: La Relación de los Sexos en un Mundo 
Cambiado [Man and Wife: Relations between the Sexes in a Changing World] 
(Buenos Aires: Lohlé, 1968), 155–250 , regarding the question of “conjugal 
relations and the regulation of births.”
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or because he is killed in an abortion. But leaving aside these 
no-to-the-pedagogical-Other (physical filicides), the pedagogical 
perversity par excellence, consider the relation:
(Father–teacher) → (child–disciple, the Other).
The child is born crying: it is his first communication, his first 
word, and though it is without sense it is still gestural and pro-
paedeutically significant. We have called “moral conscience”10 
the knowledge of how to listen to the voice of the Other. There 
is no word so indigent, with a poverty so poor, so stricken with 
destitution, lacking in every security, integrity, protection, nour-
ishment, and hospitality, as a newborn child’s. Thus the child’s 
positionality is two-directional:
[I]n fear the child steps away from the object of his terror; 
he turns to the strongest […]. Looks for defense, help, and 
protection beside the adult who is his biologically, in other 
words, next to his mother. Such is the behavior of small pri-
mates.11
After it has been born in exteriority, there exists a specific cryp-
to-philic instinct (a love which hides and protects itself, like 
when a child covers her face with the sheets to feel safe in her 
bed), a totalizing movement and yearning to return to the safety 
of the womb. This is why the instinct to “cling-to-the-mother” 
is the first and most pressing. One must find warmth, security, 
protection, and nourishment. Grasping the mother’s hands, 
feet, and mouth (or the primitive fur of the mother and her full 
breasts), the child can open itself to reality with confidence.
But at the same time there is an instinct to search, out of 
curiosity, separation, migration, and autonomy. This instinct is 
a movement toward alterity directed towards the constitution 
10 See my Enrique Dussel, Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana, 
Book II (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno, 1973), 52–88.
11 Imre Hermann, L’instinct filial (Paris: Denoël, 1972), 155.
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of an authentic world: first experiences, games, playing hide 
and seek. In this moment the father, as one who is not sexually 
linked to the child, plays his heterogeneous pedagogical role: he 
is the Other of the child–mother, the teacher of erotic and politi-
cal exteriority. The teacher, then, must not inter-pose between 
the mother–child (and if he does “inter-pose” it is because the 
mother–child has totalized perversely, through the dissatisfac-
tion of the wife-mother with the husband-father), but rather 
must advance himself as the questioning exteriority. In this 
position of liberty and free service (as that which wants noth-
ing for itself), he can listen to the child’s voice: “I am hungry!” 
Hunger for being, hunger for nourishment, hunger for culture, 
hunger for actuality. Listening to the voice of the child–student, 
the Other in its poverty, is the teacher’s first imperative.
Pedagogics’ Other, primarily the child–student, in its real po-
sitionality, either normal or an-oedipal, communicates what it 
needs in its exteriority, asking for what it is entitled to according 
to the rights assigned to it by the system, its biography, projects, 
hopes, and desires. To know how to listen to the student is to be 
able to be a teacher; it is to know how to take a humble posture 
before the new; it is to have the theme of authentically pedagogi-
cal discourse. The teacher will neither speak of, nor approach, 
the power of the pre-established gods, nor nature itself (which 
is of course the oppressive culture of the Rousseauian teacher) 
all of which precedes the student. The authentic teacher will first 
listen to the contrarian, provocative, questioning, and even in-
solent voice of one who wants to be Other. Only teachers that 
listen patiently, on the faith of his word, in a love-for-justice, are 
the hope for the liberation of the other as liberated. Only listen-
ers like that can be teachers.
The teacher, from the Incan amautas to the Aztec tlamatines 
of Latin America, bends down with sacred veneration before the 
new and the weak. That is why ancient sages were also observers 
of nature, artists, scientists, doctors and architects, lawyers and 
prosecutors of those unjustly treated. Priests and sages served 
many professional functions in the first Neolithic cities. Con-
trary to our current understanding, pedagogics is not limited 
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to the teacher–disciple relation. The doctor–patient relation, 
lawyer–client, engineer–population, psychiatrist/analyst–anal-
ysand, journalist–reader, artist–spectator, professional politi-
cian–supporter, priest–parish, philosopher–nonphilosopher, 
etc., etc., are all pedagogical relationships. The doctor, essen-
tially, teaches convalescence. We will see that medical domi-
nation assumes a total knowledge of health and “exploits” the 
sick in their sickness. In reality, the doctor should teach the sick 
(and more importantly, the healthy) how to avoid their mala-
dies and how to cure them using the patient’s active participa-
tion. The authentic “professional” (in a noble sense and not its 
“structural function”) enacts a “profession” of service to those in 
need of his “knowledge.” Every profession is knowledge of how 
to “con-duct” someone towards something (from sickness to 
health — the doctor, from homelessness to a home — the archi-
tect, from everyday opinion to meta-physical knowledge — the 
philosopher, from youth to the state of adulthood — the father, 
teacher, from “abnormality” to “normality” — the psychoana-
lyst). Professionals guide others from a state of poverty to one 
of autonomy, fulfillment, and alterity. In this way the father con-
ducts his son to become an equal, a member of the community, 
the adult Other.
The meaning of pedagogics, a priori, is to “listen to the 
voice of the student,” his new history, his revelation, that which 
each generation gives without possible repetition because it is 
unique. The liberating father, not the Oedipal father, lets the 
child be born normally (leaving the womb), cuts the umbili-
cal cord (first autonomy), lets him overcome weaning, lets him 
leave the house to play and go to school; not for the sake of the 
fatherhood-motherhood pro-ject but rather for the filial, meta-
physical pro-ject which reveals itself in the silence of the teacher.
In adolescence, when primitive societies incorporated the 
young into the world and adult institutions by “initiation rites,” 
there is a “resurrection of the Oedipal conflict”12 because the de-
12 Gérard Mendel, La crise de générations (Paris: Pavot, 1974), 138. “In the 
present-day we confirm that the young person rejects identifying himself 
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finitive emergence of sexuality (as drive) cleaves identification 
with the father. Repression of one’s love for the mother mani-
fests itself explicitly in this case. But now, within societies facing 
industrial and bureaucratic crises, the young can take neither 
the “father-family” nor the “social-authority” as their ideal be-
cause both manifest themselves as insecurity, corruption, and 
immorality (particularly in the neocolonial State). “Youth rebel-
lion,” the presence of a truly emergent social class, newness itself 
(“young people”), is a phenomenon which belongs to the opu-
lent society and the situation of neocolonial oppression. Young 
people, without “initiation rites” to reject, resist identifying with 
the father and the bureaucratic State. They resist identifying 
with the “system.” Further, among young people, those who are 
more self-conscious about these situations are those that study. 
This is why it is not strange that social critique grows its most 
positive fruit through student actions, especially at universities, 
where identification with the imago patris is practically impos-
sible.13 Confronting this, the oedipal father (filicidal dominator 
of the mother) can adopt totalizing and alienating pedagogi-
cal attitudes. Let the situation “spoil,” he says. Tempt the young 
people into becoming “fanatics.” Terrorize them with murders 
and torture. Suppress the most conscious in general (students in 
particular). All these types of social filicide resist the same father 
(especially the neocolonial father), because this filicidal father 
eliminates novelty, critique, and the possibility of liberation. The 
student that does not want to identify with his father is an “an-
archist” (who is not capable of judging the people’s liberatory 
values), or is “archaic” (like the hippies), or is simply a “fascist” 
with the model proposed by his father, by the adults and society. He does 
not want to be like them. He rejects the inheritance or what is left of it. It is 
something very different from a generational conflict, we propose to call it 
a generational crisis” (148).
13 See Alejandro Nieto, La Ideología Revolucionaria de los Estudiantes Eu-
ropeos [The Revolutionary Ideology of European Students] (Barcelona: Ariel, 
1971), 267–77. He concludes by saying: “In any case the powers that be will 
try to bury them with weapons of repression and the instruments of recu-
peration. Let us also state as a given that (youth) revolution will never be 
extinguished as long as the provoking causes are not eliminated” (266).
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(in which case he identifies himself with his father-dominator, 
or even searches for a father-dominator in the State since that 
same State is in crisis, feeble, or mired in contradictions). In any 
case, all of these are pedagogics of filicide, modes of ontological 
oppression. In each case, the child cannot express himself.
By contrast, the teacher that listens to the voice of the young 
person, the State that educates its young people and community, 
must know how to stay silent at times, must leave young peo-
ple to perform their historical responsibility. Adults are always 
ready to think that everything is at risk: the truth is that only 
Everything as “repressive system” is wagered. The repressive sys-
tem is at risk because it dominated the community (the mother) 
and thereby interposed itself (between community and youth) 
to quell the young person’s love for a free community. In the 
first oedipus the father’s punishment was enough to repress the 
young person’s love for their mother. In the second oedipus re-
pression by the police and even the military becomes necessary: 
the young man is not slapped on the wrist like a little boy, he is 
murdered in Ezeiza, tortured, kidnapped. This is the neocolo-
nial State’s new kind of filicide. The father kills the son because 
he has already repressed the mother (the people’s culture). The 
teacher, on the other hand, must listen to the voices of young 
people, “let them be,” give them time, push them towards con-
structive action. The teacher must let them love, work intensely, 
and exhaust the generous superabundance of their energy in the 
service to the poor. This is what the young student wants, but 
the teacher-dominator will not provide.
Inverting the positions, the teacher appears as the Other. The 
student is in the Totality, the child, the young person, who is 
not an orphan but rather has a mother and a people’s culture, 
a father and a State. Now it is the student who must listen to 
the teacher. The teacher, guided by the student’s revelation, was 
able to “leave” the ancient system in which he found himself 
(which is an analectic existential moment of praxis with respect 
120
pedagogics of liberation
to the teacher’s learning).14 He committed himself to a practice 
that can situate him in the Exteriority of being, outside of “the 
system” because of his praxis in attending to the urgent ques-
tions of student revelation. “From beyond,” now indeed, the 
teacher is the student’s Other, and thus the teacher can “speak 
pro-phetically” to announce to their students the critical path 
that will lead them through actuality to their authentic future. 
The father–State is an authentic teacher when, like the Other of 
the mother–son, like the people’s culture–youth–community, he 
proposes newness, that which is missing. He is like a fertilizer, 
like the pro-creator of a new process, like a critic which gives 
continuity to what the child already is. What the meta-physical 
teacher and the liberating State add to their child–community 
is the critical sense of that which already is. The child, young 
people, the community lack the discernment of that which they 
already have, between what they have introjected from the sys-
tem (through alienation) and what are in reality (if they did not 
lack, then pedagogics would not be necessary: everyone would 
be adults and upstanding citizens from the beginning and there 
would not be history). Discerning between the worst that the 
student–community “has” (which, via introjection, negates the 
new because it affirms only “the Same”) and the best that “is” 
(but which must be better in its becoming-being) is what the 
true teacher, the pro-phet, delivers as if it were a gift from Exteri-
ority. Discerning between what the oppressor has constituted in 
the colonized, as his mask, and the beautiful face of colonized-
as-autochthonic-other, the teacher’s work is to uncover this dis-
tance. The teacher’s work is to create the conditions for Alterity 
to self-evaluate. This teacher does not draw up the “pedagogi-
cal contract” that the preceptor proposes in Emile (which must 
be obeyed in full). This teacher deals with the already-existing 
student as such, treating the mother and the people’s culture in 
14 In Figure 24 of section 49 of Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoameri-
cana, we have indicated this trans-ontological action with arrow c. See Dus-
sel, Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana, Book III, 178 (see also 
section 36, Dussel, Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana, Book 
II, 171–73).
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the same way, treating the child, young people, from the com-
munity according to what it already is, according to what the 
community loves, according to what would be forgotten among 
so many repressions but was always already itself, like an Other. 
What the student is already is not some neutral nature (the na-
ture of Rousseau which masks bourgeois imperial culture), but 
rather a new history: the dis-tinct child, with sacred demands 
that are unique and concrete. The orphan makes “universal” and 
“human” demands (which, to the reigning culture, are always de 
facto). The child makes real demands, historical and individual 
and non-transferable demands (which always come from the 
people’s repressed culture, from the negated maternal relations, 
the authentic modes of an original and anointed time).
Politically, Latin American pedagogics begins by welcoming 
the revelation of the “Latin American being,” our voice. Philoso-
phy also begins here if it is truly the “analectic pedagogics of his-
torical liberation.” It is Latin American being,15 national being,16 
cultural being, the project and being of marginalized groups, 
youth, Latin American children (such as the gamín from Bo-
gotá)… The symbolic at the beginning of the last four chapters of 
this Ethics express the will to let our Latin America speak with a 
voice that in truth has been silenced, a voice hoarse from suffer-
ing but full of hopes…
15 See my “¿El Ser de Latinoamérica Tiene Pasado y Futuro?” [“Does Latin 
American Being Have a Future or a Past?”], in Dussel, América Latina, 
Dependencia y Liberación [Latin America, Dependency, and Liberation] 
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Fernando García Cambeiro, 1973), 24–36. (See also 
18–66, where I pose a similar question.)
16 See for example Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude and Other Writings, or Juan 
José Hernández Arregeui, ¿Qué es el Ser Nacional? [What is National Being?] 
(Buenos Aires: Plus Ultra, 1973), or, by the same author, La Formación de 
la Conciencia Nacional [The Formation of National Consciousness] (Buenos 
Aires: Hachea, 1960). This theme is becoming increasingly important and 
the question “national being” is taking root in all Latin American countries. 
Sometimes derived as mere indigeneity, or in the negritud of the bantú (for 
those nations which are predominantly black), or in “literatura.” In any case, 
the “necessity” of self-definition indicates a pedagogical reality: the child-
student-community desires to speak its piece, desires to say who it is.
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The child–community, the pedagogics’ poor, is not an or-
phanic entity kneeling before a schoolteacher’s ego like the reign-
ing pedagogy teaches us. The child–community is original 
Exteriority: the fountain of the future, re-novation, life that is 
dis-tinct, a political and familial ad-venture. It is an original 





The “economic” of the face-to-face pedagogic is quite unique 
and particular. It is distinct from the “economic” vis-à-vis the 
erotic or the political. Erotic and political proximity demands, 
for its permanence, the distance of economic work. On the other 
hand, proximity in pedagogics is always already “economic” be-
cause distance, at the onset, is the child’s pre-play (in the new-
born’s first experiences of hearing, seeing, smelling, moving her 
hands, etc.). Shortly after this distance comes a pre-work: play, 
humanity’s first non-pragmatic relationship with nature. Pre-
work is merely preparation for the pragmatism of the erotic or 
political “economy.” Proximity, the child–mother face-to-face at 
the breast, the children–parents face-to-face at the family table, 
or at a banquet or party or a political celebration, is at the same 
time a “face-to-face.” Proximity is immediacy. The classroom, a 
teacher’s exposition, is also a face-to-face and therefore a form 
of nourishment. This is why in the “pedagogical economy,” 
which begins with someone providing nourishment with their 
breast, ends with learning how to consume a final remedy in 
the face of the retired elder’s impending death, living the post-
pragmatic life. The adult secures through her work housing, 
clothing, food and political structure, which the child receives 
by nature of being progeny (thus the responsibility to be part 
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of the next generation continues itself through pedagogics as 
an ongoing historical regeneration). The one who suckles never 
worked for this nourishment in the first place. In this case there 
is no deferment of pleasure for work, but rather a deferment of 
work for the pleasure of play. Let us consider this problematic 
more precisely.1
The most resounding argument for the meta-physics of alter-
ity against ontology (or the economic relation between humans 
and nature, or between humans and birth as their origin in the 
world) is that the humans are born from humans and their first 
relation is with humans, not nature. We are born in someone’s 
uterus. Someone feeds us. Put even more strongly: we eat some-
one. The son-mother relationship is the veritas prima, the origi-
nal experience. On this point we do not agree with Rascovsky 
when he tells us that “intrauterine mammalian development 
begins with the oral-cannibalistic phase in which the infant is 
fed, by suction, from body parts of the mother […].”2 In reality, 
1 Latin America has been more original on this topic than any other area of 
human knowledge. See Ivan Illich, Une société sans école (Paris: Seuil, 1971), 
and by the same author, Libérer l’avenir (Paris: Seuil, 1971) (both books are 
the result of work by Illich at the CIDOC in Cuernavaca, Mexico). [Available 
English translation: Deschooling Society (London: Marion Boyars, 1996)]; 
Ivan Illich, Alternativas al Médico (Cuernavaca: CIDOC, 1974); Ivan Illich, 
Alternativas al Transporte [Alternatives to Transportation] (Cuernavaca: 
CIDOC, 1974); Ivan Ilich, Hacia una Sociedad Convivencial (Cuernavaca: 
CIDOC, 1972) English: Ivan Illich, Limits to Medicine: Medical Nemesis, the 
Expropriation of Health (London: Marion Boyars, 2000) and Ivan Illich, 
Tools for Conviviality (London: Marion Boyars, 2001). This last piece re-
quires previous knowledge of a report by MIT for the Rome Club, elaborated 
by Donella Meadows, Joergen Randers, and William Behrens, The Limits of 
Growth (New York: Universe Books, 1972). Furthermore, from among the 
immense bibliography on pedagogy and educative reality in Latin America, 
we want to indicate the “Decreto Ley 19326” [“Decree Law 19326”] or “Ley 
General de Educación” [“General Law of Education”] of Perú and “Reforma 
de la Educación Peruana: Informe General” [“Peruvian Educational Re-
form: General Report”] by the Reform Commission in Lima, 1970, in which 
the philosopher Augusto Salazar Bondy intervened actively, Ley General de 
Educación del Perú (Lima: Decreto Ley, 1972).
2 Arnaldo Rascovsky, El Filicidio [Filicide] (Buenos Aires: Orion, 1973), 23. 
The pre-human mammal is like a zoological preparation of human alterity. 
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the normal relationship among animals is not cannibalistic, and 
much less so humans, due to the specific instinct against de-
stroying individuals of the same species. This is also the case be-
cause the mother, as the Other, is experienced as someone and 
not something. Cannibalism is perversity, a form of schizo-par-
anoia. The mother’s ability to nourish is an alternative relation, 
which at the same time establishes a face-to-face relationship 
in the intimacy of its embrace, the child receiving nourishment 
as a gift. Cannibalism positions the mother as something, an 
object. To suckle is rather to receive “something” from some-
one: milk, food. The truth is that during the postpartum period 
(from birth to weaning) the child cannot distinguish between 
the pleasure of his guardian’s embrace, the pleasure of labial suc-
tion, the contact of the mother’s breast, and the flavorful luke-
warm liquids which his taste buds sense. This is therefore very 
far from a reduction of the Other to a mere edible thing.
Newborn primates desperately seek the nourishing breast, 
and without help from their mothers.3 With humans, however, 
the pedagogical task is immediate, as the child does not have an 
instinct to “cling-to-the-mother” (of course, they do not have 
fur to which they might cling). The mother must put the child’s 
mouth on her nipple. The immediacy of the mouth–nipple re-
lation is not like some totalizing cannibalistic action but more 
like a fulfilment of alterative mutual drive (the child seeking 
nourishing warmth, protection…; the mother giving nourish-
ment-warmth-love…). This moment is the moment from which 
originates, like a primal fountain, all future relations: human–
human and human–nature. We might say that history, culture, 
the erotic and the political (even archeology) are all born in the 
immediacy of that moment of “being-suckling”; some through 
dis-tinction, or alternatively through di-fference. The ecstasy of 
“being-suckling” is the archaic nucleus of Totality–Alterity. In 
Oviparous animals, on the other hand, are born in an animal-nature rela-
tion and the pedagogical process is minimal, in some species pedagogy is 
null and all is purely specific instinct.




this “being-suckling” moment there is no space or distance, but 
rather proximity: hand grasps breast (it does not work or play); 
a smooth and liberated mouth (like dogs or grazing animals) 
maintains a constantly nourishing kiss (which is neither a shout 
nor protest nor a declaration of erotic love nor a proclamation 
in the marketplace); the body lays in warmth (a warmth which 
has not yet risen like a flame); helpless feet rest (not yet suffering 
wounds from running endless paths). Humanity is still one and 
undifferentiated in this “being-suckling.” Pedagogics will be, in 
an exact and precise way, knowledge of entering the distance. 
Teaching an abandonment of proximity satisfying the child like 
a gift given (not earned) will structure a distance which con-
structs an earned proximity (through work).
The primate mother cleans her child’s skin (Hermann calls it 
“servicing the skin”4), and little by little she raises the child to be 
able to climb, swing, jump, walk, and run. The mother does all 
of this over and over again, with infinite patience. As part of the 
same process the primate mother steps back from the constant 
care of her children so they can learn to complete life’s everyday 
tasks. Thus she builds up their autonomy.5 In any case, the pri-
mate’s pedagogics is very limited: a life lead by instinct quickly 
puts an end to their possibilities.
Anthropological pedagogics, on the other hand, has limit-
less possibilities. Instincts are guided towards humanity’s erotic 
and political life through the process known as socialization. A 
life of the instincts (situated in the brain’s diencephalon region) 
gives way to humanity’s erotic-political life (which is situated 
in the neocortex): phylogenetic evolution (the life of a species) 
brings pedagogy to an ontogenetic level (in every human’s life).6 
When the instincts adapt to alterity, this adaptation serves as the 
4 Ibid., 295.
5 Ibid., 296–99.
6 The works of Piaget, for example, must be situated in this context: certainly 
limited by his experiences in “central-imperial” cultures, his conclusions are 
an important move forward in the study of the genetic structuration and the 
child’s primal evolution. It would be necessary to modify his hypothesis to 
begin thinking about the pedagogical reality of the “periphery.”
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opening of the Other as other, and the overcoming of a primal 
totality. Education completes this dif-ferentiating function, dis-
tinguishing the many moments of the archaic nucleus of “being-
suckling” into mouth-hands-feet.
At first through imitation, and then practically through do-
mestication (what the French would call “dressage”) the “hands” 
begin to play within the space perceivable by the eye. Primate 
hands have to grasp the mother’s hair. A baby human’s hands 
are free, every finger with a unique cortical region, to begin its 
history — which is still non-productive. Therefore, in play (the 
first distance) homo faber emerges, who, climbing down the tree, 
adopted an erect position and then lit a fire with that same tree 
(which signifies the symbolic mother). This is the beginning of 
industry.7
In the same way hands let go of the breast, the “mouth” dif-
ferentiates its function from nourishment to communication 
and signification. The human mouth, which for millennia has 
not been part of the aggressive instinct (such as the orangutan’s 
bite), articulates language, the mother tongue, the people’s lan-
guage. When, at approximately seven weeks old, the mother has 
a “diminution of lactation”8 a fracture erupts in the mother–
child relation, leaving “space” for the appearance of the father 
(who renews his relationship with the mother as well). This ac-
celerates the alterative pedagogical process.
Third, the child begins to use his “feet,” crawling at first and 
then walking. His ludic space widens, and with it his world. Thus 
begins a search and discovery of quotidian novelties which pop-
ulate his growing experience’s horizon. Distance develops. Prox-
imity, that of “being-suckling,” has been left behind for more 
open spaces and situations which, when they achieve their max-
imum distance (in fellow adults), will mean the child is prepared 
for the most intense proximity: erotic coitus between educated 
man and woman.
7 Hermann, L’instinct filial, 370.
8 Rascovsky, El Filicidio, 32.
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By crawling, one can turn on the TV. Walking out of the front 
door gets one neck deep in possible paths (the world of trans-
portation), the countryside, the neighborhood, the city. The con-
tents of opulent society and undeveloped and oppressed com-
munities find their way into the senses: objects into the hands, 
impressions into the eyes, noises into the ears. Growing up, one 
overcomes Oedipal identification with the father. The child thus 
arrives at “school,” the pedagogical-political institution. From 
the house (with its erotic pedagogics) to school and the mass 
media (with their political pedagogics), customs (ethos), and in-
stitutions (State) form and imprison the child. In Latin America, 
and throughout the “periphery,” the question of the “economic” 
and pedagogics must be situated at a political level, because the 
pressures of the imperial system and the arrested development it 
enforces turns education into the community’s essential politi-
cal task. Here we have a critique of prevailing pedagogical insti-
tutions in the dependent nations, maintained by the poor neo-
colonial States. It may appear that success in life is the purpose 
of the “pedagogical system.” But
achieving success in school, work, and love is a combina-
tion which only a minority of people in Latin America can 
reach, about 1–5% of people. The winners know that this is 
how to keep the rate of their income above the national av-
erage; they are also the only ones who have access to politi-
cal power, which they will use as a powerful tool to promote 
their ancestry.9
Let us make another fundamental clarification. Pedagogics must 
not be reduced to the school–student relation, or to those in-
stitutions which we commonly associate with pedagogy. For 
us, throughout this entire chapter of Ethics of Latin American 
Liberation, pedagogics includes all institutional services (in its 
social, political, and economic sense), which are essentially of 
9 Illich, Limits to Medicine, 1.
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three types: education, health, and welfare.10 The last includes 
housing, social security, transportation, etcetera.
The child’s transition from a domestic-erotic pedagogics to 
a political pedagogics also means shifting from a focus on play 
to one of planned learning, which is to say study, and educa-
tion within the institutions. This education is still not economic 
work. Erotic pedagogics articulates the relationship with the 
parents; whereas political pedagogics encompasses the relation-
ship with the State, social classes, both the dominant and peo-
ple’s cultures, science, technology, mass communication, etc. 
The child’s transition is therefore a movement from the psychic 
to the social11; a movement towards political space.
This is the point at which economic pedagogics acquires its 
fullest meaning. We now turn to the relationship between hu-
mans and nature, as a face-to-face of distance, which we will 
call pedagogical “systems”: “educational system,” “healthcare 
system,” “welfare system,” etc. These “systems” have unique his-
tories, they respond to particular demands and interests, fulfill 
particular purposes, have concrete operating procedures, and 
entail specific and determined costs for societies. We are told 
that
in Latin America, of those that enter primary schools (and 
in certain countries, this is only 20% of the population) less 
10 Rick Carlson’s excellent book, The End of Medicine (New York: John Wiley 
& Sons, 1975), cited in Illich’s above-mentioned Limits to Medicine, clearly 
states on page 39 that “obviously by services I include all of them, from TWA 
to fast food restaurants. But it is estimated that the largest expansion in the 
future will take place in educational services, in health and welfare, which 
have been officially turned into bureaucracies.”
11 This passage is contrary and has a different sense than the passage indicated 
by Gérard Mendel in “De la régression du politique au psychique,” Socio-
psychanalyse 1 (1972): 11–63, at 16, when he tells us “the regression of the 
political to the psychical happens when the social conflict cannot basically 
effect itself.” Police repression drifts from the social conflict in introjected 
psychological conflict. On the other hand, when the child reaches five years 
of age, overcoming the oedipus complex, thus begins his propaedeutic en-
trance into the political (his real entrance will come during adolescence).
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than 27% graduate to secondary school, and 1% get a univer-
sity diploma. However, no government devotes less than 18% 
of the national budget for education and some devote even 
30%. The fact is that the financial structures prohibit further 
promotion of schooling, as defined in industrial society. The 
annual cost per student in the United States — between the 
ages of twelve and twenty-four — is equal to the gross na-
tional product of many Latin Americans over a period of two 
to three years. School is extremely expensive for developing 
nations.12
What we suspect is the following: “systems” such as education, 
health, the courts (from the tribunals to the lawyers), and trans-
portation, just to name a few, constitute self-sustaining Totalities 
which have begun to exploit those they purport to serve. We will 
argue that, in fact, the educational “system” alienates the stu-
dent, the healthcare system makes the healthy sick, the courts 
create new obligations and hand down verdicts through huge 
expense (where justice does not matter at all), and transporta-
tion systems cause people to waste more time getting where they 
want to go than in the hamlets of colonial Christendom. These 
“systems” sustain themselves, regulate themselves, and impede 
the general good to such an extent that any foreign layperson 
can pass judgement on their usefulness (how could someone 
without a license chair a department of teacher education? How 
could someone without years of medical training evaluate me-
dicinal training? How would someone who is not a lawyer dare 
to make a judgement in a penal case?). They assume the exclu-
sive right to educate those entering political society through a 
sacred and highly sophisticated liturgy, and they maintain this 
exclusivity from the position of their supposed purpose in cre-
ating a secure life. All these institutions or “systems” must be 
analyzed in terms of economic pedagogics.
In the first place, we must clearly understand the mecha-
nism by which a system establishes these monopolies (teaching, 
12 See Illich, Libérer l’avenir, 111.
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health, transportation, etc). The “system” pretends to be the only 
pedagogical medium for completing its task. This is why such 
systems eliminate all pre-existing and parallel subsystems, me-
ticulously annihilating all those seemingly necessary attempts 
to supplement the limits of the system. Take an example from 
biology. Antibiotics and intensive chemotherapy, which are so 
abusively present in the “healthcare system,” have in some cases 
eliminated pathogens, but have also eliminated other subsys-
tems of germs which are necessary in maintaining a patient’s’ 
physiological equilibrium. In this case the “antibiotic system” 
assumes the exclusive right to cure and goes on to destroy dif-
ferent kinds of “natural” systems which pre-exist antibiotics. 
The organism thus becomes vulnerable to many new diseases. 
What error could the irrational administration of chemother-
apy have made? What is not taken into account is that the hu-
man organism itself, before the introduction of medicine, is 
truly, fundamentally, a “healthcare system.” In the same way, 
the “school system” presumes that the child is totally ignorant, a 
tabula rasa (just as chemotherapy presumes that a sick person is 
totally sick: without any of her own defenses against sickness). 
The “school system” presumes the child is an orphan, without 
any kind of culture (because the people’s culture is deemed non-
existent). The “school” thus assumes the grand task of deliver-
ing culture to the child (much as the doctor believes he gives 
health to the sick). In doing so, this “school system” eliminates 
educational subsystems, such as those that exist in family life, 
lessons from the community or neighborhood elders, and those 
from the priest or aunt — the people who educate the children 
around them. It not only eliminates the most inexpensive, real, 
and perfectly adapted mechanisms for educating the young in 
day-to-day life, but it critiques those processes as if they were 
its enemy (just like the doctor, rather than educating “healers,” 
simply persecutes them as blasphemous shamans). Conclusion: 
the “system” becomes expensive, unique, and exclusive, and 
the community relinquishes its control over the education of 
its own people. Besides an enormous lack of responsibility, this 
also produces a significant distortion in this “systematic” educa-
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tion. This “system,” in fact, does not educate the child. Rather 
it alienates him, steeping him in a culture that is not his own, a 
culture of the prevailing political, social, ideological, and other 
interests. The “education system’s” bureaucracy serves this cul-
ture at any given moment.
The “systems” invent themselves, define themselves, grow 
and then defend themselves until they become like a cancer 
which no one can cure. “Only within limits can education fit 
people into a man-made environment: beyond these limits lies 
the universal schoolhouse, hospital ward, or prison.”13 Primary 
schools, secondary schools and universities, which are paid for 
by the community (since the physical equality to enter school 
hides the inequality of educational possibilities),14 are used by 
the oligarchs, the national bourgeoisie and by the members of 
the “enlightened culture” in our dependent nations. The “sys-
tem” therefore benefits those already learned and educated; 
those who need culture to secure their power. Because the 
“system” is an instrumental Totality, it possesses a mechanism 
which takes humans into its grip, and this is why
future research ought to lead in the opposite direction (to 
that of current research); let us call it counterfoil research. 
Counterfoil research also has two major tasks: to provide 
guidelines for detecting the incipient stages of murderous 
logic in a tool (I would call it “logic of the Totality”); and to 
devise tools and tool systems that optimize the balance of 
life, thereby maximizing liberty for all […]. The “educational 
system” is one of those carcinogenic systems.15
13 Illich, Tools for Conviviality, 6.
14 The child of a cultured family in our underdeveloped communities has ad-
vantages over an illiterate child. At the same time “[i]n medicine the same 
principle assures that suffering will increase with increased medical care; 
the rich will be given more treatment for iatrogenic diseases and the poor 
will just suffer from them” (ibid., 10).
15 Ibid., 3–46. The value of our author’s reflections consist in indicating the 
contradiction of certain systems: they say they educate but they unedu-
cate, they say they cure and they make sick, but, what is most important is 
that the “systems” themselves cannot be self-governed: “With the possible 
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The “productive institution” known as school delivers the 
“goods” denominated education to the public. This institution’s 
deliverable is the student. Entangled in the web of the “knowl-
edge economy,” the student — who appears as its “consumer” — 
is not entirely satisfied, as evidenced by the student rebellions 
throughout fifty countries in 1969, according to reports by UN-
ESCO. The educational system fulfills its purpose in all regards: 
it forms citizens that can genuinely serve the functions society 
assigns them. Beyond this lesson, nothing is worth learning. The 
“schooling system” is therefore rather like the “rite of initiation” 
of secular society. The “certificate” or the “diploma” are thus 
keys to secure a place within the system’s purview. As we saw 
in chapter two of this book, modern education is nothing but 
a system to educate bourgeois, imperial and enlightened “man” 
in the colonies. “Schooling,” such as one sees today, has been 
instrumental throughout the “periphery” (aside from China) 
in alienating children from communities to condition and in-
struct them in the ethos of a society constituted by international 
corporations; instructing them in an empire of money and vio-
lent competition. In Latin America “deschooling” is an urgently 
needed reform of the “school system.”
Consider Law 19326, which was passed by the government of 
Peru in 1972. The law tells us that it attempts to
awaken in Peruvians a critical consciousness of their situation 
and, consequently, adequately bring forth among them a just 
perspective on knowledge and action, actions which they ac-
exception of China under Mao, no present government could restructure 
society along convivial lines. The managers of our major tools — nations, 
corporations, parties, structured movements, professions-hold power. This 
power is vested in the maintenance of the growth-oriented structures which 
they manipulate. These managers have the power to make major decisions; 
they can generate new demands for the output of their tools and enforce the 
creation of new social labels to fit them. They can even go so far as to limit 
the output of tools in the interest of maximizing benefits. But they have no 
power to reverse the basic structure of the institutional arrangements which 




complish as participants in the historical process of undoing 
structures of dependency and domination and as free men 
committed to the future of their country […]. A communal 
education, founded in an educational community through 
dialogue and responsible participation.16
But this grand project needs other educational tools besides the 
“school,” —  as in the Chinese revolution, where all citizens were 
made to participate in educational activities. Thus
it is necessary to overcome the exclusively school-based con-
ception of education, so limited, rigid, and inadequate, and 
take a more integrated approach, recognizing the possibili-
ties of other educative channels that are no less effective and 
sometimes providing a better influence than the school, like 
the family, distinct social grounds, and mass media, to cite 
the most important.17
We must therefore end the “age of school.” The modern bour-
geoisie began this age in Europe, defining it with Rousseau and 
his Emile.18 It is truly a “pedagogical syndrome” which must be 
overcome, particularly in Latin America, that peripheral and 
dependent region where “school” is the system by which mem-
bers of the people’s culture become alienated and excluded from 
16 Law Decree 19326 or “General Law of Education,” 10–11. In the Informe 
General [General Report] on “Peruvian educational reform,” we read that 
“the traditional educational system in all its characteristics always reflected 
the nature of global society’s system and decisively contributed to its per-
petuation” (15); “exaggerating the end, we might say, even though without 
being completely misguided, that we are spending more than seven mil-
lion to produce more illiterate people […]. Educational shortcomings are 
compounded by social deformations and the economics of a dependent and 
alienated country, the most potent of these negative results from those of 
the national system of education” (16).
17 Ibid, 40.
18 See Illich, “L’ école, cette vache sacrée” [“School, or The Sacred Cow”], in 
Illich, Libérer l’avenir, 120. For a repercussion in the European world on the 
question of “deschooling,” see Hartmut von Hentig, Cuernavaca oder Aler-
nativen zur Schule? (Munich: Klett/Koesel, 1971), 136–39.
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high culture (leaving in their subjectivities a bitter taste of fail-
ure, while, at the same time, a guilty conscience for not being 
“enlightened,” thereby passively accepting the State’s neocolo-
nial oppression of their people).
The “educational system,” which begins with schooling, is 
elitist, despite the fact that it is obligatory and free of charge. 
This combination fully expresses its logic of domination in the 
universities, science and technology, and, lastly, and most exten-
sively, in mass media.
“Right now, in Latin America, universities serve principally 
to maintain the institutional order of things, or, at most, the 
extent to which societies reflect modernization.”19 They are the 
culmination of the functionalist professionalization of educa-
tion in a society headed towards consumerism, extreme neo-
colonial dependence, and the internalized learning of imperial 
culture thanks to its national oligarchs. The political system that 
secures neocolonial protection (thanks to its military apparatus) 
and underdevelopment (thanks to economic exploitation), pro-
duces with the university an alienated culture of the periphery. 
This is why the humanities are dangerous for the Empire, par-
ticularly sociology and psychology, which encourage the devel-
opment of critical consciousness.20 In general one might say that 
the highest costs in funding Latin American universities do not 
have corresponding returns, but this is because they have not 
been interpreted in light of their contributions to national and 
19 Darcy Ribeiro, La Universidad Latinoamericana [The Latin American Uni-
versity] (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1971), 100 (see the bibliography 
on pages 303–14). In addition to this text by Ribeiro — the most important 
in its genre — we should also mention his Darcy Ribeiro, La Universidad 
Nueva: Un Proyecto [The New University: A Project] (Venezuela: Fundacion 
Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1973).
20 See “Imperio, Universidad y CIA” [“Empire, University, and the CIA”], in 
Héctor Silva Michelena and Heinz Rudolf Sonntag, Universidad, Depend-
encia y Revolución [University, Dependency and Revolution] (Mexico: Siglo 
Veintiuno, 1971), 141–50. Regarding the question “Is a Sociology of Lib-
eration Possible?” see Orlando Fals Borda, Ciencia Propia y Colonialismo 




social processes of liberation. Brain drain is one small indica-
tion of these frightful contradictions.
The complex formed by science and technology faces a simi-
lar situation. A long colonial and neocolonial history has left 
Latin America extremely dependent on science and technology 
from the “center.”21 But, what is worse, epistemological blindness 
prevents researchers from taking full responsibility for the poli-
tics of their science. Oscar Varsavsky has shown the inherent 
fallacy in thinking that the sciences access a “universal objectiv-
ity,” as in physics and mathematics. The validity of this objectiv-
ity is always conditioned by economic and political forces which 
frequently go unnoticed by Latin American scientists: 
The loss of the developmentalist-scientistic illusion allows 
the general problem of science’s mission in society to become 
politicized. We may come to the conclusion that it is directly 
involved in the process of replacing [society] with a better 
one […] it is clear that by pleading against the current system 
leads to the acceptance of all the critiques raised by the rebel 
groups, in all countries and all ages.22
It is still true therefore that intellectuals’ responsibility in the 
“center” is much more pressing, particularly in the United States 
and Europe, as Chomsky and Marcuse have noted.23 Depend-
21 See Helio Jaguaribe, Desarrollo Económico y Desarrollo Politico [Economic 
and Political Development] (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1964), 23–49; Amílcar 
Herrera, Ciencia y Política en América Latina [Science and Politics in Latin 
America] (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1971); and for a book on the “center,” 
see Jean J. Salomon, Ciencia y Política [Science and Politics] (Mexico: Siglo 
Veintiuno, 1974), 265–77.
22 Oscar Varsavsky, Ciencia, Política y Cientificismo [Science, Politics, and 
Scientificism] (Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual, 1971), 79–80. La Revista 
Ciencia Nueva (out of Buenos Aires) has included a good amount of critical 
material on this issue.
23 The profound origin of “radical” thought in the center has diverse begin-
nings. We will recount one of them. Before World War II, Edmund Hus-
serl, Die Krisis der europäische Wissenschaften (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), 
149, indicated the ontological priority of the “lifeworld” (Lebenswelt, that 
is, “what is given” or Vorgegebenheit): science is a thematic plane emerg-
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ing from the non-thematic horizon of the quotidian. From this hypothesis, 
Martin Heidegger, Die Frage nach dem Ding (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1962), 
68, shows similarly that the question of the thing comes after the question of 
Being and of the world: science — since the Renaissance — assumes a natu-
ral comprehension. In this tradition, though mediated by the findings of the 
Frankfurt School, see Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (New York: 
Routledge, 2013) (see part II, chapters 6 and 7, on technological rational-
ity and positivism) [Translators’ Note: Dussel did not provide the English 
citation here]. Noam Chomsky’s American Power and the New Mandarins 
(London: Penguin Books, 2003) explicitly situates the problem of science, 
technology, and the “intellectual” in an ethical-political reflection starting 
from the war in Vietnam. Chomsky offers an x-ray of the intellectual “war-
rior”: “The intelligentsia’s new technical access to power: Is an illusion or an 
increasing reality? (26). Thus begins the critique of universality’s pretend 
objectivity in the sciences. On the other hand, there is something called the 
“human sciences” which begin to discover their ethical-political priority 
over the “natural sciences” (be them exact or factical). See Stephan Strasser, 
Phénoménologie et sciences de l’homme (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1967). An-
other aspect of the redefinition of science, technology, and the function 
given to the intellectual from the “center” may be found in Antonio Gram-
sci’s thought, Antonio Gramsci, “The Formation of Intellectuals,” in Selec-
tions from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 3–23, which tells 
us that “[t]he mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist 
in eloquence, which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and 
passions, but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, organ-
izer, ‘permanent persuader’ and not just a simple orator (but superior at 
the same time to the abstract mathematical spirit); from technique-as-work 
one proceeds to technique-as-science and to the humanistic conception of 
history, without which one remains ‘specialized’ and does not become ‘di-
rective’ (specialized and political)” (10). Gramsci thinks that the intellectual 
can be revolutionary if they are organically united with the community. 
For the periphery, see Mao Tse-tung’s thinking, “Recruit Large Numbers 
of Intellectuals,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. II (Peking: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1967) 301–3, where he declares that “[w]ithout the partici-
pation of the intellectuals victory in the revolution is impossible.” We have 
seen that neocolonial imperialism first eliminates the intellectuals; this is 
the case in Brazil, Chile, Zaire, or Czechoslovakia. Those in the “human 
sciences,” the liberatory critics, are persecuted in particular. The best “work 
horse” the center has to complete its domination is therefore scientific posi-
tivism (see Ernest Gellner, “Review of Theodor W. Adorno et al., “The Posi-
tivist Dispute in German Sociology,” British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 34, no. 2 [1983]: 173–75), because it wants to have — to a structured 
epistemological extent — total moral, political, and human interpolation: its 
fake “objectivity” transforms itself into an “innocent” weapon.
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ence on technology is the subtlest and imprisoning of depend-
ences: it is how the technological basis of community develop-
ment in the periphery becomes dominated.
But the “educational system” does not stop at the school. It 
continues with what we can call the “community’s university”: 
mass media. First among them is radio (which can reach the il-
literate, as well as remote locations across economic levels), next 
is television (growing in Latin American viewership), which 
is followed by newspapers, magazines, books, propaganda, 
etc. About 80% of this entire “system” of collective communi-
cation in our dependent Latin America belongs to the United 
States (directly, through sole or principal shareholders of giant 
companies; or indirectly, through control of news agencies and 
propaganda, etc). Most disquieting in this situation is not who 
owns and maintains the mechanisms of this industry, but rather 
the invisible manipulation of its “ideological syndrome.” Essen-
tially the “system of communication” promotes a market. The 
totality of the Latin American population is considered (just like 
Emile) as a tabula rasa, with neither culture nor history (in oth-
er words, as an orphan).24 It becomes a population without its 
own needs, without culturally-appropriate responses, without 
relevance. The mass media “express” electronically formulated 
models of propaganda and they “create” the desire to consume 
goods produced by countries in the “center.” This “ideologi-
cal syndrome” has a unique mechanism. In the first place, the 
“objects” it introduces to the viewer’s knowledge (beverage n, 
cigarette x, perfume z) are neutral objects, without ethical or po-
litical value. The mechanism plays upon an image of becoming 
more of a man or woman, more modern, more beautiful. But 
at the same time it promotes the introjection of the system, be-
cause the most modern person [graph is here] will be more suc-
cessful in business or in conquering the most beautiful woman 
(like the sense, taught through propaganda, that one is “in the 
money”). Competition, the victory of the strongest, as distinct 
24 See “La Dependencia Tecnológica” [“Techno-dependency”], in Silva and 
Sonntag, Universidad, Dependencia y Revolución, 135–40.
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interactions (like in cowboy movies, or superhero stories like 
Superman and Batman), equally introduces an ethos of violence 
rather than an ethos of justice. Thus the public wants what the 
media puts in front of them, instructing their intuitions peda-
gogically. The media is a “community school,” though it is not 
managed by teachers, officials, or neocolonial States. Rather, 
this “community school’s” administration are the largest multi-
national corporations, in service of the imperial culture and in 
collaboration with the neocolonial elite’s high culture. Both of 
these cultures agree that the new, national, liberated people’s 
culture must be unraveled.25
There are other pedagogical “systems” such as, for example, 
the “healthcare system” which does not teach the community 
how to treat its own illnesses and prevent sickness, but rather 
attacks symptoms with unilateral violence, as in surgery or 
chemotherapy. This healthcare system teaches the public, like 
Rousseau in Emile, that only doctors know about disease and so 
their diagnoses must be followed blindly. The healthcare system 
teaches the public to obey its every command and not to try and 
understand its mystery, since that encourages the dangerous 
quackery of folk medicine and other types of mumbo-jumbo at 
odds with scientific rationality and the doctor’s art. In this way, 
“the capitalism of knowledge, inherent in professional imperial-
ism, subjugates the people in an imperceptible way; which is just 
as effective as weapons or international finance.”26 This quality is 
25 The same way that the Cartesian cogito is originally empty of contents, ap-
parently being part of its proper fundament; also for Newton, the fact that 
space is empty and absolute is axiomatic in physics. Similarly, economics 
begin with an “empty market” that becomes full of “merchants” that sell 
things to some universal, ideal, and pure consumer.
26 See Armand Mattelart, La Comunicación Masiva en el Proceso de Liberación 
[Mass Communication in the Process of Liberation] (Buenos Aires: Siglo 
Veintiuno, 1973), 43, who explains that “the object, the new fetish, masks 
a class which brandishes its political utopia of civic equality among men 
to proclaim a pragmatic democracy through consumption and production. 
Like the aphorism on a television commercial says: TV is for everyone and 
everyone loves brand X.” See also M.J. McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, War 
and Peace in the Global Village (Toronto: Penguin, 2003).
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most notable in the doctor’s pedagogical liturgy, making himself 
loved by those he dominates and exploits. On this subject we 
can conclude that
First, health care has less impact on health than is generally 
supposed; second, compared with a different set of socio-en-
vironmental variables, modern medical care has less impact 
on health that many of these factors (food, care, etc.); third, 
and finally, given the direction in which our society is evolv-
ing and evolutionary imperatives within the same health sys-
tem, future medical care will have even less effect than it does 
now.27
This is the death of medicine, which began only two centuries 
ago, like the ongoing death of the school.28
We must therefore make a new school, a new medicine, and 
other new services for the oppressed. To do this, it is necessary 
to first demystify imperial pedagogics, show its disproportion-
ate costs, and finally point towards a more liberatory path.
27 Illich, Tools for Conviviality, 47. For bibliography on the topic, see 42.
28 Carlson, Limits of Medicine, 154. Carlson describes “The End of Medicine” 
as a transition to “[a] macro-medicine” (61–182). It is interesting to note 
that the old are particularly “exploited” by chemotherapeutic and clinical-
hospital industry, through the doctor, as in the US. In 1970 every person 
over 65 years spent $791 (annually), and only 296 of those 19 to 65 years 
old reached that figure. The “old” (the countries of the “center” have high 
retirements) are the preferred medicinal object (6, 104ff). It would be very 
interesting to take other cases of “educational systems” as, for example, 
transportation as currently practiced: all traditional and very cheap, like the 
bicycle, horse, etc., are suppressed in favor of the automobile and the con-
sumer oil of large multinational companies (both cars and extraction and 
marketing of oil). See Illich, Alternatives to Transportation, 44: “the typical 
American devotes more than 1,500 hours per year to his car: sitting in it, 
going to work or stopped, working in order to pay for gas, tires, tolls, insur-
ance, infringements and federal taxes for roads and parking.” And, worst of 
all, this trend makes us believe the “peripheral” countries do not enjoy the 
benefits of owning their own car. We are taught to buy a car and drive it to 
save time (“because it’s gold”), but at the same time cars produce difficulties 
in growing cities. It is more difficult to live with one’s family and get to work 
today than it was during colonial Christendom.
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Economics studies the distance mediating the face-to-face, 
while pedagogics studies that which freely nourishes, clothes 
and shelters — like a gift of being. Yet play and learning are a 
proto-economic; they are pre-work, a preparation for “service” or 
a preparation for the praxis of domination. Those who become 
oppressors, oppressed, and liberators do so within a pedagogi-
cal temporality. Does everything depend on the “pedagogical 
methods” used? No. But, everything does definitively depend 
on each pedagogical system’s pro-ject. We know that the pro-
ject is the foundation of ontology, whether it is the present be-
ing of a Totality (the reigning totality) or that of a Totality to 
come (the pro-ject of liberation).1 We also know that ethics re-
fers to the meta-physical project of the Other (while morality is 
merely the ontic relation of behavior to law, whether present or 
yet-to-come). Thus, we claim that the ethics of the pedagogical 
pro-ject entails a consideration of whether the aim of education 
negates the child–community or affirms its authentic exterior-
ity. Making such a claim requires judging the pro-jects inherent 
in pedagogical systems, their basic objectives, and the ultimate 
1 See Enrique Dussel, Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana, Book 
I, sections 2–6, 21–22, 46, 58.
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ends of education. In general, pedagogues and educational re-
searchers are technocrats, bureaucratic curriculum builders for 
the system. They neither think about, nor question, the ultimate 
pro-ject of the system they build, which is essential. We must 
keep these systems’ intents clearly in mind. This is especially 
important in Latin America, where the predominant systems 
aim towards the “center’s” imperial cultural pro-ject (by which 
we mean almost exclusively European and North American cul-
ture, and the 3% of our population clearly influenced by Rus-
sia). Furthermore, in these prevailing systems, the elite oligarchs 
confuse their real pedagogical pro-ject with that of the “center,” 
negating — as we see in Sarmiento —  the pro-ject of the people’s 
culture. The poet tells us that
you must fight against everyone, and your fight will be sad 
because you will struggle against your own blood. Your fa-
ther will never recognize you. You will be a dark son — Ma-
linche cries to her mestizo son — ; [Europe] will never see 
you as anything but its slave; you will have to recognize your 
orphanity…2
In this section we must bring precise clarity to certain notions 
which are often confused. We will try to clarify the following 
(each of which includes its own fundamental pro-ject): imperial 
culture, or the self-proclaimed “universal” culture, national cul-
ture (which is not the same as the people’s culture), high culture 
of the neocolonial elite (which, while not always bourgeois, is 
always oligarchical), popular culture (which is equally alienating 
and one-dimensional for both the “center” and the “periphery”), 
and finally the people’s culture.3
2 Carlos Fuentes, “Todos los Gatos son Pardos” [“All Cats are Brown”], in 
Los Reinos Originarios [The Original Kingdoms] (Paris: French & European 
Publications, Inc., 1971), 23–195, at 115.
3 With respect to notions such as the imperial State, neocolonial State, na-
tion, country, and especially community, see Para una Ética de la Liberación 
Latinoamericana, sections 55–56.
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Imperial culture, high culture, and popular culture (which 
must include workers’ culture-as-negativity) are moments of the 
prevailing system, the dominant pedagogical Totality. Though it 
is misleading, national culture is an important category. Wheth-
er the culture of a “dominating” nation or that of a “periph-
eral” nation, national culture serves to mediate the developing 
countries’ understanding of what national liberation is, though 
that understanding may be contradictory. Essentially, the peo-
ple’s culture is the key concept in the “pedagogics of liberation.” 
This pedagogics’ pro-ject is exclusively liberatory, ethically just, 
humanizing, and alterative. Such a pedagogics of liberation is 
rooted in those cultures which child finds at home and when 
interacting with her parents.
As we will see, there is a pro-ject contrary to the humanizing 
pro-ject just mentioned, which seeks to totalize the child. This is 
the ethically perverse pro-ject of domination which anticipates 
the imperial pedagogical pro-ject (where the father-dominator 
extends the domination of his own child to other fathers’ chil-
dren). There exists another pro-ject as well: that of the liberation 
of the child. This liberatory pedagogical pro-ject lets the child 
exist in its birth-reality (which is the liberatory position of the 
new State towards the oppressed, where the State is respectful of 
their alterity). We will describe this pedagogics of liberation at 
both the erotic-domestic level as well as the political level, as we 
have done throughout this book. We will conclude that the latter 
has a particular significance for Latin America, given the many 
valid analogical norms pedagogy and evolutionary psychology 
offer the child of the “center” and the child of the “periphery.”
In this chapter and the next, we will undertake an exposition 
of Figure 4, below.
First, observe line (b), which represents how the pedagogi-
cal pro-ject can be defined by dominance. By “pedagogical pro-
ject defined by dominance” we mean an understanding of the 
dominating group in its historical and concrete being (whether 
“center,” class, father, teacher, etc.). In this case the child–com-
munity is taught “the Same,” inherent as it is in the existing 
system. Thus the pedagogical pro-ject of domination is always 
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the result of violence, conquest, and repression of the Other as 
other. Politically, the pedagogics of domination is the result of a 
bureaucratic ossifi cation and aging of social structure; in other 
words, the gerontocracy.4 Th is is similar to what Spengler would 
4 We have indicated the social-psychoanalytic analysis of Pierre Legendre, 
L’amour du censeur: Essai sur l’ordre dogmatique (Paris: Seuil, 1974), ad-
dressing the pontifi cal and canonical right in the Middle Ages where the 
author shows the origin of this actual occidental administrative right. It 
is keen to show “institutions” in relation to the Freudian interpretation of 
self-censorship (Über-Ich). Schumpeter explains that “[t]he bureaucracies 
of Europe, in spite of the fact that they have drawn enough hostile criticism 
to blur their records, exemplify very well what I am trying to convey. Th ey 
are the product of a long development that started with the administrations 
of medieval magnates (originally serfs selected for administrative and mili-
Figure 4. Pedagogical pro-jects of domination and liberation: diff erent 
levels of culture and cultural praxis. 1: Imperial pedagogical totality; 
A: “center”; a: praxis of domination from center to periphery; b: pro-
ject of domination; 2: peripheral pedagogical subtotality; B: dependent 
oligarchy; c: intranational, dependant praxis of subdomination; C-D: 
community; C: the oppressed in a community; D: the community as 
exteriority; d: praxis of liberation; e: pro-ject of liberatory pedagogics; 
f: pedagogical interpellation from exteriority (In the erotic-domestic 
pedagogical background: 1: the family; A: the father; 2: maternal-fi lial 
totalization; B: the mother; C-D: the child; C: the child as oppressed; 
D: the child as exteriority).
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call “civilization,” as the fossilization of cultural production pro-
cesses.5 Present culture — as we have defined it elsewhere6 — is 
the organic conjunction of predetermined dispositions through 
attitudes (ethos) in the face of technology (civilization), whose 
teleological instance is constituted by values and symbols be-
longing to the group engaged in an ontological project. In other 
words, the present culture is composed of lifestyles which mani-
fest in production and transform the non-built environment 
into a world sponsored by the dominant culture. This reign-
ing totality of symbolic mediations is the basic architecture of 
a pedagogics of domination’s pro-ject (b in Figure 4). Since the 
present culture is reigning and dominant, political power com-
mands the totality of the population in that given system. If we 
are speaking of the entire geopolitical milieu within which the 
empire exercises its predominance, then it is an imperial culture 
(A in Figure 4). This culture (which today is European-Russian-
American) (A) imposes itself upon the peripheral milieus and 
thereby dominates their national cultures (totality 2 in Figure 
tary purposes who thereby acquired the status of petty nobles) and went on 
through the centuries until the powerful engine emerged which we behold 
today” (Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy [New 
York: Harper, 1950], 294). Bureaucratic management of pedagogy (like eve-
rything that falls into its hands, as Henry Kissinger showed in the chapter 
“The Impact of Administrative Structure” in his book American Foreign Pol-
icy (New York: Norton, 1977), constitutes the teacher in an “employment” 
lacking in all creativity and exposed day-to-day to inspectors working with 
a cold and distant design. Teacher and child thus introject the social censure 
of programs and laws, the Freudian superego, which obligates us with steely 
urgency and pseudo-morals. The “bureaucratic mechanism” is an essential 
part of dominant pedagogy.
5 See Herbert Marcuse, “Remarks on a Redefinition of Culture,” in The Es-
sential Marcuse: Selected Writings of Philosopher and Social Critic Herbert 
Marcuse, eds. Andrew Feenberg and William Leiss (Boston: Beacon, 2007), 
13–31. We are therefore in disagreement with Marcuse (and the Frankfurt 
School) when they speak of “superior culture” as the best, as opposed to the 
trendy culture which is “prevailing, political, and popular” (14). The “intel-
lectual elite” remains poorly defined, as well as the people’s culture.
6 See Enrique Dussel, “Latin American Culture,” in A History of the Church 
in Latin America: Colonialism to Liberation (1492–1979), trans. Alan Neely 
(Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1981), 21–31, at 23.
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4). A rift forms within these peripheral, neocolonial States. On 
the one hand, an alienated culture emerges imitating that of 
the center. Its “center” is therefore outside its borders, and the 
resulting culture is high culture (B) which dominates what we 
may call popular culture (C). The way in which popular culture 
is dominated happens in a double sense: first, it is dominated 
directly (a’) (by a television show in Spanish produced in Mi-
ami, for example), or mediated by neocolonial oligarchs (c). We 
must realize that popular culture (C) is not the exteriority of the 
people’s culture properly speaking, though the community con-
cretely composes each of these cultures (since the community 
contains values, symbols, and habits of the introjected system 
[C] and other distinct values, symbols, and habits [D]).
We should make two other observations. First, every reign-
ing culture (whether it be imperial culture or high culture) has 
always been the result of a creative process which the people 
drive. The European-American bourgeois culture was the result 
of a long campaign waged against the feudal, rural, and Chris-
tian world by the bourgeoisie which lasted nearly a thousand 
years. The high culture of the oligarchs is also the result of a 
people’s movement in the Creole community. In Latin America, 
for another example, such a movement rose against the Span-
ish bureaucracy’s monopoly on symbols (whose viceroys’, judg-
es’, etc., salaries came from Spain). In the wake of this people’s 
movement, however, the people’s creativity divides and cultural 
domination appears, both in imperial and oligarchical form. 
Thus the difference between popular culture and the people’s 
culture. Second, popular culture in the “center” can be as domi-
nant, or even more dominant, than in the “periphery.” This is 
because popular culture in the “periphery” has experienced its 
exteriority (D), whereas the “center’s” popular culture has been 
totally included within the reigning culture’s system. Thus the 
world-wide cultural revolution must always arise from the op-
pressed of the “periphery.”
Just as the father dominates his child with “the Same,” the 
state dominates its people. One separates the child from its 
mother, the other separates the people from its culture and ex-
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teriority. This is why the “periphery’s” national culture (like the 
oppressed family, so different from the dominating oligarch’s 
family) is a living contradiction, a situation Hegel would call 
“civil society.”7 The contradiction has two faces. The first is an 
oligarchy which presents itself through imperial culture as the 
“superior” and “universal” culture, the culture which is worthy 
of study and to which one must travel (oligarchical tourism’s 
Mecca is Europe). The second face of the contradiction presents 
itself through an exteriority (D), through its distinct values and 
original customs (whose travels lead one to Machu Picchu, the 
legendary Tikal in Guatemala, or Mount Albán in Oaxaca). 
Combining alienating high culture and the authentic people’s 
culture-as-exteriority, results in an amorphous and bastardized 
popular culture in which both the “cultured” elite as well as the 
people themselves participate. This popular culture is the uni-
versal or unequivocal identity which wields a power, rooted as it 
is in a strategic ideology delivered by pedagogical mechanisms 
that manipulate public opinion.8
The way we intend to use the word “ideology” is different 
than the one so in vogue today.9 By “ideology” we mean the 
practico-operative and existential interpretive totality. Herme-
neutics is the act of discovering meaning. But any particular 
meaning is a single instance within a totality of meaning, which 
is the world. The world opens itself, or becomes comprehensi-
ble, through the horizon of being: the pro-ject. Through pro-
jects we come to com-prehend the potentiality of being (telos), 
grounding our ability to interpret this or that thing in a particu-
lar way. Interpretation as an act of subjectivity draws relations 
between meaning and project. Yet if a pro-ject is sponsored by 
7 For an explanation, see Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana, 
section 55.
8 See a European “state of the question” of the problematic of ideology in 
the co-organized book edited by Hans Lieber with the participation of 
Horkheimer, Marcuse, Tillich, Plessner, et al.: Hans Lieber, Ideologien-
lehre und Wissenssoziologie: Die Diskussion um das Ideologieproblem in den 
zwanziger Jahren (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974).
9 See sections 65–69 of Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana.
148
pedagogics of liberation
the dominant culture, that pro-ject closes Totality off to Alterity 
(the child and the people-as-Other, historically speaking). Such 
a project can no longer discover its real potentiality of being, 
and thus becomes unreal, schizophrenic, totalized, perverse, 
and dead. Reality, the meaning of things, is hidden from such 
a fixed totality. False interpretations of meanings emerge when 
one’s world-horizon promotes this very unreality. False attri-
bution of sense to an ambiguous word and uttering discourses 
which mask other discourses: these are examples of false inter-
pretation. The thing itself, “that which appears,” the phenome-
non, transforms into mere appearance, false presence, and con-
cealment. Speech becomes gossip10: a living metonymic chain of 
words only signifying other words, people talking about talking 
just to talk. Desire to know true reality turns into capricious 
curiosity, a desire to know about novelties as mere novelties 
without searching for newness, and thus becoming enveloped 
within a novelty without newness. The mysterious exteriority 
which distinguishes each person becomes rooted in conform-
ity. Triviality becomes king, as propaganda, kitsch, trendiness. 
“Modern and imported” goods, used up stuff, all meaningless, 
come to dominate the “mass man’s” world. His values, sym-
bols, conduct, and pro-ject form the totality of popular culture. 
The one-dimensionality with which we must interpret Donald 
Duck and Patoruzú is the same one-dimensionality with which 
sports fans enjoy their games. In them, we see the specter of 
a universal culture steeped in the ideology of the “center.” We 
must therefore clearly distinguish the unequivocal universality 
of the culture produced in the “center” from analogical worldli-
ness. The latter (always in mortal danger and at the precipice 
of violation, vulnerable to imperial domination and universal 
10 See Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1977), 167. 
Heidegger describes the inauthentic “quotidian being [alltägliches Sein].” 
The danger in this is that Europeans do not come to distinguish between 
inauthentic popular culture and authentic people’s culture. The only “exit” 
will be the tragedy of critical-elitism of the few sages that separate the mass-
community via critique. This is an inadequate solution of the intellectual-
history relation.
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counter-revolutionary manipulation) is inherent in that culture 
which must break forth, liberating the peoples’ cultures of every 
“peripheral” country (Latin American culture, Islamic culture, 
African culture, Indian culture, Chinese culture, and Southeast 
Asian culture).
The ideological mechanisms of imperial pedagogics are 
highly efficient and effective because they pose as “natural.” 
Imperial and universal culture’s message is tautological: it al-
ways talks about the “the Same,” repeating this theme in differ-
ent ways ad infinitum. One’s sense of listening, watching, and 
memory are bombarded by text, image, and the same flattened 
meaning of each thing. The imperial message is so universally 
present in everything that it becomes disingenuous not to ac-
cept it because it is so obvious. Non-critique becomes subjec-
tivity’s normal pedestrian mode of being in the world. And of 
course, losing one’s position in the social order is dangerous. It 
is a grave risk, which is what will happen if one gives a different 
meaning to something. Being distinct is grounds for persecu-
tion. Questioning the historical and political origins of things is 
bad taste and bad behavior in this culture. This kind of provo-
cation is considered vulgar culture, in the eyes of imperial cul-
ture, high culture, and popular-consumer culture (vulgar being 
a demeaning term which lets the former negate, annihilate, and 
muddle authentic people’s culture). The vulgate is heterogeneous 
irrationality, uncultured barbarism, Greek hubris, “the masses” 
(hoi polloi) devalued by Heraclitus and Hegel (his Vielheit). That 
which is rude, uneducated, rough, vulgar, shocking, is identified 
as being of the people (D in figure 2). Imperial ideology has an 
interest in keeping the people dangerous because
there has always been a “foreign” universe to which the cul-
tural goals were not applied: the Enemy, the Other, the Alien, 
the Outcast — terms referring not primarily to individu-
als but to groups, religions, “ways of life,” social systems. In 
meeting the Enemy (who has his epiphany also within one’s 
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own universe) culture is suspended or even prohibited, and 
inhumanity can often run its course.11
The subject of imperial ideology, teacher of pop-cultural peda-
gogy, uses a language that goes beyond tautology and puts eve-
rything under a kind of spell (religious, romantic, festive or 
childish music composed to “sell” a product). At the same time 
this language is authoritative (“buy now!” and “vote!”), in an en-
vironment of false familiarity (“this is your facial cream,” “your 
supermarket”). This ideological language is a language of imme-
diacy: its facthood cannot be rebutted, and imposes itself with 
its own reason. The thing is confused with its own function, its 
truth is status quo truth. “The Same” invades everything. Seman-
tic relations become tautological because the signifiers intended 
to give meaning to things in the world are concepts for everyone 
to interpret in everyday speech. Linguistic signifiers are now 
text communications, and anyone using them understands their 
meaning. The circuit of communication from sender to receiver, 
through which signifiers pass, yields certain pieces of informa-
tion to those same channels. Receiving the information entails 
the same set of codes (phonetics, syntax, semantics) along with 
the same systems of decodification. Imperial cultures “use” the 
linguistic-ideological totality like a pedagogical tool on the peo-
ple in order to transform it into popular culture, a manageable 
cultural mass. “Culture,” or being educated (the “school system” 
established for this latter purpose), is defined by its ability to 
adequately receive and manage the channels (television, radio, 
newspapers, magazines, etc.) and the codes (alphabet, speech, 
paralanguage, etc.) through the fixed structures of which (“fig-
ures” in a children’s cartoon, for instance) dominant and alien-
ating information is introjected. The people will be taught to 
11 Marcuse, The Essential Marcuse, 15. Marcuse, who has noted the question 
of exteriority in many of his writings, does not know how to initiate the 
totality of his discourse from exteriority. He only indicates here or there, but 
nothing from the heart of his thinking: Here is his limit! The CIA’s actions 
stem from an ideology of the “Other as Enemy.” See also Víctor Marchetti 
and John Marks, CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Knopf, 1974).
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become the mass. The creative and exteriorized people’s culture 
is reduced to kitsch, massified substitutes and poor imitations of 
the real thing. Clearly this imperial culture is not innocent. Ide-
ology concealed within the people’s culture infuses a “system” 
into that culture which is not only intellectual but also erotic, 
political, and economic. We cannot be astonished by
the time when capitalist imperialism takes hold of the totality 
of its resources. During this time the selection of workers is 
hurried, and their work — whether by belt or chain — tries 
with incredible might to adjust itself to systemized move-
ment. At this point, the school was swept away by the cur-
rent. In order to give a picturesque expression of our inter-
pretation we can say that Ford, rather than Comenius, lies 
at the basis of the new technique (or technology) of school 
work. And it is natural that this is so: Comenius’ Didáctica 
Magna corresponded to the manufacturing era of capitalism; 
the Decroly or Montessori system corresponds to imperial 
capitalism.12
Or, in other words:
The vicissitudes of the language have their parallel in the vi-
cissitudes of political behavior. In the sale of equipment for 
relaxing entertainment in bomb shelters, in the television 
show of competing candidates for national leadership, the 
juncture between politics, business, and fun is complete. But 
the juncture is fraudulent and fatally premature — business 
and fun are still the politics of domination… And again, it 
will not be the hero but the people who will be the ritual vic-
tims.13
12 Aníbal Ponce, Educación y la Lucha de Clases [Education and Class Struggle] 
(Buenos Aires: Materia, 1957), 268
13 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 107.
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Yet one more variable emerges in neocolonial or peripheral cul-
tures. From within an imperial culture (like that of Spykmann) 
or high culture (like that of Sarmiento), a hybrid emerges that, 
despite its hybrid status, leans more towards the imperial cul-
ture than a dependent national culture. The bourgeois business 
elite in the national periphery, when present, has a form of high 
culture which is also national. Contrarily, what we might call 
this managerial culture, has
rejected any notion of sovereignty and nation and stems 
from the ideology of multiplying the profits of international 
monopolies […]. They are technocrats, business managers, 
rationalizing market researchers linking their own destiny 
to companies that extend from Argentina or Brazil to the 
United States or Israel without any distinguishing features.14
All of the above may be understood as constituting the depend-
ent quality of a neocolonial national culture which has built up 
the dominating imperial culture. Internally, a contradictory rift 
forms within this national culture. First, it houses the anti-na-
tional, pro-empire managerial culture. Second, it contains the 
national bourgeoisie’s high culture and those in solidarity with 
them. Third, popular culture imposes itself blatantly on the to-
tality of the country’s general population. This entire system of 
cultural dependence engenders a traditionalist and conservative 
attitude (we call it traditionalist and not traditional, because 
that which is traditional is always creative and belongs to the 
people). It appears as “old” culture in contrast to the innova-
tive, chaotic, and subversive culture, but in reality, as we will see, 
this culture is actually the most traditional. The traditionalist 
attitude within the culture of dependence says that “everything 
was better in the past,” in the sense that the oligarchs (who rose 
to power through a prior processes of liberation driven by the 
14 Guillermo Gutiérrez, Ciencia, Cultura y Dependencia [Science, Culture, 
and Dependency] (Buenos Aires: Guadalupe, 1973), 33. This text introduces 
many of the distinctions we use here in this short presentation of culture.
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people) see the future horizon of novelty closing in on them. 
They are destined to repeat the model that brought them to life, 
or they perish. Traditionalism in a culture of national depend-
ence is merely another repetition of “the Same,” a living death.
The pedagogical pro-ject of domination — ontological and 
existential horizon — cannot be conceptualized, thought, nor 
denoted properly speaking. As we have repeatedly indicated, 
it is pre-conceptual. However, we can reformulate it — from a 
clear and intelligible horizon — as a pedagogical pro-ject (which 
is ontic at this stage) which must be distinguished from the no-
tion of a pedagogical model.15 By pro-ject, we draw from what the 
phenomenologists of axiological ethics called an “ideal.” Max 
Scheler explained that
an ought becomes a moral and genuine ought whenever it is 
based on insight into objective values — i.e., in this context, 
into the morally good — there is also the possibility of an evi-
dential insight into a good whose objective essence and val-
ue-content contain a reference to an individual person, and 
whose ought therefore comes to this person and to him as a 
“call,” no matter if this “call” is addressed to others or not.16
What happens is that “objective values” can constitute a total 
system of dominant values: perverse as the totality and sublime 
in their particularity. What could be better than courage? What 
could be worse than the courage of an unjust conquistador?
15 Regarding the difference between pro-ject, project, and model, see section 
58 of Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana. 
16 Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik: Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung 
eines ethischen Personalismus (Bern: Francke, 1954), 495. On this type of 
proposal see Eduard Spranger, “El Ideal Personal” [“The Personal Ideal”], 
in Formas de Vida [Forms of life] (Madrid: Revistas de Occidente, 1966), 
406–42. English: Eduard Spranger, Types of Men: The Psychology and Eth-
ics of Personality, trans. Paul John William Pigors (Halle: Niemeyer, 1928). 
His axiology does not accept that the ontological pro-ject is based on ideal 




In Latin America, educational policy and curricula articulate 
pedagogical projects. These political-pedagogical projects point 
to global trends, which states then commit to following. Such 
projects are implemented by inherently ideological models. In 
other words, we must understand and clarify the interpretive 
totality within which these models exist, the futures they hide, 
and the paths they open up.
Governments opting for dependence upon capitalism, sup-
ported by military force, promote a particular pedagogical pro-
ject and model, for instance (think of Brazil, Chile, Bolivia in 
1974, and the similar situations of Nicaragua, Haiti, etc). The 
model in these countries is domination: an authoritarianism 
which prioritizes the pedagogical system without critique, or 
what Paulo Freire calls “banking education.” Science is scient-
ism in these countries: an intellectual attitude where economics, 
politics, and social science pretend to discover universal values. 
Science and technology in these countries must be dependent 
on the “center.” Just as such fake sciences think the critical spirit 
is essentially chaotic, subversive, and immoral, they eliminate 
the critical human sciences and legitimate exact sciences, such 
as natural science and technology; though they always do so 
with the aforementioned acritical and disingenuous “scientistic” 
spirit. Elementary school, secondary school, technical training, 
universities, mass media, propaganda, etc., all of them give cre-
dence to the tautological and authoritarian character of this in-
tellectual attitude. Such a pedagogical pro-ject must imitate the 
imperial culture, introjecting empire and living in-step with it 
as an alienated culture of the masses, under the gerontocracy’s 
thumb (which the very same nationalist culture of the bourgeoi-
sie fought against for the people’s culture). Latin America has 
undergone, in just this way, an accelerated “Americanization” 
of everyday life. This phenomenon transcends pedagogical re-
gimes, and nowhere has it been more patently obvious than in 
Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and northern South 
America (principally Venezuela and Colombia). The empire’s 
presence in our daily life signifies, in the short term, the an-
nihilation of Latin America-as-cultural expression and the pre-
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vention of political-pedagogical action involving national lib-
eration.
In the same way, the pedagogical system created by conserv-
ative-liberal models and blatant political-economic dependence 
(Colombia being the case in point) are not as authoritarian as 
the previous model. However, the people’s education does not 
go beyond a system that teaches how to navigate the channels 
and signifiers of imperial language and its teachings, a system 
mediated by dominance. Critical education has barely advanced 
in these areas, if at all.
Thus the child, the people, and youth itself die. The peo-
ple’s culture introjects imperial culture, via managerial culture, 
through a process of repressive censure. The repression is peda-
gogical, psychological, political, and militarized. Its censure 
functions with a complex, high-level rationalization and coher-
ence on the erotic domain of the family as well as on the po-
litical, commercial, and pedagogical domains. It is a “system” 
founded on a pedagogical pro-ject for which schooling is a de-
cisive moment.
However, the pedagogical pro-ject can also be liberatory (e in 
Figure 4). An education that dominates is aggressive,17 patriar-
chal, and authoritarian. It commits filicide. Liberatory educa-
tion on the other hand “deploys the child’s creative forces,”18 as 
well as those of youth itself and the people. A liberatory project 
is one where the father respects the child’s alterity. Just as Barto-
lomé de Las Casas admires the beauty, goodness, and culture of 
Indigenous peoples (the new, the Other), the father respects the 
child’s new history. Similarly, revolutionary and insurgent gov-
ernments taking power in a moment of social transformation 
educate the people while keeping its exteriority in mind (area 
D in Figure 4). The liberatory educational pro-ject is a future-
oriented pro-ject, one which treats the oppressed as outside the 
17 See the small book by Siegfried Keil, Aggression und Mitmenschlichkeit 
(Stuttgart: Kreuz, 1970).
18 Martin Buber, Reden über Erziehung (Heidelberg: Schneider, 1964), 11. See 
also Reinhold Mayer, Franz Rosenzweig: Eine Philosophie der dialogischen 
Erfahrung (Darmstadt: Buchsgesell, 1973).
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present system. The people (simultaneously depicted as mass C 
and exteriority D) experience their own worlds as surpassing (in 
D) that system’s horizon. Their “eschatological precipice” has its 
own demands, which form a totality rooted in a particular his-
torical understanding of being that is advental and future-facing. 
This understanding does not merely comprehend the oppressed 
as a mass, but rather understands the people-as-exteriority and 
thus constitutes a liberatory pedagogics for the people’s culture.
This people’s culture forms an ineradicable and incorruptible 
center for resistance movements against oppression (for neoco-
lonial nations as well as marginalized social classes). The peo-
ple’s culture is national culture’s highest moment of authenticity. 
The antithesis of people’s culture is popular culture, introjected 
as it is from oppressive systems. The people’s culture operates in 
Latin America as one front of the war against oligarchy. First, it 
must fight the Spanish bureaucracy and its liberals, and then it 
must face national oligarchy, the bourgeoisie management class, 
and its imperial culture. The people’s culture is the real culture, 
one composed of the symbols and structures found “at home.” 
Historically, its artwork is made by the people, for the people, 
and expresses their creative processes. Their artwork is not “rus-
tic” but rather the work of artisans, properly speaking. Music in 
particular tells the people’s history, their trials and tribulations, 
through rhythm and words. Music is a kind of language, with its 
own structures, modes, and usages; a folklore that is more than 
folklore; traditions of events, “traditional” in its most authen-
tic sense, referring to a set of symbols that express the people’s 
plethora of forms and rituals. These symbols can include reli-
gious symbols animated by ancient communal wisdom explain-
ing their origins. The traditional symbols can also include po-
litical symbols by which the community remembers its battles, 
heroes, traitors, friends, and enemies (typically communicated 
orally, without writing). Phenomenologists of religion call this 
kind of memory super-historical. The people’s culture forms a 
totality of human meaning, largely outside the empire’s peda-
gogical system.
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We must not confuse the people’s culture with mere folk-
lore, however. And neither should we confuse it with Trotsky’s 
proletarian culture, because the latter is a part of popular cul-
ture — or, in the best case, only part of the people’s culture. The 
proletariat becomes defined within the industrial, capitalist, 
competitive system. Its exteriority is less, for example, than that 
of the field worker or of the marginalized. Proletariat culture 
in Latin America tends to fall under consumerism and, hence, 
it must defend its rights within the system (therefore defend-
ing the system itself) against society’s most oppressed classes: 
the farmhand, the marginalized people, etc. The people’s cul-
ture is also different from Oscar Lewis’s culture of poverty — a 
mere moment of marginalized culture. In a culture of poverty, 
the people’s culture is buried further down. In any case, each of 
these notions must be incorporated into a study or theory of 
culture from the periphery, but always with the central category 
of people’s culture.
One pedagogical leader from the Third World, (whom, we 
should note, was an elementary school teacher before he was a 
political and military leader) explains that
It is imperative to separate the fine old culture of the people 
which had a more or less democratic and revolutionary char-
acter from all the decadence of the old feudal ruling class 
[oligarchical culture…]. China’s present new politics and 
new economy have developed out of her old politics and old 
economy, and her present new culture, too, has developed 
out of her old culture; therefore, we must respect our own 
history and must not lop it off. However, respect for history 
means giving it its proper place as a science, respecting its 
dialectical development […]. As far as the masses and the 
young students are concerned, the essential thing is to guide 
them to look forward [pedagogical pro-ject of liberation] 
and not backward [imperial-oligarchical pro-ject].19
19 Mao Tse-tung, “On New Democracy,” in Selected Works, vol. II (Peking: 
Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 339–84, at 381. In this short book Mao 
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Popular governments in Latin America are keenly aware that 
every revolution must have a clear pedagogical pro-ject and 
model, because “colonization always starts through culture; 
decolonization, our re-conquest, also begins with culture.”20 
Thus Educational Reform, the most complicated, but also the 
most important of all reforms, constitutes the essential neces-
sity of Peruvian development and is a central objective of our 
revolution.”21 The liberatory pedagogical pro-ject breathes life 
into the historical processes of newness, and therefore
The Mexican Revolution forced us to emerge from ourselves, 
to confront the truths of history, and to recognize that we 
must invent new institutions and a new future […]. The new 
education was to be founded on our blood, our language and 
our people.22
makes countless valuable distinctions for our problematic. He tells us about 
“old” and “new” culture (354), “dominant” culture (355), “given” culture 
(354), “imperialist” culture (383), “semifeudal” culture (384), “reactionary 
cultures” (384), “cultural revolution” (387), “[t]he new-democratic culture 
is the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture of the broad masses” (388), 
“national” culture (388), “new” national culture (395), new “world” culture 
(397), “revolutionary” national culture (397), the “revolutionary cultural 
workers” (397), “the people, it must be stressed, are the inexhaustible source 
of our revolutionary culture” (398). All these notions, and many others, 
must be organizing in an explicit, explicated discourse.
20 Héctor Cámpora, Mensaje del Presidente de la Nación [The President’s Mes-
sage to the Nation] (Buenos Aires, Congreso de la Nacion, 1973), an address 
delivered to the National Congress, May 25, 1973. He also says that “the 
stages of the liberation process for the current scheme of culture, scientific, 
and technological dependence that are used by the educational system will 
organically determine the steps to reach an effective modernization of the 
Argentinian school and university, these steps will be in service to the com-
munity” (49–50).
21 Reform Commission, “Reforma de la Educación Peruana: Informe Gener-
al” [“Peruvian Educational Reform: General Report”], 1970, 1. This diagno-
sis of the educational situation says that everything it notes “becomes direr 
if one realizes that generally (the pedagogical system) has been oriented 
towards the maintenance of social order and economic establishment as a 
consequence of underdevelopment and dependency” (35).
22 Octavio Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude and Other Writings, trans. Lysander 
Kemp, Yara Milos, and Rachel Phillips Belash (New York: Grove Press, 
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The people’s culture of Latin America, in each of our countries, 
is a tradition which has managed to assimilate the historical ex-
periences of Indigenous peoples, the Spanish, Creoles, the op-
pressed, independent subsistence farmers, workers of all kinds, 
and the marginalized. The people’s culture of Latin America 
therefore has an ancient past, but is also open to an immense fu-
ture because the community exists separately from the system. 
The community’s poverty guarantees its hope: their position 
“from below” opens cracks in the system and permits newness 
to emerge in its exteriority. At the same time, this living tradi-
tion is also an historical and communal consciousness which 
has its own proper ethos, forms of life in the home, a relation-
ship to transcendence, a style of dressing and eating. The ethos 
proper to communal consciousness also includes forms of work, 
leisure, and valuing friendship through the conviviality of dia-
logue. It also has its own language, speaking with a distinct per-
sonality. The art it creates, festivals it throws, and sports it plays 
are all marked with its particular character. The erotics of this 
consciousness is also well-defined, as is its pedagogics and poli-
tics. Its aesthetics is innovative, by which we mean its rootedness 
in a love for the face of the oppressed Other, the way in which it 
configures this face from the disfiguration of the system’s mask. 
It is a total culture, a total interpretation of existence. A popular 
song called, “Man’s Destiny,” recorded by Benedicto Lavallén in 
Buenos Aires during the reign of General Rodríguez, expresses 
a moment in the people’s everyday world:
Man is born suddenly
1985), 172–73 and 152. In the first half of the twentieth century, José Vascon-
celos’s thought in La Raza Cósmica [The Cosmic Race] (Mexico: Espasa-
Calpe, 1966), collected under the term “race” that which nowadays (and 
no longer in a biologist way, but in an ethno-anthropocentric way) we 
would call community. That is why the Mexican “intelligentsia,” for exam-
ple, “turned toward the people, discovering their true nature and eventually 
making them the center of its activities. The popular arts emerged again, 




and delivered to orphanity
without knowing what will be
in the future and present. 
He does not imagine that he is a thing
and his navigating is slow
shipwrecked and lost in effect
and reduced to nothing. 
Happiness is declared: 
Time only knows.23
There is nothing “high-society” about this machacón rhythm, 
whose form uncovers a profound human meaning. The people’s 
culture is therefore not tragic, though it may appear as much 
at first. Regarding the themes of death and tragedy, the Latin 
American (particularly in Mexico)
is familiar with death, jokes about it, caresses it, sleeps with it, 
celebrates it; it is one of his favorite toys and his most steadfast 
love […], he looks at it face to face, with impatience, disdain 
or irony. “If they are going to kill me tomorrow, let them kill 
me right away” (from the popular folk song La Valentina).24
The people’s culture, therefore, whose hidden richness has rarely 
if ever been discovered in Latin America, has a liberatory pro-
ject: the new pedagogical pro-ject. But an existential pedagogi-
23 In my book Enrique Dussel and María Mercedes Esandi, El Catolicismo 
Popular en Argentina [Popular Catholicism in Argentina] (Buenos Aires: 
BONUM, 1970), 151, and extracted from Juan Jesús Benítez, “Cantares de la 
Tradición Oral Bonaerense” [“Songs from the Bonaerense Oral Tradition”], 
Revista del Instituto Nacional de la Tradición 1, no. 1 (1948): 102–14. See more 
than one hundred songs and a book about popular Argentine traditions in 
my book, just cited above, Dussel and Esandi, El Catolicismo Popular en 
Argentina, 167–77, and an initial treatment of the topic between 17–166.
24 Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude and Other Works, 58. On the festive demea-
nor, written about by so many authors: “We are a ritual people[…]. The art 
of the fiesta has been debased almost everywhere else, but not in Mexico” 
(47).
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cal pro-ject must be formulated as an ontic project, or model. As 
the community assimilated the majority of its culture, turning 
into a popular culture within the system, it has not yet reached 
this ontic formulation: the theoretical structuration of a pro-
ject/model starts with a practico-existential pro-ject. “Nor can 
the people — as long as they are crushed and oppressed, inter-
nalizing the image of the oppressor — construct by themselves 
the theory of their liberating actions. Only in the encounter of 
the people with the revolutionary leaders — in their commun-
ion, in their praxis — can this theory be built.”25
Thus a new notion emerges: cultural revolution, or better yet 
liberatory culture, which itself originates organically in the peo-
ple’s culture. This culture is the fruit of mutual fecundation, both 
of the intellectual revolutionary (the “teacher” or “pro-phet” 
properly speaking) and the people on their way towards libera-
tion. Frantz Fanon called the “cultured man” living in colonial 
and neocolonial states the “colonized intellectual.” This status 
comes with certain pedagogical requirements: “The colonized 
intellectual who decides to combat these colonialist lies does 
so on a continental scale. The past is revered.”26 The “colonized 
intellectual” rebels against his alienated function and compul-
sions, says the psychiatrist from Martinique, in three phases 
(with which this very ethics has begun as well):
First, the colonized intellectual proves he has assimilated the 
colonizer’s culture […]. In a second stage, the colonized writ-
er has his convictions shaken and decides to cast his mind 
back. But the colonized writer is not integrated with his peo-
ple, since he maintains an outsider’s relationship to them, he 
is content to remember […]. Finally, a third stage, a combat 
stage where colonized writer, after having tried to lose him-
25 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 183.
26 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Vintage, 1963), 149–50. 
In this chapter “On National Culture,” there are many summarily important 
inclinations, but Latin American countries are in large part situated in the 
context of a passage from colonialism to neocolonialism, and not really in 
the context of this national freedom.
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self among the people, with the people, will rouse the people. 
Instead of letting the people’s lethargy prevail, he turns into 
a galvanizer of the people. Combat literature, revolutionary 
literature, national literature emerges.27
We must therefore distinguish the colonized intellectual who 
converts to the revolution’s “intelligentsia,” from the “revolu-
tionary worker of the people’s culture,” situated at the breast of 
that same community. Though the latter is not an intellectual, 
he will constitute the organic moment of the cultural and libera-
tory revolution. We will elaborate this topic in the next chapter 
of this book.
In Latin America, diverse political pro-jects formulate peda-
gogical models adequate to their ends. For this reason, it is not 
difficult to suppose that nationalist regiments supported by the 
people (whether those in the center, like Varguism and Peron-
ism; those on the left like Cuban Fidelism; frentistas like those 
standing behind Allende in Chile; and modernized military 
groups like those in the Peruvian revolution of 68) tend to en-
courage the people’s participation in education — though it be-
comes difficult to obtain it, since it is implemented in varying 
ways. This education must be more dialogical, critical of politi-
cal conditions, with participants from “the base,” and ultimately 
non-authoritarian and creative. As an example, we are told that 
changing the obsolete, onerous, and inefficient school orga-
nization on the ground represents one of the most significant 
structural reforms among those provided by government 
27 Ibid., 158–59. “To fight for national culture first of all means fighting for the 
liberation of the nation, the tangible matrix from which culture can grow. 
One cannot divorce the combat for culture from the people’s struggle for 
liberation” (168). In this way, the revolutionary intellectual will pose the 
basic question: “Because it is a systematized negation of the other, a fren-
zied determination to deny the other any attribute of humanity, colonialism 
forces the colonized to constantly ask the question: “Who am I in reality?” 
(182). The intellectual liberator, propagator of liberatory culture, must con-
tribute to this theoretical response.
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[…]. There are two key criteria supporting the design of the 
new organizational structure: educational work considered 
as a social function of community responsibility; and inte-
gration of schools in interconnected networks-nuclear ser-
vices, with roles in territorial areas.”28
Thus the notion of “communal educational nucleus” is born 
with its “communal centers.” “Pedagogical space” thus organ-
izes itself with the people’s active participation. Additionally, the 
Chinese experience, though in a different geographical, politi-
cal, and cultural context, should also be taken into account.
In the same way, in Latin America, a redefinition of the uni-
versity must emerge from these liberatory pedagogical models. 
The university must be a place where teaching, science, and 
technology are presented with a clear critical sense, an ethical-
political sense, with the aim of
preserving and transmitting culture, teaching, educating and 
training professionals and technicians, investigating and de-
veloping projects through the community will be applied to 
important national objectives to serve the community on the 
path to liberation.29
The child, youth, and the people — as carriers of the people’s 
culture — properly possess the liberatory pedagogical pro-ject. 
To disrespect their exteriority, to not listen to their novel pro-
vocation, is to mire them in domination, tautology, and in the 
sterility of the “eternal return of the Same.”
28  “Reforma de la Educación Peruana,” 135–36.
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It is now time to think through the ultimately decisive issue in 
pedagogics: the educational praxis of domination juxtaposed 
with the “cultural revolution” of our time that emerges from the 
periphery. On the one hand, empire — or the “cultured” national 
elite — is the active subject. On the other hand, the active subject 
in the “cultural revolution” (which begins through revolution 
and continues by the construction of a new educational system, 
which is the fruit of the liberatory pedagogical process in its 
conjunction) is the child, youth, and the oppressed; the margin-
alized communities in the neocolonial nations of our global pre-
sent. That is to say, we must now judge the morality (goodness 
or evil) of the educational act itself, in light of its respective pro-
jects (if it is domination, it is perverse; if it is liberation it is just, 
good, human, and humanizing). The Other as child, youth, or 
the people is the absolute criterion of meta-physics and ethics: 
affirming the Other and serving him is the good act; negating the 
Other and dominating him is the evil act. The liberatory teacher 
permits the creative display of the Other. The preceptor masked 
behind “nature,” “universal culture,” and many other concealing 
fetishes is a false teacher, a sophist scientifist, the sage of the 




More than any other moment of anthropological meta-
physics, pedagogics demands listening to the voice of the Other. 
In pedagogics the Other’s voice signifies content revealing it-
self, and liberatory education can only begin with the revela-
tion of the Other. The student reveals himself to the teacher; 
the teacher reveals himself to the disciple. If the child’s voice, 
the voice of the youth and the people, is not heard by the father, 
the teacher, and the State, then liberatory education is impos-
sible. Mutual listening sends, and essentially, the other receives 
(though clearly with diverse meanings for one party). This send-
ing and receiving is the conditio sine qua non of pedagogical 
love (agapē) as extreme gratitude.1 But if speaking to the other 
is impossible, if transcending the ontic level of the expressive 
plane is like jumping on one’s own shadow, all pedagogics will 
remain ontologically situated within the praxis of a pedagogics 
of domination where teachers and students can only speak with 
one another tautologically about “the Same,” or that which the 
teacher is. This idea could serve as the inadequate conclusion 
of a hasty reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein, just as scientism is 
a false attitude deriving more from unnoticed ethical-politics 
than from science itself.
Wittgenstein indicates that “the world is all that is the case,” 
and thus “the world is the totality of facts, not of things.”2 A 
meaning is a fact in the world, from which we deduce that “the 
sense of the world must lie outside (ausserhalb) the world. In the 
world, everything is as it is (So-Seins).”3 The World, the Totality 
1 See the indicated material in section 36 of Para una Ética de la Liberación 
Latinoamericana . Those pages contain a sketch of the pedagogy which we 
will now think about at another level. [For information on Para una Ética 
de la Liberación Latinoamericana, see the “Translators’ Note.”]
2 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and 
B.F. McGuinness (New York: Routledge, 2003), 5. It is as we have explained 
in the first six sections of Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamerica-
na — with a few variations. The “fact” (Tatsache) is not exactly the “thing” 
for us, but, rather, “the thing” (Dinge) would come closer to what we de-
nominate real-thing.
3 Ibid., 86. This is exactly the conclusion we reached in section 20 of Para una 
Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana.
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is as it is and because it is what it is: it is absurd to look for a rea-
son or a foundation for the foundation itself. But Wittgenstein 
(beyond what his neopositivist and scientistic followers say) 
permits meta-physics (just as Kant does: as a mystical topic, but 
not a scientific one).4 “Ethics are transcendental”5; which is to 
say, it occupies a position beyond worldly fact, and, primarily, 
that of the free will. But “it is impossible to speak about the will 
insofar as it is the subject of ethical attributes,”6 because for Witt-
genstein “speech” refers only to facts (the meanings referring to 
worldly objects). This reduction of speech is severe, but at least it 
does not negate other types of speech (though their impossibil-
ity may follow). In any case, “if the good or bad exercise of the 
will does alter the world, it can only alter the limits of the world, 
not the fact […].”7 Said differently: the will concerns itself with 
the ontological and not the ontic, because it can deal with the 
world as such. However, we must recognize that “there are (es 
gibt), indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make 
themselves manifest. They are what is mystical (das Mystische).”8 
Regarding the ethical, which depends on free will, or regard-
ing the mystical, nothing may be spoken because it is “lacking 
meaning.” It lacks meanings because it is beyond the horizon 
of meaning that is the world itself. Thus “what we cannot speak 
about we must pass over in silence.”9 We must not, for the mo-
ment, have any radical opposition to this Wittgensteinian argu-
ment (though it appears strange), because it becomes apparent 
to us that his argument ends when it must begin. By ending his 
argument there he can make us think there is nothing more to 
say (and in this case everything spoken is exclusively ontic). In 
4 For Kant, that which is beyond knowledge is the object of rational faith, 
wisdom, and is the “corpus mysticum of rational entities” (Immanuel Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999], 679).







such a case, dominating pedagogics, anti-metaphysical neoposi-
tivism, and the “center’s” desire for universal scientism, would 
all be correct. But could it be that that which is beyond the world, 
the mystical or ethical, can be expressed and revealed from its 
exteriority? Would it not be fair to remain silent, and have this 
silence be the only adequate attitude? The only one from my 
world about which I am not only unable to speak, but also must 
not dare to speak? Would it not be just to remain silent about 
that which is Other as a dis-tinct history that only reveals itself 
from its freedom unconditioned by the horizon of my world? 
This is exactly what Wittgenstein indicates when he writes that 
“feeling the world as a limited (begrenztes) whole — it is this that 
is mystical.”10 The ethical, the meta-physical, is only reduced to a 
thing because the Other is the beyondness of being in the total-
ity of the world (or the com-prehension of being). This Other 
is a being whose horizon is given, a system of the past, a mo-
ment overcome in the history of being. Now, at that moment, I 
can discover from Alterity (Wittgenstein’s mystical) the meaning 
of the world from outside (from the reality of the Other, of the 
poor, the child, the youth, the people; or the authentic teacher 
and liberator).
It is necessary to remain silent about that which one can-
not speak; about the revelation of the Other as other, as mys-
tery, as a dis-tinct world. “Their” revelation is “unspeakable 
(Unausssprechliches)”11 from “my” world. Neither is its revelation 
nor its reality a “fact” in my world. The revelation, in the act of 
Speech (or better: speaking in the face-to-face) advances itself 
only in part as a “fact” (thing or meaning: as it is as such) but 
also partly as “exteriority” (thing or reality: it is the dis-tinctive-
ness of the ana-logical). As “exteriority,” what is said is the Other 
as other, as ethical, as meta-physical, as mystical and even sa-
cred. Wittgenstein did not end his logical argument (like Marx, 
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his atheist argument) and therefore gave way to the negation of 
the meta-physical.
The praxis of a pedagogics of domination is based on the pos-
tulate that there is no other possible speech than that which 
expresses the meaning of the established world: the ontic 
word of the reigning system, the Rousseauian teacher’s word. 
Dominating-repressive culture, the culture of censorship, prac-
tices authoritarian sadism (in the teacher–student relation) and 
masochism (State–teacher; teacher–student)12 as an ethos. The 
good educator, in this case, follows the reigning-dominant cul-
ture. His praxis is in concordance with the pro-ject taken by all 
(the dominators) as natural (though it does not ask itself if it 
is an imperial pro-ject). His virtues are those applauded by all. 
The good student must simply focus on repeating the normal 
conduct of his teacher and remember everything he is taught in 
classrooms. The ideological tautologies of the slogan, of propa-
ganda, of the crushing and dominant myths are the only words. 
This educative praxis, able to be perfected with audiovisual me-
dia, polls and group dynamics (a dominating perfection), tech-
nically imprisons the child, youth, and the people. Education is 
domestication, learning through repetition, as much in the fam-
ily (parents–children) as in politics (State–the people). Violence, 
punishment, and repression teach that rebellion is impossible.
His being hardboiled and at the same time submissive in the 
face of real power predisposes him for totalitarian forms of 
life […]. The findings (of investigations) have shown that 
subjects who may be regarded as highly susceptible to fascist 
propaganda profess an ideology calling for rigid, uncritical 
identification with the family.13
12 Apply to the pedagogical what we have analogically — by similitude — said 
in sections 26–28, of Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana.
13 Max Horkheimer, “Authoritarianism and the Family Today,” in The Fam-
ily: Its Function and Destiny, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1949), 359–74, at 367–68. See 370–71 for a description of the ethos 
of pedagogical domination: “The authoritarian character’s conventionalism 
and his concern with correctness and the ‘things to be done’ […]. He hates 
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When the father–State is extremely rigid, when the same is 
true of the teacher, and dominating praxis manifests itself co-
herently, the child overcomes too much too fast in the oedipal 
process and identifies himself with the tyrannical father–State. 
His will remains totally submitted to the paternal and is horri-
fied by autonomy, independence, and liberation. He encounters 
an ancestral insecurity when confronting the open, similar to 
agoraphobia. In such cases
(a) the teacher teaches and the students are taught; (b) the 
teacher knows everything and the students know nothing; 
(c) the teacher thinks and the students are thought about; 
(d) the teacher talks and the students listen — meekly; (e) 
the teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined; (f) 
the teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the students 
comply; (g) the teacher acts and the students have the illu-
sion of acting through the action of the teacher […].14
We could continue the list of oppositions to infinity. What is 
certain is that the educator is the schoolteacher I constitutive of 
the pedagogical world, while the student is the orphanic thing 
which receives knowledge. “In the banking concept of educa-
tion, knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider them-
selves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know 
nothing.”15 The teacher-father-State thereby dominates the stu-
dent-child-people (recall arrow b of Figure 3, p. 97; or arrows a 
and c of Figure 4, p. 148).
The dominating teacher has, as the foundation of his ethos, a 
profound distrust of his disciple. This is why he does not invent 
educational activities rooted in liberty. But injustice manifests 
whatever is weak […]. He is violently opposed to self-examination, never 
questions his own motives […]. He thinks in hierarchical terms — ‘people 
at the top, at the bottom, and so forth.’…He is a pseudo-conservative; that is, 
he has surrendered to the maintenance of the status quo […].He considers 
religion important only from a pragmatic viewpoint.”
14 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 73.
15 Ibid., 72.
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itself in the magisterial ego through the permanently boast-
ful, lying, hypocritical, and masked attitude.16 Most important 
is that, frequently, there is little sense of culpability for acts of 
concealed and false teaching in the ideological conscience. The 
formal lie is an affirmation of something false enunciated in-
tentionally to confuse another person. For the ideological con-
science or “happy conscience,” acceptance of the (dominating) 
pro-ject’s goodness is so naive, obvious, acritical, and ahistori-
cal, that the teacher does, in fact, teach with the best intention, 
with honest severity, and disciplined stoicism.17 In reality, all 
the virtues of the “honest” teacher of the reigning pedagogical 
system which teach from “nature” (without conscience that na-
ture is the dominating pro-ject of the imperial, managerial, high 
culture, etc.), are corruptive vices mystified within educational 
bureaucracy, a castrating bureaucracy, and filicidal. The “hon-
est” teacher of the dominating system is the sado-masochistic 
mediator of the concealment of exteriority. How can the teacher 
uncover the real meaning of things to his disciples if he accepts 
and teaches from the pro-ject that conceals the child, youth, and 
people as Other, and only accepts them as non-being, as noth-
ing, like a tabula rasa, an orphan, ignoramus, like material to be 
formalized: like an object?
Very much on the contrary, the praxis of a pedagogics of lib-
eration is based on the postulate that I myself never pronounce 
16 In the Middle Ages, vices opposed to truth were denominated: mendacium, 
simulatio hypocrisis, boasting and irony. [Translators’ note: See St. Thomas 
Aquinas, The Summa Theologiae, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province (London: Benzinger Bros., 1947). Dussel provides some citations 
to the “Questions” in Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, furnishing some re-
sources for properly citing them throughout this chapter. We have done our 
best to cite the questions as they are available in the above reference which 
is available online at http://www.http://dhspriory.org/. These passages, as 
translated by the Fathers of the Dominican Province, do correspond to the 
“Questions” to which Dussel refers. We therefore write “q. 86” to refer to the 
86th question, etc., in lieu of a page number.]
17 When he writes that “ratio-mendacii sumitur a formali falsitate: ex hoc 
scilicet quod aliquis habet voluntatem falsum enuntiandi” (Aquinas, The 
Summa Theologiae, q. 110) Aquinas does not pose the question of ideology 
as a form of social and political concealment.
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the revelatory word of the Other. One can, originarily, hear the 
meta-physical word of ethics. Liberatory, revolutionary, future-
oriented culture is practiced as the free love-of-justice ethos, as 
service, as an ana-lectic practice which is a response to the ana-
logical word.18 Henceforth, our exposition will be divided into 
three parts and will imply a pedagogics which is anti-Emile. In 
the first place, we will show the falsity of the idea that “it makes 
no difference whether (the child-the people: the student) has [a] 
mother and father,”19 since the child’s having a father–mother 
and a people’s culture is the originary fontanality of pedagogics. 
Second, we will also show the falsity of the claim that the teacher 
“is responsible for their (the students’) duties, (to) take charge 
of their rights…(and students must therefore) not obey anyone 
but myself (il ne doit obéir qu’à moi),” the teacher. Instead it is the 
teacher, as critical exteriority, that “obeys” the student. Third, the 
educative process is not exclusively conducive to the constitu-
tive magisterial I. Rather the educative practice is fulfilled from 
the student’s creativity (the active subject) and the incarnated 
criticality of a pedagogics of fecundity suffusing all the different 
grades of pedagogical-liberatory institutions. Let us examine 
each of these three aspects separately.
We must jettison two extremes before we begin. On one side, 
there is the defective pedagogical situation of the “enlightened 
intellectual” (the Rousseauian teacher) that teaches the masses 
the path to revolution. Such a teacher assumes a truth which 
may never be possessed by or in itself. On the other hand, the 
utopia of a community that can critically rule itself. This spon-
taneous illusion of the utopian community is manipulated by 
either the unscrupulous or the dreamers. Both, in one way or 
another, want to “use” the community. Every community needs 
the exteriority of teachers, but of course not every prophet is 
authentic. There are false prophets, mercenary sophists, “space 
cadets.” Overcoming this aporia — either vanguard intellectual-
18 See sections 29–31 in Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana. 
19 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, or On Education, trans. Allan Bloom (New 
York: Basic, 1954), 52–53.
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ism or a people’s culture that is self-reflexive — will demand that 
we briefly formulate the ana-lectic pedagogics of liberation.
The first step may be enunciated in the following way: the 
pedagogics of oppression as exteriority (area D in Figure 4). This 
topic was mentioned in chapter three of this book. The child, 
from the first oedipus, then the second oedipus in youth, the 
people as subject of the people’s culture — all speak their word. 
Their word says, if it is revealed by the Other as other: “I am 
a new history which you do not understand and cannot inter-
pret!” From its limited rationality, the child cannot protest if its 
words are not heard. On the other hand, its own words are ex-
pressed negatively, like a baby’s cry. It is easy to silence its voice 
with a challenge, with a scream, or with corporal punishment. 
But at the same time the child easily identifies himself with his 
father, represses the love for his mother, and enters the machista 
world of the reigning culture. The crisis is overcome with the 
son’s repression: the first filicide, but for which there is no testa-
ment other than the son’s primal frustration. 
The young man, on the other hand, from his adolescence, 
shouts as well but with more potency. Furthermore, he can use 
his long and youthful legs to run, his strong arms to hit, throw 
rocks, use weapons: this is the young people’s rebellion. He also 
shouts: “I am other! Different than my parents, different than 
the ancient generations past, than the reigning culture!” This 
is his word. What is the response? “These boys do not know 
what they want. What’s going on here is that they have not had 
to suffer yet. They must work in order to understand.” In other 
words: when these young people “function” within the system 
they will not make so much noise… But we ask: is not “func-
tioning” in the system repressing one’s authentic love for one’s 
father and a more just country for the people’s culture which 
today is oppressed and works for the Empire? Isn’t this a liv-
ing death? The young people’s rebellion which presented itself 
in more than fifty countries in 1968–1969, fifty years after the 
Reform of Córdoba (1918), is not a passing eruption of ir-
rationality. This rebellion is the unavoidable presence of the 
new against the aims of the reigning culture, the presence of 
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those who do not want to live a dying life in the system (death 
is totalization in “the Same”: the eternally repeating ontologi-
cal infusion of boredom without novelty). This global revo-
lution of the youth, in the United States and Europe,20 Asia,21 
20 See, among other publications, J. Sauvageot and D. Cohn Bendit, La ré-
volte étudiante: Les animateurs parlent (Paris: Seuil, 1968), 2: “They want 
the revolution, but they do not intend to carry it out in a political party. 
Capitalist society is the enemy. The bureaucratic apparatuses, the brakes.” It 
is a counter-rebellion, but not only “counter,” also in favor of a project they 
live and comprehend (like all meta-physical pro-jects) but that they cannot 
express: it is the new, it shall be overcome with a quasi-religious devotion. 
What is certain is that France trembled as a whole and, in fact, Gaullism 
itself could not recuperate. The second oedipus of the erotico-familiar situ-
ation (like a rebellion against a weak father and in crisis with the impossible 
identification with the political level (against a bureaucratic system, a new 
dominating father who, at the same time, is a hypocrite, hidden, split, and 
in crisis as well). See Klaus Allerbeck, Soziologie radikaler Studentenbewe-
gungen: Eine vergleichende Untersuchung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
und den Vereinigten Staaten (Berlin: Oldenburg, 1973), 246–63. The book by 
Alejandro Nieto, La Ideología Revolucionaria de los Estudiantes Europeos 
[The Revolutionary Ideology of European Students] (Barcelona: Ariel, 1971) 
is quite complete, and shows the variety of nationalities in the international 
student movement, the passage from immobilization to renewal, from re-
formism to revolution, with its supposed ideological foundations (negation 
of the universalist neutrality of science, teaching, the student-position, and 
opposition to dominating authority). It is possible to conclude that in the 
student movement, “triumph is not its function, (its function) is not the 
substitution of proletarian political parties, but rather to open a breach — as 
a vanguard —  in the system, through which others could enter later in 
greater force […]. And since a new opposition is expressed, an unedited 
opening, referring to themselves as new men, there is nothing particular 
about them employing a new language, a technique and new symbols” 
(160). This is called the “new left.”
21 The concept of cultural revolution is born in China. For Mao Tse-tung, the 
cultural revolution starts when “the workers, the students, and the new na-
tional bourgeoisie” propose a new anti-imperialist and anti-feudal (there-
fore anti-Confucian) culture, although it is still a bourgeois culture. Mao 
Tse-tung, “The May 4th Movement,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 
II (New York: Pergamon, 1977), 237–39. Only in 1966 will Mao send the 
youth (the “red guards”), supported by the army, to the “cleansing” of the 
Chinese communist party that would get “out of hand.” It was a tactical 
operation of recuperation. However, the “new Chinese left” went further 
and critiqued Mao himself. Its members were sent to the camps, from which 
they did not return nor will they return. Isn’t this a case of filicide as well? 
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Africa,22 and our own Latin America,23 shows us from its very 
Were the youth not used in a tactical moment but also strategically con-
demned?
22 In black Africa there is a struggle against metropolitan culture, principally 
French and English, but the youth movement will be naive when facing the 
dangers of neocolonial national culture. See Jean Pierre Ndiaye, La jeunesse 
africaine face à l’impérialisme (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1973). This book 
shows how in Senegal there was also real uprising among the youth in 1968, 
which repeated in 1969 while it did not repeat in France. Why this differ-
ence? “Senghor could not do what the French employers could, which was 
maintain the advantage of neocolonial exploitation” (88–89). The depend-
ent state’s neocolonial power cannot contribute solutions from the “center”: 
they are too expensive and what is more they suppose political and econom-
ic liberation. Thus, the student movements have continued in peripheral 
countries. Which is to say, “the economic situation in poor countries tends 
to deteriorate, while at the same time the general state of consciousness and 
education grows” (Renate Zahar, Colonialismo y Enajenación: Contribución 
a la Teoría Política de Frantz Fanon [Colonialism and Alienation: Contribu-
tion to the Political Theory of Frantz Fanon] [Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno, 1970], 
122), which is why we can deduce the growing upsurge of student conflicts 
in the Third World. Thus the anti-revolutionary war which imperialism 
wages tends to close the critical faculties of universities in the periphery: the 
human sciences, sociology (political conflict of dependence) and psychol-
ogy (discovery of the second oedipus and the socio-cultural applications of 
Freud).
23 See the study by Armand Mattelart and Michèle Mattelart, Juventud Chil-
ena: Rebeldía y Conformismo [Chilean Youth: Rebelling and Conform-
ing] (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1970), one developed from a sur-
vey — very unique for its genre. Reaching scientific conclusions about 
young students (poor, middle class, and rich), workers, employees, farmers, 
and marginalized groups in urban and rural areas, the study opens enor-
mous possibilities for philosophical reflection on the pedagogical. Consider 
the previous chart on Chile, 1969. The author deduces that the young uni-
versity student is positioned as “a privileged ideal” (317), such that “they fos-
ter a great number of personal and social dreams” (317). This youth which 
is “self-conscious,” yet still free of the “system,” is a threat to the patriarchal 
imperialist culture of the center and the managers of the periphery. Filicide 
is a boon to so many intelligence services (see the CIA’s plan for Latin Amer-
ican universities) as repressive forces (thus the case of Tlatelolco, critically 
theorized by Octavio Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude and Other Writings, 
trans. Lysander Kemp, Yara Milos, and Rachel Phillips Belash [New York: 
Grove Press, 1985], 320: “Tlatelolco is the counterpart, in terms of blood and 
sacrifice, of the petrification of the Institutional Revolutionary Party”); the 
PRI, the official party, the Latin American neocolonial State is the son’s cas-
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beginning a new pedagogical and historical fact in human his-
tory: a world culture brewing, global in its structure, which 
represses the young, those who have therefore not entered the 
system but must do so soon, and compels them to leave behind 
games for “serious” work. Their reaction is like someone being 
hauled off to jail or the electric chair, kicking and screaming in 
distress. This time of the student is the time when one has not 
yet accepted the approaching loss of the liberty existing before 
the system, the pre-historic goals of the functionary, bureaucrat, 
of the “honest” businessman, soldier, worker…
The people, in the end, make a more multitudinous clamor. 
Every political, economic, national, or social revolution is simul-
taneously a cultural revolution. To desire political, economic, or 
social independence is to desire at the same time the ability to 
speak one’s own language, pray to one’s own god, prop up one’s 
own heroes, use one’s own symbols… to live at the bosom of the 
people’s culture “of which and in which we were born and have 
been fed.”24 Folklorism, “rustic” interior design, the return of the 
trating father, the terrorizing father. Without any warning, the father–State 
assassinates the youth, the child, as if with vengeance: vengeance against his 
own castrating father, vengeance for being repressed in a frustrating system, 
creating the impossibility of letting the child be as Other, free, as a newness, 
as that which he could not be. Mattelart shows us that employed youth, 
on the other hand, have a “double tendency” towards “escapism and real-
ism” (pertaining to their position within popular culture); the young work-
ers “some of which might be considered pragmatists” (317). It is therefore 
necessary to differentiate among diverse kinds of youth. Among farmers, 
who are more oppressed, there are those with less consciousness of their op-
pression and those who have more consciousness of their oppression. This 
will let us understand the importance of the teacher/pro-phet, the critical 
teacher of liberation. Further, it is normal that when facing the pedagogi-
cal system the university student who is more critical is able to express the 
more challenging truths. His critique is the same critique that the small 
repressed child launches, the same critique as the employed bureaucrat, and 
the worker with clearly defined function.
24 “[P]arentes e patria, a quibus et in qua et nati et nutriti sumus” (Aquinas, 
The Summa Theologiae, q. 101): “(the principles of our being and govern-
ment) are our parents and our country, that have given us birth and nour-
ishment.” The people’s culture is simultaneously that of parents and country. 
(Aquinas, The Summa Theologiae, q. 101, a. 1).
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national mother tongue, the appreciation of local literature (the 
boom of Latin American literature), the dignified self-affirma-
tion of the Mestizo, Indio, the Black peoples of the Caribbean, 
are frequently secondary signs of the people’s exteriority and its 
expression, which pro-voke a new pedagogics. This expression 
is a clamorous one. The important thing is to hear it, and be-
come accustomed to hearing it. Essentially, it says “I’m hungry! 
I have my own history! Let me be dis-tinct! I do not want to be 
the object of missions, nor civilized education, nor pedagogical 
methods! Let me be! I have rights!”
The second step may be enunciated thusly: the liberatory 
teacher as critical exteriority (arrow f in Figure 4). The man who 
will be teacher or pro-phet (he who will speak critically “before” 
the system) starts as merely one more person. At least he does 
so as an integrated member of popular culture, when he is not 
starting with oligarchical or even imperial culture. But one day 
he hears the pedagogical voice of the Other (of the child, youth, 
the people). The ability to listen is already an entire conversion, 
a “death unto the quotidian.”25 The ability to establish a “face-to-
face” with the pedagogical poor is to put the system into ques-
tion, and to question oneself in the system. Thus, the school-
teacher’s ego of the anti-Emile does not demand obedience from 
the student, but rather demands obedience of himself as teacher 
to the disciple (ob-audire: listen to that which stands before me). 
This liberatory schoolteacher’s ego is the anti-Rousseauian, anti-
imperial and anti-bourgeois pact. The teacher is “bound, saving 
his obedience to his superiors…”26 The liberatory teacher of the 
future is led by the hand, blind and weak in the darkness of the 
new world (which is what the Other is in reality), by his son, 
the youth, the people. Only the confidence in their language 
guides him away from erring, mis-stepping from the path which 
brings him to the Other (arrow d of Figure 4). The disciple in-
25 See what we have said about this conversion, only in its ontological sense 
in Para una Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana, section 33, and in its 
metaphysical sense in section 37.
26 Aquinas, The Summa Theologiae, q. 104.
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dicates who he is to him “by signs,”27 through their relevant and 
revealing language. What the student is (the child, youth, the 
people) must be believed, “they believe its absence, yet see its 
presence”28: the Other as other is beyond the presence of things; 
it is meta-physical, the incomprehensible which does not re-
veal itself. In my world its face is present, but the mystery of 
its new-history-other is absent. Ob-edience to the Other’s voice, 
and the con-fidence in that which reveals, is the point of depar-
ture of the authentic magisterial ego, the real: he who will edu-
cate. The student’s pro-vocative or questioning word con-verts 
(makes convergent) the simple father or citizen into a teacher. 
This teacher is not born into Rousseau’s pedagogical pact, with 
its demands for obedience. This teacher is born when someone, 
whomever, ob-eys and con-fides in the voice of the person ask-
ing for service; the person asking for something needed. The 
teacher will be one who serves, and thus is born as the one who 
listens to the alterative novelty of the Other.
The voice of the other is ex-igent, peremptorily calling for 
liberatory work. Before anything else, to be capable of serving 
and doing this work, it is necessary to coexist together and to be 
able to communicate. Inability to communicate in a face-to-face, 
the initial respective relation, must be lived in communication,29 
27 “And thus, through the instrumentality, as it were, of what is told him, the 
natural reason of the pupil arrives at a knowledge of the things which he 
did not know” (Tomás de Aquina, “Quaestiones disputatae [Cuestiones dis-
putadas],” De Magistro [Torino: Marietti, 1964]). English: Thomas Aquinas, 
Truth, Vol. II, trans. James V. McGlynn (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Co., 1994), 83.
28 “We believe that which is absent, but we see that which is present […]. So, 
for us, the arguments for matters of faith are unknown” (ibid., 298). Revisit 
what we have said about anthropological faith in section 31 of Para una 
Ética de la Liberación Latinoamericana.
29 The face-to-face encounter is an originary situation of non-communica-
tion-yet, which should not be confused with the lack of communication 
between members of the Totality (see Carlos Castilla del Pino, La Incomuni-
cación [Miscommunication] [Barcelona: Editorial Peninsula, 1970]), where 
the totalizing modes of incommunication are exposed: everyday incom-
munication, boredom, routine, fetishism, reification, etc. (69). The kind of 
“communication” we are talking about here is one which analectically over-
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in conviviality.30 Communication is to assume the oppression 
of the oppressed, to live-with, to suffer-with. The teacher of the 
future is formed here. Overcoming learned theory, irreal theory, 
moving towards that theory born at the breast of the people and 
history itself, real theory, is to arrive in militancy,31 in the con-
crete commitment where revelation of the Other (child, youth, 
the people) brings the future teacher to the praxis of what is 
believed, but not yet interpreted adequately. He risks himself 
through the Other as other. Thus, little by little, the other be-
comes. Thus he goes beyond the horizon of his world and liber-
ates himself from being a functional “part” of the system and 
emerges in exteriority (area D of Figure 4). The militant com-
mitment, an adequate meta-physical place, the hermeneutical 
place par excellence (poverty of the historical-real), has permit-
ted the future teacher to grow in self-consciousness, perhaps 
an intellectual critic, perhaps a revolutionary, perhaps more: a 
liberator.32 The pro-phet, the teacher properly speaking, is he 
comes its relevant horizon, to con-verge with the Other in a new moment of 
“us.” Young people have difficulties in owning such a moment of authentic 
communication with the world of the system.
30 A notion which Illich uses in many of his aforementioned texts. To over-
come mere “community” (to become common) by living-together (with-
living as a supreme human good): conviviality.
31 The argentine philosopher Osvaldo Ardiles works with this fecund notion 
when describing the exercise of philosophy and also teaching in general. 
The “militant” is someone who, immersed in praxis, discovers the need for 
a real “theory.” Jurgen Habermas, citing Lukacs, notes in Theorie und Praxis 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971), 52, that “the organization is the form of me-
diation between theory and praxis.” If this is societally true, then the media-
tion is produced in the “militant,” who is the base of the organization and its 
creator.
32 The leader of the Chinese revolution proposes to us a new model of the 
teacher: “People engaged in revolutionary cultural work are the command-
ers at various levels on this cultural front […]. A revolutionary cultural 
worker who is not close to the people is a commander without an army, 
whose fire-power cannot bring the enemy down […]. To attain this objec-
tive, written Chinese must be reformed, given the requisite conditions, and 
our spoken language brought closer to that of the people, for the people, it 
must be stressed, are the inexhaustible source of our revolutionary culture. 
A national, scientific and mass culture — such is the anti-imperialist and 
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who will begin his pedagogical task and comes forth only from 
exteriority, from outside, in precarity, persecution, isolation; the 
desert.
The praxis of a pedagogics of liberation (avodah in Hebrew, 
service) is precision in speech, unequivocating speech, dis-
cernment, it is the “judge of the Totality,” the “criterion that 
de-stroys.” The teacher outside the system (area D) cuts with a 
double-edged sword (arrow f in Figure 4). The teacher’s ethos 
is tremendous from that moment on: if uncritical, he dies as 
a teacher; and if he lives as a teacher he runs the continuous 
risk of being the object of persecution, physical violence, factical 
annihilation, death itself. His death as a teacher is the betrayal 
to the child’s word, the language of youth and the people. His 
death as testimony of this word, however, is martyrdom, heroic, 
the humanely supreme death, greater even than the death of the 
hero fighting for equality in his country. The teacher dies for 
the weakest, those who can neither defend nor avenge him. The 
country’s hero dies for the present; the teacher dies for the fu-
ture, for the ad-vent. Therefore, the ethos of school-teaching is 
the fontanic fecundity of veracity.
Veractiy is not only truth as dis-covery. Veracity is not only 
speaking truth. It is wanting to speak the truth to those who, 
in apprehending it, liberate themselves. Thus veracity includes 
the risk of ideological concealment. It requires a courage which 
dissolves the fear of speaking an erotic, pedagogic, and politi-
cal truth which opposes the system. Veracity is a moment of 
justice,33 giving the student that to which he corresponds as a 
anti-feudal culture of the people, the culture of New Democracy, the new 
culture of the Chinese nation” (Mao Tse-tung, “On New Democracy,” in 
Selected Works, vol. II [Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967], 339–84, at 
382). This is what Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 68, would tell 
us: “The only effective instrument is a humanizing pedagogy in which the 
revolutionary leadership establishes a permanent relationship of dialogue 
with the oppressed.” Without this spontaneous “theory,” demagoguery or 
counter-revolution would devise its pro-ject of historical liberation. This is 
Gramsci’s position, “the organic intellectual.”
33 Aquinas demonstrates “truth as virtue.” He indicates that “[t]he first of vir-
tues is faith, whose object is truth,” but “[t]here are two ways of declining 
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new and future human. The teacher that teaches the “truth” of 
the reigning system, the concealed meaning of things from the 
predominant and perverse pro-ject, neither teaches truth nor 
is truthful in doing so. In reality he is the sage of the system, 
charged by the dominators to deceive children, youth, and the 
community so that they accept the system as natural, eternal, 
and sacred. On the contrary, he who professes, as his profession, 
to be a pro-phet or teacher, he who, as his ethos, demystifies that 
which the system pretends to conceal, he who has being-in-the-
truth of the Other in order to permit the Other to be itself, other 
than the system, as his pro-ject — this person will be an incor-
ruptible critic. It is from sacred devotion that inspires, for his 
student,34 an endearing love greater than any other love. Loss 
from the truth to that which is less. First, by affirming, as when a man does 
not show the whole good that is in him, for instance science, holiness and so 
forth. This is done without prejudice to truth, since the lesser is contained 
in the greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to what is less. (And this is 
part of justice because it is directed to another (ad alterum), since the mani-
festation, which we have stated to be an act of truth, is directed to another 
(altei manifestat)” (Aquinas, The Summa Theologiae, q. 109).
34 Traditional thinking would demand pious child or filial love from the father 
(ibid.): “[W]herefore just as it belongs to religion to give worship to God, so 
does it belong to piety, in the second place, to give worship to one’s parents 
and one’s country,” there is little or no mention of the virtues of the father-
teacher viz. the child. Therefore, as sacred Other, we can apply this idea in 
its strict sense though [with] anthropological relations with respect to the 
sacred. If there is a cult with one’s parents (mine) and country (mine), then 
to what extent is a relation with the other as Other impossible to create? The 
teacher must maintain a religion (anthropological religion) for the student 
(ibid., q. 81), for the “poor.” At the same time it must be consecrated in its 
service [“Devotion is derived from ‘devote’ (The Latin ‘devovere’ means ‘to 
vow’)[…]. Therefore devotion is a special act of the will,” ibid., q. 82]. This 
sacred devotion that the teacher has for his students moves him to a perma-
nent disposition and service without yielding in truth until death, if neces-
sary. This explains the death of Socrates, and anthropologically the crucifix-
ion of the rabbi (teacher) of Galilee. Essentially the teacher cannot obligate 
the student through physical coercion, but rather insinuations, conviction; 
thus one must ask them, beg them (ibid., q. 83), to accept our plea to “be the 
same.” Further, the teacher must “place” signs of his fidelity, must sacrifice 
himself as a testimony (ibid., q. 85), must know to offer his own life (ibid., 
q. 86), with a firm and unending will (ibid., q. 88). In its essence, the Rous-
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of life through fidelity to the student is more bearable for the 
authentic teacher than that loss of life-meaning he betrays with 
students, those who confide in him, when teaching within the 
system.
However, the teacher does not leave aside precision, de-
mands, and discipline when it comes to the child, youth, and 
community. On the contrary, with renewed zeal he tries to fight 
the worst things students have within themselves: the introjec-
tion of the system in which negativity lives as oppression, but 
that in reality is the desire to dominate with those who domi-
nate, to possess the system’s values (area C in Figure 4). This 
discernment prevents the authentic teacher from falling prey to 
easy demagoguery, staying true to justice and the hard path of 
liberation. An immense fortitude which must be communicated 
to the student — is necessary to head up the educative process of 
liberation. As has been said, to discern the worst (what has been 
introjected through the system) from the best (exteriority D) is 
the essential task of the teacher. This is therefore rough work, 
difficult work, which demands firm judgement and a theory 
which is both real and clear.
The third step may be enunciated thusly: the educative pro-
cess, by definition, negates the introjection of the system (de-
struction) and affirmatively con-structs exteriority through ana-
lectic praxis of liberation, in the permanent creative-innovative 
unity of teacher–student. There is no longer a pure magisterial 
ego that teaches (educator) and an orphanic entity that is edu-
cated (student). He who will be taught first teaches the one who 
will be his teacher; he is a teacher who teaches the student to 
critique that which is, that which the teacher himself learned as 
a disciple. What the teacher teaches is now returned by the stu-
dent through objection, critique, question, derivation, proposal, 
innovation, etc. The teacher thus learns continuously from the 
student; the student continually teaches. The relation is not a 
seauian or anti-Sarmientian “pact” is a teacher’s oath to consecrate (ibid., q. 
89) the student’s obedience in order to free the student, a freedom mediated 
through critical service.
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dominating dia-lectic but rather a liberatory ana-lectic. As an 
example, we see several oppositions in both attitudes:
Dominating dia-lectic versus Liberatory ana-lectic
Conquistador’s attitude versus Co-laborator’s attitude
Divisive attitude versus Convergent attitude
Demobilizing attitude versus Mobilizing attitude
Manipulative attitude versus Organizing attitude
Attitude of cultural 
invasion
versus Creative attitude35
Cultural liberation is an action with enormous innovative 
wealth. The con-structing subject of “the new” (in the child his 
character matched to his exteriority; in the young professional 
his job in a just society; in the community, the realization of its 
people’s national culture) is the student himself. What happens is 
that, to con-struct he must first dis-arm what the system impos-
es (not just what it “puts in place”). This dis-arming moment is 
what has been called assumptive “de-struction.” Which is to say, 
the mode of expression necessary to negate the negation pro-
duced by the pedagogy of domination of the child, young per-
son, and community. In effect, pedagogical dominance (from 
home, school, university, science and technology, mass media; 
whether it originates from empire, national oligarchy, etc.), 
tends to “conquer” converts, members, and puppets whom, by 
their numbers and passivity, give mass to the establishment’s 
power. To conquer the Other it is necessary to “divide them,” 
separate them, make each person into an island, and prohibit 
them from forming a group consciousness, whether that be 
class consciousness or community consciousness. Divisionism 
makes it impossible to “mobilize,” to conjure a certain reflection 
at the base, a pedagogical praxis; tactical action that opens stra-




tegic comprehension of the critical problematic. Demobilization 
manipulates every member of popular culture whether through 
propaganda, using undeclared purposes, bribery, terror, intimi-
dation, etc. All these are imperial and national-oligarchical “cul-
tural invasions” against the people’s culture. These attitudes are 
dia-lectical dominators because they simply include the Other 
in the system and introject the Other in the reigning culture 
(area C in Figure 4). This dominating introjection of “the Same” 
is the alienation of the other, the child, youth, and community. 
The father’s authoritative force, school bureaucracy, is total bu-
reaucracy (as Marcuse would say). Even “life-long education,” in 
this case, is nothing other than the system’s pretension to pro-
long an alienating era of student manipulation, separating the 
educated person from the people’s educational institutions in 
order to totally absorb him in a schooling that would never end 
(of course it is possible in peripheral countries for the high cost 
of this useless bureaucratization would mean).
On the contrary, pedagogical liberation is conscious that the 
teacher is only a pro-creative subject, a maker of fecundity in 
the educational process, from his critical exteriority. He will 
not pretend he has no influence on his students like Socrates 
or the preceptor of the Emile. On the contrary, he will point out 
the student’s creative positionality and will give him a reflective 
consciousness about what he adds to the educational process, 
permitting the disciple thus to be critical of the critical teacher. 
However, the only way to move the student along is to give him 
something missing from his education: liberatory critique as 
method. But in order for that critique to not become dominat-
ing one must warn the student how he can exercise the critique 
himself. One must “put everything on the table” so the student 
knows what he is getting into.
The critical teacher co-laborates in the process. First, by 
pointing out what the system has introjected (area C). This in-
trojection is a negation of the student’s exteriority, however, it 
is also a devaluation that must not simply annihilate, but also 
overtakes: it is an assumptive negation. In this way he will know 
the system, he will be able to expropriate what is convenient so 
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that he will not have to “reinvent the wheel.” Only someone who 
knows the “system” very well (and thus could become an op-
pressor within it) can exercise this practico-theoretical discern-
ment, this systematic existential hermeneutic.
The disciple con-verges thus with his fellow students, through 
exteriority, to re-cognize their proper values (those of the new 
child, the dis-tinct generation as youth, the people’s authentic 
culture). But this convergence must be mobilizing. This is to say, 
it must be able to exercise a certain educative praxis, wherein 
the risk of their novel exteriorization comes along with con-
sciousness of their destiny. Thus the active subject surges forth, 
a creator, con-structor of the new order. Starting with his real 
situation he will be able to apprehend how to build his new 
world. If always taught a mythical, distant, irreal world he will 
never be able to grow within reality. The child must discover 
the hydrology of his community’s water system; his father’s and 
grandfather’s histories; language in his infantile speech. Young 
people must discover the reality of the world from their local 
reality, its economics and politics. The community must gain a 
critical consciousness of their situation in terms of class, group, 
and region from within that same quotidian world. Thus Paulo 
Freire indicates that it is essential for “education as the prac-
tice of freedom” to include group reflection with total simplic-
ity “las situaciones existenciales que posibilitan la comprensión 
del concepto de cultura.”36 Going forward from the discovery of 
their reality the student must organize and act, must structure 
their praxis, share responsibilities, and, using their theory, make 
an illuminating moment for their life in common with others.
36 Paulo Freire, La Educación como Práctica de la Libertad [Education as the 
Practice of Freedom] (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno, 1970), 151–79. Freire 
proposes ten situations, that permit the man of the community, by using 
pictures and photographs of his everyday life — life in the neighborhood, 
town or place — to discover the real structures in which he lives but had not 
noticed. From here emerge: “the 17 selected words generated from the lexi-
cal universe” of the student ( 173). These must be the synthesis of their lives, 
be it cultural, economic, political, familial; in them they must discover their 
distinct exteriority. Liberation starts from their exteriority.
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Negating the introjected, de-stroying it assumptively, is what 
the subject as con-structor must realize in their creative work. 
So commences the cultural revolution in a privileged moment of 
revolutionary culture. This is a euphoric moment, a profoundly 
expressive happiness. In the neocolonial era it is the enthusiasm 
which the heroes of the nineteenth century showed for build-
ing a new emancipated society. It is the happiness from which 
“lo facundico” (as Saul Taborda says of Argentina: the people’s 
culture of the oppressed in our nations, the provinces, counties, 
regions in the countryside or marginalized areas) erupts as new 
aesthetic. The face of the Indian, Mestizo, worker, woman, child, 
young person, the face of danger and fear is now seen as hope 
and beauty: from these arise the future and a new homeland.
To liberate themselves pedagogically, the oppressed (the 
child of filicide, youth and the community of plebicide), must 
discover step by step the new con-structive institutions of the 
new order. These anti-bureaucratic institutions must be born 
from below, from the base, from the community. Discovering 
thus, in an immediate way, mediations eliminated by domina-
tion of the “systems” that were built to oppress.37 Between the 
looming professor and the intimidated student, between the 
super-specialized doctor at some high scientific level and a sick 
person’s common cold there are no intermediary pedagogical 
moments: these have been eliminated. Thus, for example, the 
cultural worker (as an extended version of the educational sys-
tem beyond the absorptive and bureaucratic “school system”) 
from every block and neighborhood, every rural region, does 
not need all the schoolteachers’ and professors’ “knowledge” ac-
credited by a diploma. He can teach not only reading and writ-
ing, but can also foster critical consciousness. The people’s medi-
cal workers (one in every hundred people in China)38 permit a 
37 See what has been said about the “systems” in section 51 of Para una Ética de 
la Liberación Latinoamericana, like, for example the “school system” or the 
“health system.”
38 See the works of Illich, especially, Limits to Medicine: Medical Nemesis, the 
Expropriation of Health (London: Marion Boyars, 2000), and Deschooling 
Society (London: Marion Boyars, 1996), the section on “General Character-
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postponement of consultations with university doctors who at-
tend only extreme cases. In this way the community takes on its 
own culture, its own health, and transportation, supplying for 
itself its own services rather than those monstrous bureaucratic 
“services” (which, at the end of the day, exploit taxes and do not 
provide utility). The cultural worker or people’s medic, further, 
remain at the breast of the community for other jobs (shoemaker, 
bread baker, etc.), which is a much more integrated moment of 
theory-praxis, and responds better to the needs of the people’s 
culture. The community regains thus not merely the use and 
passive learning of their culture; the community regains crea-
tion and construction of its own culture, but even further: they 
regain control of their own history.
The “systems” of schooling, university, science and technol-
ogy, and mass media must be redefined at the service of the peo-
ple’s culture. The community must not only participate in these, 
they must also be in control of them by the mediations of the 
militant revolutionaries from within their own culture. Peru’s 
organic educational law, for example, tells us that “reformed 
education has at its essence the achievement of a new man in a 
new society. This implies the task of creating original conditions 
for the emergence of new personal and social behaviors — be-
haviors that are authentically human — and, therefore, are not 
subject to historical deformations produced by underdeveloped 
societies and opulent societies, both ruled by money-making, 
repression and aggression.”39 The new system is called the “nu-
clear educative model” and includes an adequate distribution 
of pedagogical services which it might call the “national educa-
tional space.”40 This permits a greater participation on the part 
of the community in taking on its own education by constituting 
“teaching communities” throughout the country, which among 
other things lowers costs. Notably, few mention how teachers 
istics of New Formal Educational Institutions,” 108–11, where the reader will 
find norms for a rethinking of new deschooled mediations.
39 Reform Commission, “Reforma de la Educación Peruana: Informe Gen-




trained without theory are better-adapted to meet the people’s 
needs. In this sense reform has not yet reached the base. There 
is, therefore, an interesting “graduate civil service” (of universi-
ties, colleges, etc.) in which those who leave devote a certain 
amount of time in service to the people’s education.41
The ethos of the child, of the youth, and of the community in 
the process of their cultural liberation can only be discovered 
when there are authentic teachers who have extreme fidelity in 
the veneration of their disciples. For them, the student may feel 
admiration and respect. For them, there is what classicists call 
pietas, which is not “piety” but rather grateful reverence, a love-
of-pedagogue, love to he who comes to give the security of an 
“ego ideal” which lacks the introjected father of the contradicto-
ry, dominating, and immoral system. The teacher can be an ob-
ject of worship when those who hold similar positions (such as 
the father and the dependent neocolonial State) betray the child, 
youth, and community.42 In liberation, on the other hand, the 
father in the home, the teacher in the pedagogical system and 
the independent State permit the child to develop their altera-
tive, meta-physical, and dis-tinct possibilities in a creative way.
The praxis of pedagogical liberation, therefore, permits the 
teacher-disciple relation to grow mutually and become a broth-
erly relation in a fraternal politics (the object of section IX of 
Para una Ética). The erotic position of husband-wife gives way 
to the pedagogical position of the parents–child; then this posi-
tion gives way to a Latin American politics, adult-to-adult rela-
tionships in a fraternal community.
The pedagogical is meta-physical fidelity, that of the child, 
but it is Latin American, about which the poet says well “when I 
41 Ibid., 179. There are in Latin America diverse experiences that must be tak-
en into account: like the literacy campaign in Cuba, the Costa Rican educa-
tional system, and the old work institutes in Argentina between 1948–1955.
42 Aquinas indicates that the pious are concerned with worship of parents and 
country (Aquinas, De Veritate, 294). [Translator: We were unable to find the 
precise edition cited by Dussel.]
189
The Morality of Liberatory Pedagogical Praxis
came into this world, / no one was expecting me”43 or, perhaps, 
our mother, Amerindian, would wish for us a more promising 
future than history held for her. In a book by Carlos Fuentes, 
Cortes’s Indian lover would say the following:
They kneel, moaning; crying; embracing; Marina screams.
Marina: Oh, come out now, my son, come out, come out, 
come out between my legs… come out, son of a bitch… my 
son, whom I adore, come out… fall on this land that is neither 
mine nor your father’s, but yours… come out, child of two en-
emy bloodlines… come out, my son, to recover your ruined 
earth… founded on permanent crime and fugitive dreams,…
see if you can take back your land and your dreams, my son, 
my white and brown son; see if you can wash all the blood 
from the pyramids and swords and stained crosses standing 
like the terrible and greedy fingers of your land, come out 
upon your land… son of the morning… . There are too many 
white men in command and they all want the same thing: 
the blood, work, and backsides of dark men… You must fight 
against everyone, and your fight will be sad because you will 
struggle against your own blood. […Therefore] you are my 
unique heritage, the heritage of Malintzin, the goddess, of 
Marina, the bitch, of Malinche, the mother.
Coro: Malintzin, Malintzin, Malintzin; Marina, Marina, Ma-
rina; Malinche, Malinche, Malinche…
Marina: (shouting)… (Pause). You, my son, you will be my 
triumph; the woman’s triumph.
Coro: Malinxochitl, goddess of sunrise… Tonantzin, Guada-
lupe, mother… 44
43 Nicolás Guillén, “Cuando yo vine / a este mundo” [“When I came / to this 
world”], in El Son Entero [The Complete Sound] (Buenos Aires: Losada, 
1968), 66.
44 Carlos Fuentes, “Todos los Gatos son Pardos” [“All Cats are Brown”], in 
Los Reinos Originarios [The Original Kingdoms] (Paris: French & European 
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